This work addresses the Probability Calculus foundations. We begin with considering the relations of the event models today in use with the physical reality. Then we propose the structural model of the event and a definition of probability that harmonizes the interpretations sustained by different probabilistic schools.
This contribution derives from a rather extensive study on the foundations of probability. We start by discussing critically the two main models of the random event in Probability Theroy and cast light over a number of incongruities. We conclude that the argument of probability is the critical knot of the probability foundations and put forward the structure of levels for the partially determinate event. The structural model enables us to define the prabability and to attune its subjective and objective interpretations.
Physicists have, hitherto, mostly adopted a frequentist conception of probability, according to which probability statements apply only to ensembles. It is argued that we should, instead, adopt an epistemic, or Bayesian conception, in which probabilities are conceived as logical constructs rather than physical realities, and in which probability statements do apply directly to individual events. The question is closely related to the disagreement between the orthodox school of statistical thought and the Bayesian school. It has important technical implications (it makes a difference, what statistical methodology one adopts). It may also have important implications for the interpretation of the quantum state. 1 1.
How can quantum mechanics be (i) the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics and (ii) a probability calculus that presupposes the events to which, and on the basis of which, it assigns probabilities? The question is answered without invoking knowledge or observers, by interpreting the necessary distinction between two kinds of physical quantities - unconditionally definite quantities and quantities that have values only if they are measured - as a distinction between the manifested world and its manifestation.
Physicists have, hitherto, mostly adopted a frequentist conception of probability, according to which probability statements apply only to ensembles. It is argued that we should, instead, adopt an epistemic, or Bayesian, conception, in which probabilities are conceived as logical constructs rather than physical realities and in which probability statements do apply directly to individual events. The question is closely related to the disagreement between the orthodox school of statistical thought and the Bayesian school. It has important technical implications (it makes a difference what statistical methodology one adopts). It may also have important implications for the interpretation of the quantum state.
La théorie des probabilités et la théorie quantique, l’une mathématique et l’autre physique, s’apparentent dans la mesure où chacune admet plusieurs interprétations fort différentes. Certains ont proposé que les problèmes conceptuels de la théorie quantique puissent être, sinon résolus, du moins atténués par une interprétation adéquate des probabilités. Nous montrerons plutôt, à travers un survol historique et analytique des probabilités et de la théorie quantique, que si certaines interprétations de l’une et de l’autre s’agencent particulièrement bien, aucune ne s’impose de façon unique. * * * The theory of probability and the quantum theory, the one mathematical and the other physical, are related in that each admits a number of very different interpretations. It has been proposed that the conceptual problems of the quantum theory could be, if not resolved, at least mitigated by a proper interpretation of probabilities. We rather show, through a historical and analytical overview of probabilities and quantum theory, that if some interpretations of the one and the other go along particularly well, none follows in a unique way.