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Boston studies in the philosophy of science

Did They Just Misunderstood Each Other? Logical Empiricists and Bohr’s Complementarity Argument

Ulrich Röseberg

Published Jan 1, 1995• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-94-017-2658-0_6

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Having discussed the meaning of complementarity in general and wave particle complementarity in particular, I wish now to explicate Bohr's subtle argument for the thesis that certain pairs of classical concepts which are mutually compatible in classical physics are mutually exclusive in quantum physics, i.e. the thesis of kinematic–dynamic complementarity. It is generally held that Bohr regarded the mutual exclusiveness in question as being not only epistemic but also ontic or semantic, in the sense that the uncertainty principle expresses a restriction not only on the joint measurability of canonically conjugate observables but also on the joint instantiation of the properties corresponding to these observables. I shall consider the question of the ontic or semantic construal of kinematic–dynamic complementarity in Chapter 7. Bohr's argument for complementarity in the epistemic sense is, however, more fundamental: it goes to the heart of his theory of observation and measurement in quantum physics. What, then, is Bohr's argument?

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Having discussed the meaning of complementarity in general and wave particle complementarity in particular, I wish now to explicate Bohr's subtle argument for the thesis that certain pairs of classical concepts which are mutually compatible in classical physics are mutually exclusive in quantum physics, i.e. the thesis of kinematic–dynamic complementarity. It is generally held that Bohr regarded the mutual exclusiveness in question as being not only epistemic but also ontic or semantic, in the sense that the uncertainty principle expresses a restriction not only on the joint measurability of canonically conjugate observables but also on the joint instantiation of the properties corresponding to these observables. I shall consider the question of the ontic or semantic construal of kinematic–dynamic complementarity in Chapter 7. Bohr's argument for complementarity in the epistemic sense is, however, more fundamental: it goes to the heart of his theory of observation and measurement in quantum physics. What, then, is Bohr's argument?