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Springer eBooks

Bohr’s Como Argument: Complementarity and the Problem of Causality

Arkady Plotnitsky

Published Aug 3, 2009• 2 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-0-387-85334-5_6

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This paper examines the transformation of Bohr's interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, known as complementarity, from the version presented in his famous Como lecture (1927), which introduced complementarity, to a new version that was developed by Bohr shortly thereafter, in part under the impact of his intervening exchanges with Einstein. While the existence of more than one version of Bohr's complementarity (and of still different versions of the Copenhagen interpretation by others) has been noted, Bohr's rethinking itself of complementarity has rarely been adequately addressed. Apart from refining and indeed correcting the Como argument, the transformation in question was, I argue, defined by a shift from a more philosophical to a more experimental argument. My aim is to explore both this shift and the complexity of the relationships between physics and philosophy in Bohr's thinking in order to understand better the beginnings and the ends, also in the sense of aims, of Bohr's complementarity.

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‘The agency of observation not to be neglected’: complementarity, causality and the arrow of events in quantum and quantum-like theories

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The argument of this article is grounded in the irreducible interference of observational instruments in our interactions with nature in quantum physics and, thus, in the constitution of quantum phenomena versus classical physics, where this interference can, in principle, be disregarded. The irreducible character of this interference was seen by N. Bohr as the principal distinction between classical and quantum physics and grounded his interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum theory. Bohr saw complementarity as a generalization of the classical ideal of causality, which defined classical physics and relativity. While intimated by Bohr, the relationships among observational technology, complementarity, causality and the arrow of events (a new concept that replaces the arrow of time commonly used in this context) were not addressed by him either. The article introduces another new concept, that of quantum causality, as a form of probabilistic causality. The argument of the article is based on a particular interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum theory, defined by the concept of 'reality without realism (RWR)'. This interpretation follows Bohr's interpretation but contains certain additional features, in particular the Dirac postulate. The article also considers quantum-like (Q-L) theories (based in the mathematics of QM) from the perspective it develops. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thermodynamics 2.0: Bridging the natural and social sciences (Part 2)'.

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences•Aug 13, 2023•6 citations
This paper examines the transformation of Bohr's interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, known as complementarity, from the version presented in his famous Como lecture (1927), which introduced complementarity, to a new version that was developed by Bohr shortly thereafter, in part under the impact of his intervening exchanges with Einstein. While the existence of more than one version of Bohr's complementarity (and of still different versions of the Copenhagen interpretation by others) has been noted, Bohr's rethinking itself of complementarity has rarely been adequately addressed. Apart from refining and indeed correcting the Como argument, the transformation in question was, I argue, defined by a shift from a more philosophical to a more experimental argument. My aim is to explore both this shift and the complexity of the relationships between physics and philosophy in Bohr's thinking in order to understand better the beginnings and the ends, also in the sense of aims, of Bohr's complementarity.
The argument of this article is grounded in the irreducible interference of observational instruments in our interactions with nature in quantum physics and, thus, in the constitution of quantum phenomena versus classical physics, where this interference can, in principle, be disregarded. The irreducible character of this interference was seen by N. Bohr as the principal distinction between classical and quantum physics and grounded his interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum theory. Bohr saw complementarity as a generalization of the classical ideal of causality, which defined classical physics and relativity. While intimated by Bohr, the relationships among observational technology, complementarity, causality and the arrow of events (a new concept that replaces the arrow of time commonly used in this context) were not addressed by him either. The article introduces another new concept, that of quantum causality, as a form of probabilistic causality. The argument of the article is based on a particular interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum theory, defined by the concept of 'reality without realism (RWR)'. This interpretation follows Bohr's interpretation but contains certain additional features, in particular the Dirac postulate. The article also considers quantum-like (Q-L) theories (based in the mathematics of QM) from the perspective it develops. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thermodynamics 2.0: Bridging the natural and social sciences (Part 2)'.