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Bulletin of the American Physical Society

DIGIT-PHYSICS: Digits Are Bosons Are Quanta Because (On Average) Quanta and Bosons Are and Always Were Digits!!!;Contra Wigner, ``On the Unreasonable Effectiveness of \textbf{\textit{Physics in}} Mathematics!''; Do Physics-NECESSARY-Averages Equal or VS. DIGITS-Log-LawS(!!!) Averages???

Hermon Chernoff, Edward Carl-Ludwig Siegel, Marvin Antonoff, Adolph Smith, Frederic Young

Published Mar 19, 2013• 0 citations
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DIGIT-PHYSICS: Digits Are Bosons Are Quanta Because (On Average) Quanta and Bosons Are and Always Were Digits!!! DIGITS?: For a Very Long Time Giving Us All The FINGER!!!

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Bulletin of the American Physical Society•Mar 4, 2015•0 citations

MATHEMATICAL MODELS AND PHYSICAL REALITY FROM CLASSICAL TO QUANTUM PHYSICS

Arcangelo Rossi

The concept of physical object in twentieth century's physical theories (relativity and quanta) turns from intuitive-substantial to formal-functional, that is to a relatively invariable properties system well beyond the intuitive properties “carrier” typical of classical physics (CP). Anyway, the autonomous heuristic fecundity of this formal mathematical model neither was fully shown before the twentieth century nor, moreover, is independent of the properties it correlates. In quantum mechanics (QM) the turn to such purely functional correlation, which is nevertheless irreducible to mere information related to measurements, is historically evidenced by the fact that the formalization of the theory as an operator calculus in Hilbert space came before its physical interpretation. Dirac, moreover, asserted the irreducibility of quantum properties to mere measurements, just because this simply pragmatic reduction is poor and ambiguous in front of a mathematical formulation of linguistically expressible (even though not always experimentally decidable) properties. Neither a falsificationist interpretation of scientific theories, which makes them empirically decidable even though irreducible to mere instrumental theories, fits the purpose. It is then safer, and in better agreement with historical testimony, to admit not only the existence of properties which are measurable and reducible to instrumental operations, or at least falsifiable, but also the existence of properties which are physically inaccessible or empirically untestable, since properties of this kind are described and fruitfully implied by the mathematical model.

Conference on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics: Historical Analysis and Open Questions•Jun 1, 2006•0 citations

``Quantum-Computing''(Q-C) = Simple-Arithmetic Since Digits = Quanta/Bosons Via Algebraic-INVERSION 1881(<1901-05-25) of Digits On-Average Logarithmic-Law = ONLY BEQS!!!

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Bulletin of the American Physical Society•Mar 22, 2011•0 citations

Quanta, Physicists, and Probabilities ... ?

Elemér Elad Rosinger

There seems to be nothing short of a {\it double whammy} hitting the users of probability, and among them physicists, especially those involved in the foundations of quanta. First is the instant instinctual reaction that phenomena which interest one do sharply and clearly divide into the {\it dichotomy} of {\it two and only two} alternatives of being {\it either} ``deterministic", {\it or} on the contrary, being ``probabilistic". However, there is also a second, prior and yet deeper trouble, namely, the ``probabilistic" case is strongly believed to be equally clear and well-founded as is the ``deterministic" one. And the only difference seen between the two is that the latter can talk also about ``individual" phenomena, while the former can only do so about large enough ``ensembles" for which, however, it is believed to be equally clear, precise and rigorous with the ``deterministic" approach. Or briefly, ``probabilistic'' is seen as nothing else but the ``deterministic'' on the level of ``ensembles" ... \\The fact, however, is that there is a {\it deep gap} between the empirical world of ``random" phenomena, and on the other hand, theories of ``probability". Furthermore, any attempt to bridge that gap does inevitably involve {\it infinity}, thus aggravating the situation to the extent that even today, and even if not quite realized by many, theories of ``probabilities" have a {\it shaky} foundation. \\This paper tries to bring to the awareness of various users of ``probabilities", and among them, to physicists involved in quanta, the fact that - seemingly unknown to them - they are self-inflicted victims of the mentioned double whammy. \\ \\

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Reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics

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Is mathematics the only language of science? Is there an equation for the observer? If not, can science ignore observer as unscientific. Was Wigner right when he talked about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics? Was Godel's incompleteness theorem based on natural mathematics? What is the basis of number theory? If we re-envision classical and quantum observations as macroscopic overlap of quantum effects, we may solve most problems. The physics community blindly accepts rigid, linear ideas about the nature of space, time, dimension, etc. These theories provide conceptual convenience and attractive simplicity for pattern analysis, but at the cost of ignoring equally-plausible alternative interpretations of observed phenomena that could possibly have explained the universe better.

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Applied mathematics/Applied Mathematics. A Journal of Chinese Universities/Gao-xiao yingyong shuxue xuebao•Jan 1, 2018•0 citations
The concept of physical object in twentieth century's physical theories (relativity and quanta) turns from intuitive-substantial to formal-functional, that is to a relatively invariable properties system well beyond the intuitive properties “carrier” typical of classical physics (CP). Anyway, the autonomous heuristic fecundity of this formal mathematical model neither was fully shown before the twentieth century nor, moreover, is independent of the properties it correlates. In quantum mechanics (QM) the turn to such purely functional correlation, which is nevertheless irreducible to mere information related to measurements, is historically evidenced by the fact that the formalization of the theory as an operator calculus in Hilbert space came before its physical interpretation. Dirac, moreover, asserted the irreducibility of quantum properties to mere measurements, just because this simply pragmatic reduction is poor and ambiguous in front of a mathematical formulation of linguistically expressible (even though not always experimentally decidable) properties. Neither a falsificationist interpretation of scientific theories, which makes them empirically decidable even though irreducible to mere instrumental theories, fits the purpose. It is then safer, and in better agreement with historical testimony, to admit not only the existence of properties which are measurable and reducible to instrumental operations, or at least falsifiable, but also the existence of properties which are physically inaccessible or empirically untestable, since properties of this kind are described and fruitfully implied by the mathematical model.
There seems to be nothing short of a {\it double whammy} hitting the users of probability, and among them physicists, especially those involved in the foundations of quanta. First is the instant instinctual reaction that phenomena which interest one do sharply and clearly divide into the {\it dichotomy} of {\it two and only two} alternatives of being {\it either} ``deterministic", {\it or} on the contrary, being ``probabilistic". However, there is also a second, prior and yet deeper trouble, namely, the ``probabilistic" case is strongly believed to be equally clear and well-founded as is the ``deterministic" one. And the only difference seen between the two is that the latter can talk also about ``individual" phenomena, while the former can only do so about large enough ``ensembles" for which, however, it is believed to be equally clear, precise and rigorous with the ``deterministic" approach. Or briefly, ``probabilistic'' is seen as nothing else but the ``deterministic'' on the level of ``ensembles" ... \\The fact, however, is that there is a {\it deep gap} between the empirical world of ``random" phenomena, and on the other hand, theories of ``probability". Furthermore, any attempt to bridge that gap does inevitably involve {\it infinity}, thus aggravating the situation to the extent that even today, and even if not quite realized by many, theories of ``probabilities" have a {\it shaky} foundation. \\This paper tries to bring to the awareness of various users of ``probabilities", and among them, to physicists involved in quanta, the fact that - seemingly unknown to them - they are self-inflicted victims of the mentioned double whammy. \\ \\
Is mathematics the only language of science? Is there an equation for the observer? If not, can science ignore observer as unscientific. Was Wigner right when he talked about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics? Was Godel's incompleteness theorem based on natural mathematics? What is the basis of number theory? If we re-envision classical and quantum observations as macroscopic overlap of quantum effects, we may solve most problems. The physics community blindly accepts rigid, linear ideas about the nature of space, time, dimension, etc. These theories provide conceptual convenience and attractive simplicity for pattern analysis, but at the cost of ignoring equally-plausible alternative interpretations of observed phenomena that could possibly have explained the universe better.