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IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

Key Distribution Protocols Based on Noisy Channels in Presence of an Active Adversary: Conventional and New Versions With Parameter Optimization

Viktor Yakovlev, Коржик Валерий Иванович, Guillermo B. Morales-Luna

Published May 29, 2008• 23 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the information-theoretic secure key distribution problem over noisy wiretap channels with public discussion and in the presence of an active adversary. There are several well-known versions of the protocols proposed by Maurer and Wolf to solve this problem. We describe several new versions of the key distribution protocols for the same channel model allowing to increase the key rate given a fixed key security and under an optimization of the protocol parameters. Both asymptotic and nonasymptotic cases are presented. It is shown that in some cases the nonasymptotic key rate is not so far from the asymptotic one whenever the lengths of the transmitted strings are of the order of thousands of bits.

DOI
10.1109/tit.2008.921689

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Key Distribution Protocols Based on Extractors Under the Condition of Noisy Channels in the Presence of an Active Adversary

Viktor Yakovlev, Коржик Валерий Иванович, Guillermo B. Morales-Luna +1 more

We consider in this paper the information-theoretic secure key distribution problem over main and wire-tap noise channels with a public discussion in presence of an active adversary. In contrast to the solution proposed by ourselves for a similar problem using hashing for privacy amplification, in the current paper we use a technique of extractors. We propose modified key distribution protocols for which we prove explicit estimates of key rates without the use of estimates with uncertain coefficients in notations $O,Ω,Θ$. This leads in the new conclusion that the use of extractors is superior to the use of hash functions only with the very large key lengths $\ell$ (of order $\ell>10^5$ bits). We suggest hybrid key distribution protocols consisting from two consecutively executed stages. At the fist stage it is generated a short authentication key based on hash function, whereas at the second stage it is generated the final key with the use of extractors. We show that in fact the use of extraction procedure is effective only at the second stage. We get also some constructive estimates of the key rates for such protocols.

arXiv:1005.3184•May 18, 2010•2 citations

Interactive message transmission over adversarial wiretap channel II

Pengwei Wang, Reihaneh Safavi–Naini

In Wyner wiretap II model of communication, Alice and Bob are connected by a channel that can be eavesdropped by an adversary with unlimited computation who can select a fraction of communication to view, and the goal is to provide perfect information theoretic security. Information theoretic security is increasingly important because of the threat of quantum computers that can effectively break algorithms and protocols that are used in today's public key infrastructure. We consider interactive protocols for wiretap II channel with active adversary who can eavesdrop and add adversarial noise to the eavesdropped part of the codeword. These channels capture wireless setting where malicious eavesdroppers at reception distance of the transmitter can eavesdrop the communication and introduce jamming signal to the channel. We derive a new upperbound R ≤ 1 - ρ for the rate of interactive protocols over two-way wiretap II channel with active adversaries, and construct a perfectly secure protocol family with achievable rate 1 - 2ρ + ρ2. This is strictly higher than the rate of the best one round protocol which is 1 - 2ρ, hence showing that interaction improves rate. We also prove that even with interaction, reliable communication is possible only if ρ <; 1/2. An interesting aspect of this work is that our bounds will also hold in network setting when two nodes are connected by n paths, a ρ of which is corrupted by the adversary. We discuss our results, give their relations to the other works, and propose directions for future work.

IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM)•May 1, 2017•0 citations

On the Problem of Local Randomness in Privacy Amplification with an Active Adversary

Xin Li

We study the problem of privacy amplification with an active adversary in the information theoretic setting. In this setting, two parties Alice and Bob start out with a shared $n$-bit weak random string $W$, and try to agree on a secret random key $R$ over a public channel fully controlled by an active and unbounded adversary. Typical assumptions are that these two parties have access to local private uniform random bits. In this paper we seek to minimize the requirements on the local randomness used by the two parties. We make two improvements over previous results. First, we reduce the number of random bits needed for each party to $Θ(\ell+\log n)$, where $\ell$ is the security parameter, as long as $W$ has min-entropy $n^{Ω(1)}$. Previously, the best known result needs to use $Θ((\ell+\log n)\log n)$ bits. Our result is also asymptotically optimal. Second, we generalize the problem to the case where the two parties only have local weak random sources instead of truly uniform random bits. We show that when each party has a local weak random source with min-entropy $> n/2$, there is an efficient privacy amplification protocol that works nearly as good as if the two parties have access to local uniform random bits. Next, in the case where each party only has a weak random source with arbitrarily linear min-entropy, we give an efficient privacy amplification protocol where we can achieve security parameter up to $Ω(\log k)$. Our results give the first protocols that achieve privacy amplification when each party only has access to a local weak random source.

arXiv:1011.2551•Nov 11, 2010•1 citation

Secret Key Generation under Active Attacks

Wenwen Tu, Lifeng Lai

Physical layer security, also called information theoretic security, is an emerging field which exploits physical layer properties of communication channels to secure future generations of communication systems. The approach to generating the secret key at the physical layer is proposed in the source model by the pioneer works. Different from the key generation process in the source model, the legitimate users typically observe no sources in advance, but they can obtain the sources via estimating the channel gain. This chapter discusses the problem of key generation under active attacks. It first reviews the basic scenarios for key generation in the presence of a passive adversary. Then, it considers the scenario where the attacker attacks the public discussion, reviews the relationship between the key rate obtained from the case with an active attacker with the corresponding key rate obtained from the passive case and discusses the condition which decides this relationship.

Chapman & Hall/CRC eBooks•Sep 1, 2017•0 citations

Key Agreement over Wiretap Models with Non-Causal Side Information

Ali Zibaeenejad

The security of information is an indispensable element of a communication system when transmitted signals are vulnerable to eavesdropping. This issue is a challenging problem in a wireless network as propagated signals can be easily captured by unauthorized receivers, and so achieving a perfectly secure communication is a desire in such a wiretap channel. On the other hand, cryptographic algorithms usually lack to attain this goal due to the following restrictive assumptions made for their design. First, wiretappers basically have limited computational power and time. Second, each authorized party has often access to a reasonably large sequence of uniform random bits concealed from wiretappers. \nTo guarantee the security of information, Information Theory (IT) offers the following two approaches based on physical-layer security. \nFirst, IT suggests using wiretap (block) codes to securely and reliably transmit messages over a noisy wiretap channel. No confidential common key is usually required for the wiretap codes. The secrecy problem investigates an optimum wiretap code that achieves the secrecy capacity of a given wiretap channel. \nSecond, IT introduces key agreement (block) codes to exchange keys between legitimate parties over a wiretap model. The agreed keys are to be reliable, secure, and (uniformly) random, at least in an asymptotic sense, such that they can be finally employed in symmetric key cryptography for data transmission. The key agreement problem investigates an optimum key agreement code that obtains the key capacity of a given wiretap model. \nIn this thesis, we study the key agreement problem for two wiretap models: a Discrete Memoryless (DM) model and a Gaussian model. Each model consists of a wiretap channel \nparalleled with an authenticated public channel. The wiretap channel is from a transmitter, called Alice, to an authorized receiver, called Bob, and to a wiretapper, called Eve. The Probability Transition Function (PTF) of the wiretap channel is controlled by a random sequence of Channel State Information (CSI), which is assumed to be non-causally available at Alice. The capacity of the public channel is C_P₁∈[0,∞) in the forward direction from Alice to Bob and C_P₂∈[0,∞) in the backward direction from Bob to Alice. For each model, the key capacity as a function of the pair (C_P₁, C_P₂) is denoted by C_K(C_P₁, C_P₂). We investigate the forward key capacity of each model, i.e., C_K(C_P₁, 0) in this thesis. We also study the key generation over the Gaussian model when Eve's channel is less noisy than Bob's. \nIn the DM model, the wiretap channel is a Discrete Memoryless State-dependent Wiretap Channel (DM-SWC) in which Bob and Eve each may also have access to a sequence of Side Information (SI) dependent on the CSI. We establish a Lower Bound (LB) and an Upper Bound (UB) on the forward key capacity of the DM model. When the model is less noisy in Bob's favor, another UB on the forward key capacity is derived. The achievable key agreement code is asymptotically optimum as C_P₁→ ∞. For any given DM model, there also exists a finite capacity C⁰_P₁, which is determined by the DM-SWC, such that the forward key capacity is achievable if C_P₁≥ C⁰_P₁. Moreover, the key generation is saturated at capacity C_P₁= C⁰_P₁, and thus increasing the public channel capacity beyond C⁰_P₁ makes no improvement on the forward key capacity of the DM model. If the CSI is fully known at Bob in addition to Alice, C⁰_P₁=0, and so the public channel has no contribution in key generation when the public channel is in the forward direction. \nThe achievable key agreement code of the DM model exploits both a random generator and the CSI as resources for key generation at Alice. The randomness property of channel states can be employed for key generation, and so the agreed keys depend on the CSI in general. However, a message is independent of the CSI in a secrecy problem. Hence, we justify that the forward key capacity can exceed both the main channel capacity and the secrecy capacity of the DM-SWC. \nIn the Gaussian model, the wiretap channel is a Gaussian State-dependent Wiretap Channel (G-SWC) with Additive White Gaussian Interference (AWGI) having average power Λ. For simplicity, no side information is assumed at Bob and Eve. \nBob's channel and Eve's channel suffer from Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN), where the correlation coefficient between noise of Bob's channel and that of Eve's channel is given by ϱ. \nWe prove that the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model is independent of ϱ. Moreover, we establish that the forward key capacity is positive unless Eve's channel is less noisy than Bob's. We also prove that the key capacity of the Gaussian model vanishes if the G-SWC is physically degraded in Eve's favor. However, we justify that obtaining a positive key capacity is feasible even if Eve's channel is less noisy than Bob's according to our achieved LB on the key capacity for case (C_P₁, C_P₂)→ (∞, ∞). Hence, the key capacity of the Gaussian model is a function of ϱ. \nIn this thesis, an LB on the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model is achieved. For a fixed Λ, the achievable key agreement code is optimum for any C_P₁∈[0,∞) in both low Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR) and high SIR regimes. We show that the forward key capacity is asymptotically independent of C_P₁ and Λ as the SIR goes to infinity, and thus the public channel and the interference have negligible contributions in key generation in the high SIR regime. On the other hand, the forward key capacity is a function of C_P₁ and Λ in the low SIR regime. Contributions of the interference and the public channel in key generation are significant in the low SIR regime that will be illustrated by simulations. \nThe proposed key agreement code asymptotically achieves the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model for any SIR as C_P₁→ ∞. Hence, C_K(∞,0) is calculated, and it is suggested as a UB on C_K(C_P₁,0). Using simulations, we also compute the minimum required C_P₁ for which the forward key capacity is upper bounded within a given tolerance. \nThe achievable key agreement code is designed based on a generalized version of the Dirty Paper Coding (DPC) in which transmitted signals are correlated with the CSI. The correlation coefficient is to be determined by C_P₁. In contrast to the DM model, the LB on the forward key capacity of a Gaussian model is a strictly increasing function of C_P₁ according to our simulations. This fact is an essential difference between this model and the DM model. \nFor C_P₁=0 and a fixed Λ, the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model exceeds the main channel capacity of the G-SWC in the low SIR regime. By simulations, we show that the interference enhances key generation in the low SIR regime. In this regime, we also justify that the positive effect of the interference on the (forward) key capacity is generally more than its positive effect on the secrecy capacity of the G-SWC, while the interference has no influence on the main channel capacity of the G-SWC.

•Jun 20, 2012•2 citations

Secret key agreement on wiretap channels with transmitter side information

Ashish J. Khisti

Secret-key agreement protocols over wiretap channels controlled by a state parameter are studied. The entire state sequence is known (non-causally) to the sender but not to the receiver and the eavesdropper. Upper and lower bounds on the secret-key capacity are established both with and without public discussion. The proposed coding scheme involves constructing a codebook to create common reconstruction of the state sequence at the sender and the receiver and another secret-key codebook constructed by random binning. For the special case of Gaussian channels, with no public discussion, - the secret-key generation with dirty paper problem, the gap between our bounds is at-most 1/2 bit and the bounds coincide in the high signal-to-noise ratio and high interference-to-noise ratio regimes. In the presence of public discussion our bounds coincide, yielding the capacity, when then the channels of the receiver and the eavesdropper satisfy an in- dependent noise condition.

arXiv:1006.5901•Jun 30, 2010•7 citations
In this paper, we consider the information-theoretic secure key distribution problem over noisy wiretap channels with public discussion and in the presence of an active adversary. There are several well-known versions of the protocols proposed by Maurer and Wolf to solve this problem. We describe several new versions of the key distribution protocols for the same channel model allowing to increase the key rate given a fixed key security and under an optimization of the protocol parameters. Both asymptotic and nonasymptotic cases are presented. It is shown that in some cases the nonasymptotic key rate is not so far from the asymptotic one whenever the lengths of the transmitted strings are of the order of thousands of bits.
We consider in this paper the information-theoretic secure key distribution problem over main and wire-tap noise channels with a public discussion in presence of an active adversary. In contrast to the solution proposed by ourselves for a similar problem using hashing for privacy amplification, in the current paper we use a technique of extractors. We propose modified key distribution protocols for which we prove explicit estimates of key rates without the use of estimates with uncertain coefficients in notations O,Ω,ΘO,Ω,ΘO,Ω,Θ. This leads in the new conclusion that the use of extractors is superior to the use of hash functions only with the very large key lengths ℓ\ellℓ (of order ℓ>105\ell>10^5ℓ>105 bits). We suggest hybrid key distribution protocols consisting from two consecutively executed stages. At the fist stage it is generated a short authentication key based on hash function, whereas at the second stage it is generated the final key with the use of extractors. We show that in fact the use of extraction procedure is effective only at the second stage. We get also some constructive estimates of the key rates for such protocols.
In Wyner wiretap II model of communication, Alice and Bob are connected by a channel that can be eavesdropped by an adversary with unlimited computation who can select a fraction of communication to view, and the goal is to provide perfect information theoretic security. Information theoretic security is increasingly important because of the threat of quantum computers that can effectively break algorithms and protocols that are used in today's public key infrastructure. We consider interactive protocols for wiretap II channel with active adversary who can eavesdrop and add adversarial noise to the eavesdropped part of the codeword. These channels capture wireless setting where malicious eavesdroppers at reception distance of the transmitter can eavesdrop the communication and introduce jamming signal to the channel. We derive a new upperbound R ≤ 1 - ρ for the rate of interactive protocols over two-way wiretap II channel with active adversaries, and construct a perfectly secure protocol family with achievable rate 1 - 2ρ + ρ2. This is strictly higher than the rate of the best one round protocol which is 1 - 2ρ, hence showing that interaction improves rate. We also prove that even with interaction, reliable communication is possible only if ρ <; 1/2. An interesting aspect of this work is that our bounds will also hold in network setting when two nodes are connected by n paths, a ρ of which is corrupted by the adversary. We discuss our results, give their relations to the other works, and propose directions for future work.
We study the problem of privacy amplification with an active adversary in the information theoretic setting. In this setting, two parties Alice and Bob start out with a shared nnn-bit weak random string WWW, and try to agree on a secret random key RRR over a public channel fully controlled by an active and unbounded adversary. Typical assumptions are that these two parties have access to local private uniform random bits. In this paper we seek to minimize the requirements on the local randomness used by the two parties. We make two improvements over previous results. First, we reduce the number of random bits needed for each party to Θ(ℓ+log⁡n)Θ(\ell+\log n)Θ(ℓ+logn), where ℓ\ellℓ is the security parameter, as long as WWW has min-entropy nΩ(1)n^{Ω(1)}nΩ(1). Previously, the best known result needs to use Θ((ℓ+log⁡n)log⁡n)Θ((\ell+\log n)\log n)Θ((ℓ+logn)logn) bits. Our result is also asymptotically optimal. Second, we generalize the problem to the case where the two parties only have local weak random sources instead of truly uniform random bits. We show that when each party has a local weak random source with min-entropy >n/2> n/2>n/2, there is an efficient privacy amplification protocol that works nearly as good as if the two parties have access to local uniform random bits. Next, in the case where each party only has a weak random source with arbitrarily linear min-entropy, we give an efficient privacy amplification protocol where we can achieve security parameter up to Ω(log⁡k)Ω(\log k)Ω(logk). Our results give the first protocols that achieve privacy amplification when each party only has access to a local weak random source.
Physical layer security, also called information theoretic security, is an emerging field which exploits physical layer properties of communication channels to secure future generations of communication systems. The approach to generating the secret key at the physical layer is proposed in the source model by the pioneer works. Different from the key generation process in the source model, the legitimate users typically observe no sources in advance, but they can obtain the sources via estimating the channel gain. This chapter discusses the problem of key generation under active attacks. It first reviews the basic scenarios for key generation in the presence of a passive adversary. Then, it considers the scenario where the attacker attacks the public discussion, reviews the relationship between the key rate obtained from the case with an active attacker with the corresponding key rate obtained from the passive case and discusses the condition which decides this relationship.
The security of information is an indispensable element of a communication system when transmitted signals are vulnerable to eavesdropping. This issue is a challenging problem in a wireless network as propagated signals can be easily captured by unauthorized receivers, and so achieving a perfectly secure communication is a desire in such a wiretap channel. On the other hand, cryptographic algorithms usually lack to attain this goal due to the following restrictive assumptions made for their design. First, wiretappers basically have limited computational power and time. Second, each authorized party has often access to a reasonably large sequence of uniform random bits concealed from wiretappers. \nTo guarantee the security of information, Information Theory (IT) offers the following two approaches based on physical-layer security. \nFirst, IT suggests using wiretap (block) codes to securely and reliably transmit messages over a noisy wiretap channel. No confidential common key is usually required for the wiretap codes. The secrecy problem investigates an optimum wiretap code that achieves the secrecy capacity of a given wiretap channel. \nSecond, IT introduces key agreement (block) codes to exchange keys between legitimate parties over a wiretap model. The agreed keys are to be reliable, secure, and (uniformly) random, at least in an asymptotic sense, such that they can be finally employed in symmetric key cryptography for data transmission. The key agreement problem investigates an optimum key agreement code that obtains the key capacity of a given wiretap model. \nIn this thesis, we study the key agreement problem for two wiretap models: a Discrete Memoryless (DM) model and a Gaussian model. Each model consists of a wiretap channel \nparalleled with an authenticated public channel. The wiretap channel is from a transmitter, called Alice, to an authorized receiver, called Bob, and to a wiretapper, called Eve. The Probability Transition Function (PTF) of the wiretap channel is controlled by a random sequence of Channel State Information (CSI), which is assumed to be non-causally available at Alice. The capacity of the public channel is C_P₁∈[0,∞) in the forward direction from Alice to Bob and C_P₂∈[0,∞) in the backward direction from Bob to Alice. For each model, the key capacity as a function of the pair (C_P₁, C_P₂) is denoted by C_K(C_P₁, C_P₂). We investigate the forward key capacity of each model, i.e., C_K(C_P₁, 0) in this thesis. We also study the key generation over the Gaussian model when Eve's channel is less noisy than Bob's. \nIn the DM model, the wiretap channel is a Discrete Memoryless State-dependent Wiretap Channel (DM-SWC) in which Bob and Eve each may also have access to a sequence of Side Information (SI) dependent on the CSI. We establish a Lower Bound (LB) and an Upper Bound (UB) on the forward key capacity of the DM model. When the model is less noisy in Bob's favor, another UB on the forward key capacity is derived. The achievable key agreement code is asymptotically optimum as C_P₁→ ∞. For any given DM model, there also exists a finite capacity C⁰_P₁, which is determined by the DM-SWC, such that the forward key capacity is achievable if C_P₁≥ C⁰_P₁. Moreover, the key generation is saturated at capacity C_P₁= C⁰_P₁, and thus increasing the public channel capacity beyond C⁰_P₁ makes no improvement on the forward key capacity of the DM model. If the CSI is fully known at Bob in addition to Alice, C⁰_P₁=0, and so the public channel has no contribution in key generation when the public channel is in the forward direction. \nThe achievable key agreement code of the DM model exploits both a random generator and the CSI as resources for key generation at Alice. The randomness property of channel states can be employed for key generation, and so the agreed keys depend on the CSI in general. However, a message is independent of the CSI in a secrecy problem. Hence, we justify that the forward key capacity can exceed both the main channel capacity and the secrecy capacity of the DM-SWC. \nIn the Gaussian model, the wiretap channel is a Gaussian State-dependent Wiretap Channel (G-SWC) with Additive White Gaussian Interference (AWGI) having average power Λ. For simplicity, no side information is assumed at Bob and Eve. \nBob's channel and Eve's channel suffer from Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN), where the correlation coefficient between noise of Bob's channel and that of Eve's channel is given by ϱ. \nWe prove that the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model is independent of ϱ. Moreover, we establish that the forward key capacity is positive unless Eve's channel is less noisy than Bob's. We also prove that the key capacity of the Gaussian model vanishes if the G-SWC is physically degraded in Eve's favor. However, we justify that obtaining a positive key capacity is feasible even if Eve's channel is less noisy than Bob's according to our achieved LB on the key capacity for case (C_P₁, C_P₂)→ (∞, ∞). Hence, the key capacity of the Gaussian model is a function of ϱ. \nIn this thesis, an LB on the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model is achieved. For a fixed Λ, the achievable key agreement code is optimum for any C_P₁∈[0,∞) in both low Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR) and high SIR regimes. We show that the forward key capacity is asymptotically independent of C_P₁ and Λ as the SIR goes to infinity, and thus the public channel and the interference have negligible contributions in key generation in the high SIR regime. On the other hand, the forward key capacity is a function of C_P₁ and Λ in the low SIR regime. Contributions of the interference and the public channel in key generation are significant in the low SIR regime that will be illustrated by simulations. \nThe proposed key agreement code asymptotically achieves the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model for any SIR as C_P₁→ ∞. Hence, C_K(∞,0) is calculated, and it is suggested as a UB on C_K(C_P₁,0). Using simulations, we also compute the minimum required C_P₁ for which the forward key capacity is upper bounded within a given tolerance. \nThe achievable key agreement code is designed based on a generalized version of the Dirty Paper Coding (DPC) in which transmitted signals are correlated with the CSI. The correlation coefficient is to be determined by C_P₁. In contrast to the DM model, the LB on the forward key capacity of a Gaussian model is a strictly increasing function of C_P₁ according to our simulations. This fact is an essential difference between this model and the DM model. \nFor C_P₁=0 and a fixed Λ, the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model exceeds the main channel capacity of the G-SWC in the low SIR regime. By simulations, we show that the interference enhances key generation in the low SIR regime. In this regime, we also justify that the positive effect of the interference on the (forward) key capacity is generally more than its positive effect on the secrecy capacity of the G-SWC, while the interference has no influence on the main channel capacity of the G-SWC.
Secret-key agreement protocols over wiretap channels controlled by a state parameter are studied. The entire state sequence is known (non-causally) to the sender but not to the receiver and the eavesdropper. Upper and lower bounds on the secret-key capacity are established both with and without public discussion. The proposed coding scheme involves constructing a codebook to create common reconstruction of the state sequence at the sender and the receiver and another secret-key codebook constructed by random binning. For the special case of Gaussian channels, with no public discussion, - the secret-key generation with dirty paper problem, the gap between our bounds is at-most 1/2 bit and the bounds coincide in the high signal-to-noise ratio and high interference-to-noise ratio regimes. In the presence of public discussion our bounds coincide, yielding the capacity, when then the channels of the receiver and the eavesdropper satisfy an in- dependent noise condition.