Beginning with its introduction by W. Heisenberg, quantum mechanics was often seen as an overly abstract theory, mathematically and physically, vis‐à‐vis classical physics or relativity. This perception was amplified by the fact that, while the quantum‐mechanical formalism provided effective predictive algorithms for the probabilistic predictions concerning quantum experiments, it appeared unable to describe, even by way idealization, quantum processes themselves in space and time, in the way classical mechanics or relativity did. The aim of the present paper is to reconsider the nature of mathematical and physical abstraction in modern physics by offering an analysis of the concept of “physical fact” and of the concept of “physical concept,” in part by following G. W. F. Hegel’s and G. Deleuze’s arguments concerning the nature of conceptual thinking. In classical physics, relativity, and quantum physics alike, I argue, physical concepts are defined by the following main features—1) their multi‐component multiplicity; 2) their essential relations to problems; 3) and the interactions between physical, mathematical, and philosophical components within each concept. It is the particular character of these interactions in quantum mechanics, as defined by its essentially predictive (rather than descriptive) nature, that distinguishes it from classical physics and relativity.
Beginning with its introduction by W. Heisenberg, quantum mechanics was often seen as an overly abstract theory, mathematically and physically, vis‐à‐vis classical physics or relativity. This perception was amplified by the fact that, while the quantum‐mechanical formalism provided effective predictive algorithms for the probabilistic predictions concerning quantum experiments, it appeared unable to describe, even by way idealization, quantum processes themselves in space and time, in the way classical mechanics or relativity did. The aim of the present paper is to reconsider the nature of mathematical and physical abstraction in modern physics by offering an analysis of the concept of “physical fact” and of the concept of “physical concept,” in part by following G. W. F. Hegel’s and G. Deleuze’s arguments concerning the nature of conceptual thinking. In classical physics, relativity, and quantum physics alike, I argue, physical concepts are defined by the following main features—1) their multi‐component multiplicity; 2) their essential relations to problems; 3) and the interactions between physical, mathematical, and philosophical components within each concept. It is the particular character of these interactions in quantum mechanics, as defined by its essentially predictive (rather than descriptive) nature, that distinguishes it from classical physics and relativity.
Beginning with its introduction by W. Heisenberg, quantum mechanics was often seen as an overly abstract theory, mathematically and physically, vis‐à‐vis classical physics or relativity. This perception was amplified by the fact that, while the quantum‐mechanical formalism provided effective predictive algorithms for the probabilistic predictions concerning quantum experiments, it appeared unable to describe, even by way idealization, quantum processes themselves in space and time, in the way classical mechanics or relativity did. The aim of the present paper is to reconsider the nature of mathematical and physical abstraction in modern physics by offering an analysis of the concept of “physical fact” and of the concept of “physical concept,” in part by following G. W. F. Hegel’s and G. Deleuze’s arguments concerning the nature of conceptual thinking. In classical physics, relativity, and quantum physics alike, I argue, physical concepts are defined by the following main features—1) their multi‐component multiplicity; 2) their essential relations to problems; 3) and the interactions between physical, mathematical, and philosophical components within each concept. It is the particular character of these interactions in quantum mechanics, as defined by its essentially predictive (rather than descriptive) nature, that distinguishes it from classical physics and relativity.
Taking its historical point of departure in Heisenberg’s work, this article offers a view of quantum mechanics as, arguably, the first truly experimental and truly mathematical physical theory, that is, a theory concerned with experimenting with nature and mathematics alike. It is truly experimental because it is not, as in classical physics, merely the independent behavior of the system considered, in other words, what happens in any event, that we track, but what kind of experiments we perform that defines what happens. By the same token, the theory is also truly mathematical because, at least in the interpretation adopted here, its mathematical formalism does not stand in the service of a mathematical description of (quantum) physical processes in space and time in the way the formalism of classical physics does, but is only used to predict the outcomes of relevant experiments. It also follows that quantum theories experiment more freely with mathematics itself, since we invent predictive mathematical schemes, rather than proceed by refining mathematically our phenomenal representations of nature, which process constrains us in classical mechanics.
A physical theory is a construction of thought which is founded on experience so as to constitute knowledge of the natural world. Propositions in physics are constituted of concepts which express the properties and processes of the physical world. For purposes of record and communication concepts are designated by the terms of a language, such as mathematical symbols, and philosophical discussion may be based on linguistic forms. In this essay, however, the element of discussion will be the concept as a mode of thought through which are grasped the attributes of physical things and the relations exemplified in physical processes. The present philosophical analysis of a physical theory, quantum mechanics, is to be carried out by critical analysis of its basic concepts. In particular, the program is to show that in quantum mechanics the concept of physical object exhibits the characters of discontinuity, complementarity, and relativity.
Quantum theory comprises a number of physical concepts and methods of calculation applicable to bodies on an atomic scale and consequently to the explanation of the properties of macroscopic bodies in terms of the behaviour of their constituent particles. In advanced work the theory is highly mathematical, but at an elementary level the difficulties lie mostly in the appreciation of the relevant physical ideas. Wave-particle duality, indeterminacy, the nature of a quantized state of a system and the exclusion principle cause most conceptual problems.
This article considers a partly philosophical question: What are the ontological and epistemological reasons for using quantum-like models or theories (models and theories based on the mathematical formalism of quantum theory) vs. classical-like ones (based on the mathematics of classical physics), in considering human thinking and decision making? This question is only partly philosophical because it also concerns the scientific understanding of the phenomena considered by the theories that use mathematical models of either type, just as in physics itself, where this question also arises as a physical question. This is because this question is in effect: What are the physical reasons for using, even if not requiring, these types of theories in considering quantum phenomena, which these theories predict fully in accord with the experiment? This is clearly also a physical, rather than only philosophical, question and so is, accordingly, the question of whether one needs classical-like or quantum-like theories or both (just as in physics we use both classical and quantum theories) in considering human thinking in psychology and related fields, such as decision science. It comes as no surprise that many of these reasons are parallel to those that are responsible for the use of QM and QFT in the case of quantum phenomena. Still, the corresponding situations should be understood and justified in terms of the phenomena considered, phenomena defined by human thinking, because there are important differences between these phenomena and quantum phenomena, which this article aims to address. In order to do so, this article will first consider quantum phenomena and quantum theory, before turning to human thinking and decision making, in addressing which it will also discuss two recent quantum-like approaches to human thinking, that by M. G. D'Ariano and F. Faggin and that by A. Khrennikov. Both approaches are ontological in the sense of offering representations, different in character in each approach, of human thinking by the formalism of quantum theory. Whether such a representation, as opposed to only predicting the outcomes of relevant experiments, is possible either in quantum theory or in quantum-like theories of human thinking is one of the questions addressed in this article. The philosophical position adopted in it is that it may not be possible to make this assumption, which, however, is not the same as saying that it is impossible. I designate this view as the reality-without-realism, RWR, view and in considering strictly mental processes as the ideality-without-idealism, IWI, view, in the second case in part following, but also moving beyond, I. Kant's philosophy.
The argument of this article is threefold. First, the article argues that from its rise in the sixteenth century to our own time, the advancement of modern physics as mathematical-experimental science has been defined by the invention of new mathematical structures. Second, the article argues that quantum theory, especially following quantum mechanics, gives this thesis a radically new meaning by virtue of the following two features: on the one hand, quantum phenomena are defined as essentially different from those found in all previous physics by purely physical features; and on the other, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory are defined by purely mathematical postulates, which connect them to quantum phenomena strictly in terms of probabilities, without, as in all previous physics, representing or otherwise relating to how these phenomena physically come about. While these two features may appear discordant, if not inconsistent, I argue that they are in accord with each other, at least in certain interpretations (including the one adopted here), designated as “reality without realism”, RWR, interpretations. This argument also allows this article to offer a new perspective on a thorny problem of the relationships between continuity and discontinuity in quantum physics. In particular, rather than being concerned only with the discreteness and continuity of quantum objects or phenomena, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory relate their continuous mathematics to the irreducibly discrete quantum phenomena in terms of probabilistic predictions while, at least in RWR interpretations, precluding a representation or even conception of how these phenomena come about. This subject is rarely, if ever, discussed apart from previous work by the present author. It is, however, given a new dimension in this article which introduces, as one of its main contributions, a new principle: the mathematical complexity principle.