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Routledge eBooks

Chance

Mauricio Suárez

Published Aug 11, 2021• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

This chapter is concerned with the application of the ontological dimension of probability to physical chance. Both ratios or proportions in populations, and dispositions and tendencies have a much longer philosophical history; their explicit association to probability and chance is, however, more of a fin de siècle development. On the frequency interpretation, probabilities are frequencies; and it is very hard to see how frequencies can explain other frequencies. While the propensity interpretation of probability overcomes the previously described difficulties for frequencies, it nonetheless has problems of its own. Collapse interpretations then postulate the second kind of openly non-deterministic evolution in order to account for the fact that measurements of any dynamical property on a quantum system routinely obtain definite results. This is the “collapse” dynamical rule: a near-instantaneous evolution of the system that takes its state to the eigenstate of the relevant operator with a certain probability.

DOI
10.4324/9781315623818-60

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This chapter is concerned with the application of the ontological dimension of probability to physical chance. Both ratios or proportions in populations, and dispositions and tendencies have a much longer philosophical history; their explicit association to probability and chance is, however, more of a fin de siècle development. On the frequency interpretation, probabilities are frequencies; and it is very hard to see how frequencies can explain other frequencies. While the propensity interpretation of probability overcomes the previously described difficulties for frequencies, it nonetheless has problems of its own. Collapse interpretations then postulate the second kind of openly non-deterministic evolution in order to account for the fact that measurements of any dynamical property on a quantum system routinely obtain definite results. This is the “collapse” dynamical rule: a near-instantaneous evolution of the system that takes its state to the eigenstate of the relevant operator with a certain probability.
Abstract Many theories and models from physics are probabilistic. This observation raises several philosophical questions: What are probabilities in physics? Do they reflect objective chances which exist independently of the human mind? Or do they only express subjective credences and thus capture our own uncertainty about the world? Finally, which metaphysical lessons, if at all, can one draw from the largely probabilistic character of physics? The chapters collected in this volume address these questions and provide a detailed philosophical appraisal of the status of probabilities in all of physics. Particular emphasis is laid upon statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Many chapters reflect a desire to understand probabilities from physics as objective chances. These chances are characterized, e.g., as time-averages, as probabilities from a best system in the terms of David Lewis, or using the Boltzmannian typicality approach. Other chapters are sympathetic to a Bayesian view of probabilities in physics. The chapters about quantum mechanics elucidate the peculiar characteristics of quantum correlations and discuss strategies to justify the Born Rule. Finally, the chapters of this volume demonstrate how closely interpretive issues about probabilities are entangled with other foundational problems of physics such as the Reversibility Paradox, the ontology of the quantum world and the question whether the world is deterministic.
Abstract This chapter states the aims of this volume and provides an introduction to the material to follow. In the first section, various interpretations of probabilities are surveyed and discussed with an eye to physics and its probabilities. It is stressed that the axioms of the probability calculus do not suffice to understand probabilities from physics. Objectivist interpretations take it that probabilistic statements reflect mind-independent facts. However, as a discussion of frequentism, propensity views, and other objectivist interpretations shows, it is difficult to say what exactly these facts are. According to subjectivist views, probabilities are used to express degrees of belief. These views have problems to explain why physicists reasonably agree on the values of many probabilities. The second section of this introduction summarizes the chapters of this volume.
Abstract This paper develops a metaphysical interpretation of quantum probability under the title Distributed Presence (DP). The central claim is that quantum probabilities should not be understood as measures of ignorance, nor merely as formal devices for predicting measurement outcomes, but as expressions of an objective mode of being: a system’s structured distribution of presence across mutually available channels of realization. On this view, a quantum system prior to measurement is neither fully actual in one determinate outcome nor reducible to a set of hidden definite properties. Rather, it exists in a non-binary mode, articulated by normalized presence fractions associated with the possible outcomes defined by a given interaction context. The Born rule is accordingly not replaced, but reinterpreted: the standard probability assignment is read as the operational expression of an underlying ontological distribution. The paper argues that this framework provides a unified reading of several familiar quantum features. Superposition is understood as a real distribution of presence rather than as epistemic indeterminacy; measurement is interpreted as single-channel actualization rather than as the physical destruction of alternatives; wave-particle duality is recast as the relation between distributed structure and localized realization; and quantum randomness is treated as intrinsic yet structurally constrained. The proposal remains fully compatible with the standard Hilbert-space formalism and introduces no hidden variables, additional collapse dynamics, or many-world branching. Its aim is interpretive rather than revisionary. Beyond its relevance to the foundations of quantum theory, DP is advanced as a contribution to the ontology of probability more broadly. It seeks to show how probability may be objective, physically meaningful, and ontologically basic without collapsing into determinism on the one hand or epistemicism on the other. In that sense, the paper offers a realist, single-world, structurally articulated account of quantum chance.
The previous chapter addressed the challenge of making sense of the notion of a quantum state assignment being performed correctly without thereby acknowledging the notion of a quantum state a quantum system ‘is in’. The present chapter discusses what interpretation of quantum probabilities goes best with the account that I have called the ‘Rule Perspective’ and started to develop in the previous chapter. The first section considers what quantum probabilities should be taken to be probabilities of in the Rule Perspective; the second investigates what philosophical interpretation of probabilities applies best to quantum probabilities thus conceived. The third section considers two objections to the resulting account of quantum probabilities. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is the first single volume about the collapse theories of quantum mechanics, which is becoming a very active field of research in both physics and philosophy. In standard quantum mechanics, it is postulated that when the wave function of a quantum system is measured, it no longer follows the Schrödinger equation, but instantaneously and randomly collapses to one of the wave functions that correspond to definite measurement results. However, why and how a definite measurement result appears is unknown. A promising solution to this problem are collapse theories in which the collapse of the wave function is spontaneous and dynamical. Chapters written by distinguished physicists and philosophers of physics discuss the origin and implications of wave-function collapse, the controversies around collapse models and their ontologies, and new arguments for the reality of wave function collapse. This is an invaluable resource for students and researchers interested in the philosophy of physics and foundations of quantum mechanics.
THE PUZZLE CONCERNING THE CONCEPT OF PROBABILITY IN SM Throughout the book we have been preoccupied with a single simple scenario. We consider now an n -particle system M that is in a state s t at t . We want to know whether s t has a certain property A . The question that we are asking has a perfectly clear physical meaning. Nevertheless, the information that the answer requires may not always be available to us. It may be the case that the experiment needed to answer the question is too expensive or difficult to perform. It is also possible that there are theoretical reasons why we cannot perform the experiment, or, simply, the experiment has not been performed yet. In all of these cases the need for probabilities arises. We need to calculate the probability P ( s t ∈ A ) and use our results to derive predictions concerning M . But, even if there is little doubt that we constantly use probabilities, there is a basic problem concerning the interpretation of the probabilities. It is difficult to define probabilities as observable parameters that depend only on the physical properties of M . This difficulty gives rise to a philosophical puzzle: If probabilities are not physical parameters that we discover by methods of observation and measurement only, how can we justify our willingness to be guided by them? How can we explain the utility of probabilities? In the previous chapters, we reviewed several attempts to solve this problem.