We argue that quantum theory does not allow for a generalization of the notion of classical conditional probability by showing that the probability defined by the Lüders rule, standardly interpreted in the literature as the quantum-mechanical conditionalization rule, cannot be interpreted as such.
Guerra Bobo (2013) has questioned whether Lüders conditionalization for quantum probabilities supplies a notion of conditional probability worthy of the name. I agree in large part with Guerra Bobo's critique; indeed, I show how her critique can be sharpened. But while valuable in itself, the main virtue of the critique derives from the fact that it prompts questions about the nature of quantum probabilities that engage some of the more important and contentious issues in the foundations of QM. I show how understanding the role of Lüders conditionalization in quantum probability theory helps to illuminate these issues.
In this work, we show that a counterfactual account of Lüders' rule—which we argue is naturally implied by the mathematical structure of the rule itself—rules out underlying-state models of quantum mechanics (a type of hidden-variable model, typically used in the contextuality and nonlocality literature, where quantum states are treated as probability measures over “better-defined states”). This incompatibility arises because the counterfactual update requires ontological models to update their states according to conditional probability, which in turn establishes an equivalence between compatibility and the existence of such models.
There is a peculiar similarity between Probability Theory and Quantum Mechanics: both subjects are mature and successful, yet both remain subject to controversy about their foundations and interpretation. I first present a classification of the various interpretations of probability, arguing that they should not be thought of as rivals, but rather as applications of a general theory to different kinds of subject matter. An axiom system that makes conditional probability the fundamental concept is put forward as being superior to Kolmogorov's axioms. I then discuss the relevance to quantum theory of the various interpretations of probability, the applicability of classical probability theory within quantum mechanics, and the relations between the interpretation of probability and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
In this work, we show that a counterfactual account of Lüders' rule—which we argue is naturally implied by the mathematical structure of the rule itself—rules out underlying-state models of quantum mechanics (a type of hidden-variable model, typically used in the contextuality and nonlocality literature, where quantum states are treated as probability measures over “better-defined states”). This incompatibility arises because the counterfactual update requires ontological models to update their states according to conditional probability, which in turn establishes an equivalence between compatibility and the existence of such models.
In a recent paper, Michael Friedman and Hilary Putnam argued that the Lüders rule is ad hoc from the point of view of the Copenhagen interpretation but that it receives a natural explanation within realist quantum logic as a probability conditionalization rule. Geoffrey Hellman maintains that quantum logic cannot give a non-circular explanation of the rule, while Jeffrey Bub argues that the rule is not ad hoc within the Copenhagen interpretation. As I see it, all four are wrong. Given that there is to be a projection postulate, there are at least two natural arguments which the Copenhagen advocate can offer on behalf of the Lüders rule, contrary to Friedman and Putnam. However, the argument which Bub offers is not a good one. At the same time, contrary to Hellman, quantum logic really does provide an explanation of the Lüders rule, and one which is superior to that of the Copenhagen account, since it provides an understanding of why there should be a projection postulate at all.