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The London Edinburgh and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science

VII. The measurement of chance

Norman Phillips Campbell

Published Jul 1, 1922• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Summary It is maintained that the chance of an event happening is always a physical property of a system, measured by a process of derived measurement involving the two fundamental magaitudes—nuumber of events and number of trials. Chances are not measurable by a process of fundamental measurement. Bat the calculation of chances is analogous to fundamental measurement. It is usually theoretical, and is valuable only in so far as the calculated chances are confirmed by measurement. When a proposition concerns a system characterized by a chance, it may sometimes (but by no means always) be regarded as having a definite probability determined by that chance. The probability of propositions which do not concern systems characterized by chances has nothing to do with chance.

DOI
10.1080/14786440708633980

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Routledge eBooks•Aug 11, 2021•1 citation
Summary It is maintained that the chance of an event happening is always a physical property of a system, measured by a process of derived measurement involving the two fundamental magaitudes—nuumber of events and number of trials. Chances are not measurable by a process of fundamental measurement. Bat the calculation of chances is analogous to fundamental measurement. It is usually theoretical, and is valuable only in so far as the calculated chances are confirmed by measurement. When a proposition concerns a system characterized by a chance, it may sometimes (but by no means always) be regarded as having a definite probability determined by that chance. The probability of propositions which do not concern systems characterized by chances has nothing to do with chance.
On a very intuitive way of thinking, if it is already determined that some event will happen, then there is no non-trivial chance of it failing to happen, and if it is already determined that some event will not happen, then there is no non-trivial chance of it happening. A different sort of worry that arises for an actual frequentist analysis of deterministic chance is that such an analysis seems unsuited to theories like Boltzmannian statistical mechanics or Bohmian mechanics insofar as those theories are supposed to describe the evolution of the Universe as a whole. It should be clear, then, that there are options available for understanding deterministic chance that are in keeping with several of the leading metaphysical analyses of chance. It is widely accepted that whatever chances are, they are to be contrasted with individual credences . According to classical statistical mechanics, the fundamental laws are Newtonian and thus deterministic.
The chance of a physical event is the objective, single-case probability that it will occur. In probabilistic physical theories like quantum mechanics, the chances of physical events play the formal role that the values of physical quantities play in classical (deterministic) physics, and there is a temptation to regard them on the model of the latter as describing intrinsic properties of the systems to which they are assigned.I argue that this understanding of chances in quantum mechanics, despite being a part of the orthodox interpretation of the theory and the most prevalent view in the physical community, is incompatible with a very wide range of metaphysical views about the nature of chance. The options that remain are unlikely to be attractive to scientists and scientifically minded philosophers.
The chance of a physical event is the objective, single-case probability that it will occur. In probabilistic physical theories like quantum mechanics, the chances of physical events play the formal role that the values of physical quantities play in classical (deterministic) physics, and there is a temptation to regard them on the model of the latter as describing intrinsic properties of the systems to which they are assigned.I argue that this understanding of chances in quantum mechanics, despite being a part of the orthodox interpretation of the theory and the most prevalent view in the physical community, is incompatible with a very wide range of metaphysical views about the nature of chance. The options that remain are unlikely to be attractive to scientists and scientifically minded philosophers.
Abstract The concept of objective probability — chance — has three distinctive features: chances are measured by statistics, but only with high chance, increasing with the number of trials involved; when the chances of the outcomes of a chance process are known, even in the context of a single trial, then one's subjective probabilities — credences — in those outcomes should be set equal to those chances; and finally, chance processes involve uncertainty as to the outcomes of those processes. The second of these features is established for ratios in the squared norms of branches by the Born-rule theorem, proved in Chapter 8. This chapter shows that the first and third hold for those same quantities. All three characteristics of chance thus apply to branching in the Everett interpretation. In consequence, branching processes should be identified with chance processes, and ratios in the squared norms with chances.
The notion of objective probability or chance, as a physical trait of the world, has proved elusive; the identification of chances with actual frequencies does not succeed. An adequate theory of chance should explain not only the connection of chance with statistics, but with degrees of belief, and more broadly the entire phenomenology of (seemingly) chance events and their measurement. Branching structure in the decoherence-based many worlds theory provides an account of what chance is that satisfies all these desiderata, including the requirement that chance involves uncertainty.
This chapter is concerned with the application of the ontological dimension of probability to physical chance. Both ratios or proportions in populations, and dispositions and tendencies have a much longer philosophical history; their explicit association to probability and chance is, however, more of a fin de siècle development. On the frequency interpretation, probabilities are frequencies; and it is very hard to see how frequencies can explain other frequencies. While the propensity interpretation of probability overcomes the previously described difficulties for frequencies, it nonetheless has problems of its own. Collapse interpretations then postulate the second kind of openly non-deterministic evolution in order to account for the fact that measurements of any dynamical property on a quantum system routinely obtain definite results. This is the “collapse” dynamical rule: a near-instantaneous evolution of the system that takes its state to the eigenstate of the relevant operator with a certain probability.