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dialectica

The Principle of Anomaly in Quantum Mechanics

Hans Reichenbach

Published Jan 1, 1948• 41 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The following two questions are examined: 1o Do the unobservable parameters possess precise, though unknown, values ? 2o If these unobservable values were known, would it be possible to make precise predictions of the reults of later measurements ? The answer is shown to be negative; the questions, therefore, are not meaningless, being capable of a falsification. The inquiry leads to the establishment of a principle of anomaly, more precisely speaking, of causal anomaly, which is to be added to Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy. This principle states that the principle of action by contact is violated whenever definite values are assigned to the unobserved quantities, i. e., when an exhaustive interpretation of quantum mechanics is used. The two most important exhaustive interpretations are given by the corpuscle and the wave interpretation; each leads to causal anomalies, though for different places. The causal anomalies can be eliminated by the use of a restrictive interpretation, which separates statements about unobserved quantities, as a third propositional class, from true or false statements. Bohr and Heisenberg have called such statements meaningless, without being able to eliminate them completely; these statements arte thus merely shifted into the metalanguage. In another version of the restrictive interpretation such statements are assigned a third truth value, the value indeterminate, and quantum mechanics is then presented in the form of a three-valued logic. The inquiry is carried through without the presupposition of any philosophical conception; every interpretation is examined with respect to the consequences to which it leads. - H. R.'

DOI
10.1111/j.1746-8361.1948.tb00707.x

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The following two questions are examined: 1o Do the unobservable parameters possess precise, though unknown, values ? 2o If these unobservable values were known, would it be possible to make precise predictions of the reults of later measurements ? The answer is shown to be negative; the questions, therefore, are not meaningless, being capable of a falsification. The inquiry leads to the establishment of a principle of anomaly, more precisely speaking, of causal anomaly, which is to be added to Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy. This principle states that the principle of action by contact is violated whenever definite values are assigned to the unobserved quantities, i. e., when an exhaustive interpretation of quantum mechanics is used. The two most important exhaustive interpretations are given by the corpuscle and the wave interpretation; each leads to causal anomalies, though for different places. The causal anomalies can be eliminated by the use of a restrictive interpretation, which separates statements about unobserved quantities, as a third propositional class, from true or false statements. Bohr and Heisenberg have called such statements meaningless, without being able to eliminate them completely; these statements arte thus merely shifted into the metalanguage. In another version of the restrictive interpretation such statements are assigned a third truth value, the value indeterminate, and quantum mechanics is then presented in the form of a three-valued logic. The inquiry is carried through without the presupposition of any philosophical conception; every interpretation is examined with respect to the consequences to which it leads. - H. R.'
​The question of indeterminacy is the most sensational [sic] in quantum theory. It really is one of the adventures of the mind. Werner Heisenberg found that deductively his equations led to a formula: that the consequence of lack of precise prediction leads to a statistical character, and that this statistical character is what is ultimately needed to explain the eigen-states of the atom. Erwin Schrödinger showed this with wave mechanics. Heisenberg said that as a consequence there are very few causal laws for atoms, which is, he said, a refutation of the principle of causality.
In its beginning, quantum mechanics was approached in two completely different ways. Schrodinger, reasoning that electronic motions could be treated as waves, developed wave mechanics. The stationary states that an electron or molecule might have were analogues to standing waves set up by applying appropriate boundary conditions. Bohr’s theory could not explain the Stark and Zeeman effect, and the spectra of atoms more complex than alkali metals. In 1927, Heisenberg added one more dimension to the problem through the uncertainty principle. The postulates of any theory are a set of fundamental statements that are asked to be believed and draw conclusions from them. In classical mechanics, all dynamical variables are observables, but there are certain fundamental restrictions placed upon simultaneously measurable quantities in quantum mechanics.
Local Re-description versus Global Selection This methodological note examines where genuine empirical content can arise in an inference-first reconstruction of quantum mechanics based on the maximum-caliber principle. Rather than introducing new physics, it clarifies the epistemological status of the programme's existing results. Central Question Can a reconstruction genuinely predict physical parameters, or does it merely re-express them in a different mathematical language? The note argues that this distinction depends on the level of the formalism being considered. Main Thesis The reconstruction naturally separates into two sectors: Local inferential sector: Fisher information, Legendre duality, Kähler geometry, quantum potential, and causal reconstruction. Global selection sector: closure conditions, self-consistency principles, attractors, and global constraints acting on the inferential frame itself. The local sector can generate deep and non-trivial mathematical consequences, but these remain analytic consequences of the chosen inferential framework. They therefore constitute re-descriptions rather than predictions. Local Re-description Theorem A central proposition establishes that any result obtained inside a fixed maximum-caliber framework is deductively entailed by the adopted constraints. Consequently, however sophisticated the derivation may be, it introduces no new empirical content beyond those premises. The distinction is made explicit between: deductive depth; empirical content. A result may possess great deductive depth while carrying no additional predictive power. Content as Exclusion The note adopts a Popperian notion of empirical content: a statement is informative insofar as it excludes possibilities. This criterion is then translated into Bayesian language through predictive concentration and Occam factors, showing that the exclusion criterion is already implicit within inference-based reasoning. Global Selection Principle A second proposition shows that no free parameter can be predicted from operations internal to a local inferential frame. Prediction necessarily requires a constraint acting on the framework itself. Such a constraint may take the form of: a closure condition; a self-consistency requirement; a dynamical attractor; a global selection rule. Excess Content Criterion Not every global principle is predictive. A genuine selection principle must possess excess content: it must forbid more than the value it was introduced to explain. Three requirements are identified: independence from the selected value; additional falsifiable consequences; selection of isolated points rather than continuous reparametrisations. Without these properties, a global principle becomes merely a re-description in global form. Applications The criterion is applied to several examples from the reconstruction programme: the interpretation of mass as inverse informational stiffness; the Z₃/Koide lepton-mass construction; proposed action–Hubble relations; attractor and renormalisation-group style selection mechanisms. The analysis concludes that local Fisher–Legendre–Kähler structures determine form but not parameter values, whereas genuine predictive power can only arise from global selection mechanisms possessing excess content. Ontological Consequence The note proposes a corresponding ontological distinction. The local sector is interpreted as representational and epistemic, describing how inference organises information. The global selection sector alone carries ontological commitment, because it determines which configurations are realised rather than merely represented. Conclusion The paper identifies the precise locus at which empirical content can appear within an inference-first reconstruction of quantum mechanics. Local reconstruction supplies mathematical form; prediction requires global selection. The decisive question is therefore not whether a result is global, but whether it carries excess content beyond the quantity it was designed to explain.
One of the aspects of quantum theory which has attracted the most general attention, is the novelty of the logical notions which it presupposes. It asserts that even a complete mathematical description of a physical system S does not in general enable one to predict with certainty the result of an experiment on S, and that in particular one can never predict with certainty both the position and the momentum of S, (Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle). It further asserts that most pairs of observations are incompatible, and cannot be made on S, simultaneously (Principle of Non-commutativity of Observations).
In an empirical logic, an experimentally verifiable proposition P relating to a quantum system is assigned the value of either true of false if the system is in the pure state that belongs or, respectively, does not belong to the Hilbert subspace that represents P. Determined in such a way, truth or falsity of P can be termed “a factual truth-value” of P. In this present paper, it is proposed to consider “a counter-factual truth-value” of P, i.e., either of the values, true or false, that might have been taken by P if the system had been in a pure state belonging to a Hilbert subspace that does not represent P. The assumption that it is always possible to speak meaningfully of counter-factual truth-values of experimental propositions can be called “the hypothesis of propositional counter-factual definiteness.” As shown in this paper, this hypothesis lies at the basis of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (known as EPR) paradox, a striking and influential thought experiment intended to defy predictions of quantum mechanics, such as the one where measurements of spin along the different axes are incompatible. The purpose of this paper is to show that this hypothesis can be falsified by declining to paste together invariant-subspace lattices of contexts associated with the system (in other words, Boolean algebras or blocks) into one Hilbert lattice. Without such pasting, the EPR paradoxical inference cannot be reached.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative