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arXiv:1005.3184

Key Distribution Protocols Based on Extractors Under the Condition of Noisy Channels in the Presence of an Active Adversary

Viktor Yakovlev, Коржик Валерий Иванович, Guillermo B. Morales-Luna, Mihail Bakaev

Published May 18, 2010• 2 citations
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Abstract

We consider in this paper the information-theoretic secure key distribution problem over main and wire-tap noise channels with a public discussion in presence of an active adversary. In contrast to the solution proposed by ourselves for a similar problem using hashing for privacy amplification, in the current paper we use a technique of extractors. We propose modified key distribution protocols for which we prove explicit estimates of key rates without the use of estimates with uncertain coefficients in notations $O,Ω,Θ$. This leads in the new conclusion that the use of extractors is superior to the use of hash functions only with the very large key lengths $\ell$ (of order $\ell>10^5$ bits). We suggest hybrid key distribution protocols consisting from two consecutively executed stages. At the fist stage it is generated a short authentication key based on hash function, whereas at the second stage it is generated the final key with the use of extractors. We show that in fact the use of extraction procedure is effective only at the second stage. We get also some constructive estimates of the key rates for such protocols.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1005.3184

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We consider in this paper the information-theoretic secure key distribution problem over main and wire-tap noise channels with a public discussion in presence of an active adversary. In contrast to the solution proposed by ourselves for a similar problem using hashing for privacy amplification, in the current paper we use a technique of extractors. We propose modified key distribution protocols for which we prove explicit estimates of key rates without the use of estimates with uncertain coefficients in notations O,Ω,ΘO,Ω,ΘO,Ω,Θ. This leads in the new conclusion that the use of extractors is superior to the use of hash functions only with the very large key lengths ℓ\ellℓ (of order ℓ>105\ell>10^5ℓ>105 bits). We suggest hybrid key distribution protocols consisting from two consecutively executed stages. At the fist stage it is generated a short authentication key based on hash function, whereas at the second stage it is generated the final key with the use of extractors. We show that in fact the use of extraction procedure is effective only at the second stage. We get also some constructive estimates of the key rates for such protocols.
In this paper, we consider the information-theoretic secure key distribution problem over noisy wiretap channels with public discussion and in the presence of an active adversary. There are several well-known versions of the protocols proposed by Maurer and Wolf to solve this problem. We describe several new versions of the key distribution protocols for the same channel model allowing to increase the key rate given a fixed key security and under an optimization of the protocol parameters. Both asymptotic and nonasymptotic cases are presented. It is shown that in some cases the nonasymptotic key rate is not so far from the asymptotic one whenever the lengths of the transmitted strings are of the order of thousands of bits.
For pt. II see ibid., vol.49, no.4, p.832-38 (2003). Here, we consider the special case where the legitimate partners already share a mutual string which might, however, be partially known to the adversary. The problem of generating a secret key in this case has been well studied in the passive-adversary model - for instance, in the context of quantum key agreement - under the name of privacy amplification. We consider the same problem with respect to an active adversary and propose two protocols, one based on universal hashing and one based on extractors, allowing for privacy amplification secure against an adversary whose knowledge about the initial partially secret string is limited to one third of the length of this string. Our results are based on novel techniques for authentication secure even against adversaries knowing a substantial amount of the "secret" key.
We propose a new key sharing protocol executed through any constant parameter noiseless public channel (as Internet itself) without any cryptographic assumptions and protocol restrictions on SNR in the eavesdropper channels.This protocol is based on extraction by legitimate users of eigenvalues from randomly generated matrices.A similar protocol was proposed recently by G. Qin and Z. Ding.But we prove that, in fact, this protocol is insecure and we modify it to be both reliable and secure using artificial noise and privacy amplification procedure.Results of simulation prove these statements.
We consider information-theoretic key agreement between two parties sharing somewhat different versions of a secret w that has relatively little entropy. Such key agreement, also known as information reconciliation and privacy amplification over unsecured channels, was shown to be theoretically feasible by Renner and Wolf (Eurocrypt 2004), although no protocol that runs in polynomial time was described. We propose a protocol that is not only polynomial-time, but actually practical, requiring only a few seconds on consumer-grade computers. Our protocol can be seen as an interactive version of robust fuzzy extractors (Boyen et al., Eurocrypt 2005, Dodis et al., Crypto 2006). While robust fuzzy extractors, due to their noninteractive nature, require w to have entropy at least half its length, we have no such constraint. In fact, unlike in prior solutions, in our solution the entropy loss is essentially unrelated to the length or the entropy of w, and depends only on the security parameter.
In this paper, the problem of key generation over an unauthenticated public channel in a network setup is considered. The considered model consists of four terminals: two legitimate terminals who need to share a key, a helper and an active adversary. The legitimate terminals and the helper are allowed to exchange messages over a public noiseless channel, to which the adversary has full access and may modify messages exchanged through this public channel. We investigate two types of keys: secret key (secure from the adversary only) and private key (secure from both the helper and the adversary). We characterize the relationship between the key rates in our model and the existing models with a passive adversary. We characterize conditions under which the generated key rates in this model are non-zero, and further provide an authentication scheme to show that key capacities, if are non-zero, are the same as those for the scenario with a passive adversary.
Physical layer security, also called information theoretic security, is an emerging field which exploits physical layer properties of communication channels to secure future generations of communication systems. The approach to generating the secret key at the physical layer is proposed in the source model by the pioneer works. Different from the key generation process in the source model, the legitimate users typically observe no sources in advance, but they can obtain the sources via estimating the channel gain. This chapter discusses the problem of key generation under active attacks. It first reviews the basic scenarios for key generation in the presence of a passive adversary. Then, it considers the scenario where the attacker attacks the public discussion, reviews the relationship between the key rate obtained from the case with an active attacker with the corresponding key rate obtained from the passive case and discusses the condition which decides this relationship.