A class of theories alternative to standard quantum mechanics, including that of Ghirardi et al ('GRWP'), postulates that when a quantum superposition becomes amplified to the point that the superposed states reach some level of 'macroscopic distinctness', then some non-quantum-mechanical principle comes into play and realizes one or other of the two macroscopic outcomes. Without specializing to any particular theory of this class, I ask how far such 'macrorealistic' theories are generically constrained, if one insists that the physical reduction process should respect Einstein locality, by the results of existing EPR-Bell experiments. I conclude that provided one does not demand that the prescription for reduction respects Lorentz invariance, at least some theories of this type, while in principle inevitably making some predictions that conflict with those of standard quantum mechanics, are not refuted by any existing experiment.
A class of theories alternative to standard quantum mechanics, including that of Ghirardi et al ('GRWP'), postulates that when a quantum superposition becomes amplified to the point that the superposed states reach some level of 'macroscopic distinctness', then some non-quantum-mechanical principle comes into play and realizes one or other of the two macroscopic outcomes. Without specializing to any particular theory of this class, I ask how far such 'macrorealistic' theories are generically constrained, if one insists that the physical reduction process should respect Einstein locality, by the results of existing EPR-Bell experiments. I conclude that provided one does not demand that the prescription for reduction respects Lorentz invariance, at least some theories of this type, while in principle inevitably making some predictions that conflict with those of standard quantum mechanics, are not refuted by any existing experiment.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox gives an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics based on a plausible criterion for reality, as well as the assumption of locality. A general view is that the argument is compromised, because EPR's premises are falsified by Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) and Bell experiments. In this paper, we present an EPR argument based on premises not falsified by these experiments. First, we consider macroscopic EPR-Bohm, Bell, and GHZ experiments using spins ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ defined by two macroscopically distinct states. The analyzers that realize the unitary operations ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ determining the measurement settings $\ensuremath{\theta}$ are nonlinear devices creating macroscopic superposition states. We note two definitions of macroscopic realism (MR). For a system with two macroscopically distinct states available to it, MR posits a predetermined outcome for the measurement ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ distinguishing between the states. Deterministic macroscopic realism assumes MR for the system defined prior to the interaction ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ being carried out but is falsifiable by the macroscopic Bell and GHZ proposals. Motivated by arguments to uphold MR (without resorting to decoherence), as well as no-signaling and the properties of a meter, we define a set of premises referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) posits MR for the system after ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, at the time tf---when the system is prepared with respect to the measurement basis, ready for a ``pointer'' measurement and readout. For this system, wMR posits that the outcome of ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ is determined and not changed by interactions that might subsequently occur at a remote system B. The premise wMR also posits a weaker version of EPR's criterion for reality. Importantly, we show that the GHZ and Bell predictions are consistent with wMR. Yet, an EPR paradox arises for a macroscopic EPR-Bohm state, based on wMR. As considered by Schr\"odinger, it is possible to measure two complementary spins of system A simultaneously, ``one by direct, the other by indirect measurement'': If we assume wMR, then once both settings are fixed, the outcomes of the two spins are both determined. We revisit the original EPR paradox and find a similar result: An EPR argument can be based on a set of premises, weak local realism, which we show are not falsifiable by GHZ or Bell experiments.
As contrasted with physicists to idolize Bell's theorem and quantum nonlocality, we argue that quantum mechanics (QM), in reality, respects the principles of a macroscopic realism (PMRs). The current QM to tell us that "... the state of a system can be instantaneously changed by a distant measurement >..." cannot be treated as a physical theory. Its key statements - that the EPR-Bell experiments to violate Bell's inequality verify nonlocality, and nonlocal correlations respect special relativity - are false. Both the EPR-Bell experiments and theorems to support the "non-signalling principle" are based on the implicit assumption that all quantum postulates and, in particular, Born's averaging rule are fully applicable to Cat states. However, this is not the case. Introducing observables (e.g., correlations) for Cat states violates the correspondence principle. Pure (macro- and micro-)Cat states must be governed both by the PMRs and superposition principle. Our (macrorealistic) model of a one-dimensional completed scattering shows how these principles coexist with each other, in the case of a one-electron micro-Cat state.
This paper discusses the extent to which existing experiments test the validity of extrapolating the formalism of quantum mechanics to the macroscopic level, and in particular to what extent they confirm that linear superpositions of macroscopically distinguishable states actually exist in nature (so that even at the macrolevel, "realistic" classical concepts are not always applicable). It is concluded that the "Bell's-theorem" experiments can be interpreted as evidence for this conclusion only with some rather strong supplementary assumptions. On the other hand, recent experiments on superconducting devices, while affording strong circumstantial evidence in favor of the validity of the extrapolation of the quantum formalism at least to this level, do not directly test the principle of superposition of macrostates independently of this formalism. Currently envisaged experiments on such devices may, however, if feasible definitively test the principle against a large class of alternative, "macro-realistic" hypotheses.
Bell inequalities are intended to formulate mathematically the argument of the thought-experiment proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) in the Einstein-Bohr Debate. Devised to test Bell inequalities against quantum mechanics for resolving the Einstein-Bohr debate, Bell experiments are purportedly modern versions of the EPR experiment. However, there exists a fatal logical flaw in Bell experiments. Because of the logical flaw, Bell experiments differ essentially from the EPR experiment, and quantum correlation in the EPR experiment is not "quantum entanglement" in Bell experiments; the latter is not physically meaningful. In addition to the logical flaw in Bell experiments, a physical constraint imposed on measuring individual quantum objects is violated by all Bell inequalities, which makes Bell inequalities physically meaningless. Unlike Bell experiments, the EPR experiment will not violate any physical constraint, and the EPR argument has no logical flaw. Consequently, the experimental invalidation of Bell inequalities is not evidence for falsifying the two fundamental hypotheses for scientific research, i.e., locality and realism, underlying the EPR experiment, and by no means can Bell experiments resolve the Einstein-Bohr debate. Stemming from abandoning either locality or realism or both, the so-called new applications of quantum mechanics, including various quantum information technologies, are all ineligible and doomed to failure, for they attempt to exploit physically meaningless "quantum superposition" or "quantum entanglement", treating them as physical resources "out there" in the real world.
Adjusting EPR (to accord with Bohr's insight), and accepting Bell's principles (but not his false inferences), we:— (i) complete the QM account of EPR correlations in a classical way; (ii) deliver Bell's hope for a simple constructive model of EPRB; (iii) justify EPR's belief that additional variables would bring locality and causality to QM's completion; (iv) refute key claims that such variables are impossible — including CHSH, Mermin's three-particle always-vs-never variant of GHZ, and this: in the context of Bell's theorem ‘it's a proven scientific fact that a violation of local realism has been demonstrated theoretically and experimentally,' (Annals of Physics Editors, 2016). In short: we refute Bell's theorem and endorse Einstein's locally-causal Lorentz-invariant worldview.
The postulate of the collapse of the wave-function stands between the microscopic, quantum world, and the macroscopic world. Because of this intermediate position, the collapse process cannot be examined with the formalism of the quantum mechanics (QM), neither with that of classical mechanics. This fact makes some physicists propose interpretations of QM, which avoid this postulate. However, the common procedure used in that is making assumptions incompatible with the QM formalism. The present work discusses the most popular interpretations. It is shown that because of such assumptions those interpretations fail, i.e. predict for some experiments results which differ from the QM predictions. Despite that, special attention is called to a proposal of S. Gao, the only one which addresses and tries to solve an obvious and major contradiction. A couple of theorems are proved for showing that the collapse postulate is necessary in the QM. Although non-explainable with the quantum formalism, this postulate cannot be denied, otherwise one comes to conclusions which disagree with the QM. It is also proved here that the idea of “collapse at a distance” is problematic especially in relativistic cases, and is a misunderstanding. Namely, in an entanglement of two quantum systems, assuming that the measurement of one of the systems (accompanied by collapse of that system on one of its states) collapses the other systems, too without the second system being measured, which leads to a contradiction.