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arXiv:0707.0401 · American Journal of Physics

John S. Bell’s concept of local causality

Travis Norsen

Published Nov 29, 2011• 157 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

John Stewart Bell’s famous theorem is widely regarded as one of the most important developments in the foundations of physics. Yet even as we approach the 50th anniversary of Bell’s discovery, its meaning and implications remain controversial. Many workers assert that Bell’s theorem refutes the possibility suggested by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) of supplementing ordinary quantum theory with “hidden” variables that might restore determinism and/or some notion of an observer-independent reality. But Bell himself interpreted the theorem very differently—as establishing an “essential conflict” between the well-tested empirical predictions of quantum theory and relativistic local causality. Our goal is to make Bell’s own views more widely known and to explain Bell’s little-known formulation of the concept of relativistic local causality on which his theorem rests. We also show precisely how Bell’s formulation of local causality can be used to derive an empirically testable Bell-type inequality and to recapitulate the EPR argument.

DOI
10.1119/1.3630940

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John Stewart Bell’s famous theorem is widely regarded as one of the most important developments in the foundations of physics. Yet even as we approach the 50th anniversary of Bell’s discovery, its meaning and implications remain controversial. Many workers assert that Bell’s theorem refutes the possibility suggested by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) of supplementing ordinary quantum theory with “hidden” variables that might restore determinism and/or some notion of an observer-independent reality. But Bell himself interpreted the theorem very differently—as establishing an “essential conflict” between the well-tested empirical predictions of quantum theory and relativistic local causality. Our goal is to make Bell’s own views more widely known and to explain Bell’s little-known formulation of the concept of relativistic local causality on which his theorem rests. We also show precisely how Bell’s formulation of local causality can be used to derive an empirically testable Bell-type inequality and to recapitulate the EPR argument.
J.S. Bell believed that his famous theorem entailed a deep and troubling conflict between the empirically verified predictions of quantum theory and the notion of local causality that is motivated by relativity theory. Yet many physicists continue to accept, usually on the reports of textbook writers and other commentators, that Bell's own view was wrong, and that, in fact, the theorem only brings out a conflict with determinism or the hidden-variables program or realism or some other such principle that (unlike local causality), allegedly, nobody should have believed anyway. (Moreover, typically such beliefs arise without the person in question even being aware that the view they are accepting differs so radically from Bell's own.) Here we try to shed some light on the situation by focusing on the concept of local causality that is the heart of Bell's theorem, and, in particular, by contrasting Bell's own understanding with the analysis of Jon Jarrett which has been the most influential source, in recent decades, for the kinds of claims mentioned previously. We point out a crucial difference between Jarrett's and Bell's own understanding of Bell's formulation of local causality, which turns out to be the basis for the erroneous claim, made by Jarrett and many others, that Bell misunderstood the implications of his own theorem.
J.S. Bell's remarkable 1964 theorem showed that any theory sharing the empirical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics would have to exhibit a surprising – and, from the point of view of relativity theory, very troubling – kind of nonlocality. Unfortunately, even still on this 50th anniversary, many commentators and textbook authors continue to misrepresent Bell's theorem. In particular, one continues to hear the claim that Bell's result leaves open the option of concluding either nonlocality or the failure of some unorthodox “hidden variable” (or “determinism” or “realism”) premise. This mistaken claim is often based on a failure to appreciate the role of the earlier 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in Bell's reasoning. After briefly reviewing this situation, I turn to two alternative versions of quantum theory – the “many worlds” theory of Everett and the quantum Bayesian interpretation of Fuchs, Schack, Caves, and Mermin – that purport to provide actual counterexamples to Bell's claim that nonlocality is required to account for the empirically verified quantum predictions. After analyzing each theory's grounds for claiming to explain the EPR–Bell correlations locally, however, one can see that (despite a number of fundamental differences) the two theories share a common for-all-practical-purposes (FAPP) solipsistic character. This dramatically undermines such theories’ claims to provide a local explanation of the correlations and thus, by concretizing the ridiculous philosophical lengths to which one must go to elude Bell's own conclusion, reinforces the assertion that nonlocality really is required to coherently explain the empirical data. Introduction Fifty years ago, in 1964 [1], John Stewart Bell first proved the theorem that has become widely known as “Bell's Theorem” but that Bell himself instead referred to as the “locality inequality theorem” [2]. In Bell's own view, the theorem showed that the empirical predictions of local theories will be constrained by Bell's inequality (or as Bell himself preferred to call it, the “locality inequality”). Hence, nonlocality is a necessary feature of any theory that shares the empirical predictions of standard quantum mechanics.
In papers published in the 25 years following his famous 1964 proof, John Bell refined and reformulated his views on locality and causality. Although his formulations of local causality were in terms of probability, he had little to say about that notion. But assumptions about probability are implicit in his arguments and conclusions. Probability does not conform to these assumptions when quantum mechanics is applied to account for the particular correlations Bell argues are locally inexplicable. This account involves no superluminal action and there is even a sense in which it is local, but it is in tension with the requirement that the direct causes and effects of events be nearby. Introduction I never met John Bell, but his writings have supplied me with a continual source of new insights as I read and reread them over 40 years. As I worked toward a rather different understanding of quantum mechanics he was foremost in my mind as a severe but honest critic of such attempts. We all would love to know what Einstein would have made of Bell's theorem. I confess that the deep regret I feel that Bell cannot respond to this paper is sometimes assuaged by a sense of relief. Locality and Local Causality In his seminal 1964 paper [1], John Bell expressed locality as the requirement that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past. [2, p. 14] This seems to require that the result of a measurement would have been the same, no matter what operations had been performed on such a distant system. But suppose the result of a measurement were the outcome of an indeterministic process. Then the result of the measurement might have been different even if exactly the same operations (if any) had been performed on that distant system. So can no indeterministic theory satisfy the locality requirement? Bell felt no need to address that awkward question in his 1964 paper [1], since he took the EPR argument to establish that any additional variables needed to restore locality and causalitywould have to determine a unique result of ameasurement.
Many of the heated arguments about the meaning of 'Bellʼs theorem' arise because this phrase can refer to two different theorems that John Bell proved, the first in 1964 and the second in 1976.His 1964 theorem is the incompatibility of quantum phenomena with the dual assumptions of locality and determinism.His 1976 theorem is the incompatibility of quantum phenomena with the unitary property of local causality.This is contrary to Bellʼs own later assertions, that his 1964 theorem began with that single, and indivisible, assumption of local causality (even if not by that name).While there are other forms of Bellʼs theorems-which I present to explain the relation between Jarrett-completeness, 'fragile locality', and EPR-completeness-I maintain that Bellʼs two versions are the essential ones.Although the two Bellʼs theorems are logically equivalent, their assumptions are not, and the different versions of the theorem suggest quite different conclusions, which are embraced by different communities.For realists, the notion of local causality, ruled out by Bellʼs 1976 theorem, is motivated implicitly by Reichenbachʼs principle of common cause and explicitly by the principle of relativistic causality, and it is the latter which must be forgone.Operationalists pay no heed to Reichenbachʼs principle, but wish to keep the principle of relativistic causality, which, bolstered by an implicit 'principle of agent-causation', implies their notion of locality.Thus for operationalists, Bellʼs theorem is the 1964 one, and implies that it is determinism that must be forgone.I discuss why the two 'camps' are drawn to these different conclusions, and what can be done to increase mutual understanding.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox that argues for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics as a description of physical reality has been put to rest by John Bell’s famous theorem, which inspired numerous experimental tests and brought about further affirmations of quantum reality. Nevertheless, in his writings and public presentations, Richard Feynman never acknowledged the significance of Bell’s contribution to the resolution of the EPR paradox. In this paper, we discuss several variants of the Bell inequalities (including one that was specifically espoused by Feynman), and explore the ways in which they demolish the arguments in favor of local hidden-variable theories. We also examine the roots of Feynman’s attitude toward Bell’s theorem in the context of Feynman’s special perspective on quantum mechanics.
Between 1964 and 1990, the notion of nonlocality in Bell's papers underwent a profound change as his nonlocality theorem gradually became detached from quantum mechanics, and referred to wider probabilistic theories involving correlations between separated beables. The proposition that standard quantum mechanics is itself nonlocal (more precisely, that it violates ‘local causality’) became divorced from the Bell theorem per se from 1976 on, although this important point is widely overlooked in the literature. In 1990, the year of his death, Bell would express serious misgivings about themathematical form of the local causality condition and leave ill-defined the issue of the consistency between special relativity and violation of the Bell-type inequality. In our view, the significance of the Bell theorem, in both its deterministic and stochastic forms, can only be fully understood by taking into account the fact that a fully Lorentz covariant version of quantum theory, free of action at a distance, can be articulated in the Everett interpretation. Introduction John S. Bell's last word on his celebrated nonlocality theorem and its interpretation appeared in his 1990 paper ‘La nouvelle cuisine’, first published in the year of his untimely death. Bell was careful here to distinguish between the issue of ‘no superluminal signalling’ in quantum theory (both quantum field theory and quantum mechanics) and a principle he first introduced explicitly in 1976 and called ‘local causality’ [1]. In relation to the former, Bell expressed concerns that amplify doubts he had already expressed in 1976. These concerns touch on what is now widely known as the no-signalling theorem in quantum mechanics, and ultimately have to do with Bell's distaste for what he saw as an anthropocentric element in orthodox quantum thinking. In relation to local causality, Bell emphasised that his famous factorizability (no-correlations) condition is not to be seen ‘as the formulation of local causality, but as a consequence thereof’ and stressed how difficult he found it to articulate this consequence. He left the question of any strict inconsistency between violation of factorizability and special relativity theory unresolved, a not insignificant shift from his thinking up to the early 1980s.