Feynman introduces the concept of negative probability in the context of Young's double-slit experiment and in doing so sheds a new light on the problem. However, there are, as Feynman notes, conceptual problems as well as insights associated with this point of view. The micromaser which-path (Welcher-Weg) detector eliminates these conceptual difficulties. We also emphasize that the concept of negative probability yields useful insight into the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) problem.
Feynman introduces the concept of negative probability in the context of Young's double-slit experiment and in doing so sheds a new light on the problem. However, there are, as Feynman notes, conceptual problems as well as insights associated with this point of view. The micromaser which-path (Welcher-Weg) detector eliminates these conceptual difficulties. We also emphasize that the concept of negative probability yields useful insight into the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) problem.
In this paper we attempt to establish a theory of negative (quasi) probability distributions from fundamental principles and apply it to the study of the double-slit experiment in quantum mechanics. We do so in a way that preserves the main conceptual issues intact but allow for a clearer analysis, by representing the double-slit experiment in terms of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer, and show that the main features of quantum systems relevant to the double-slit are present also in the Mach-Zehnder. This converts the problem from a continuous to a discrete random variable representation. We then show that, for the Mach-Zehnder interferometer, negative probabilities do not exist that are consistent with interference and which-path information, contrary to what Feynman believed. However, consistent with Scully et al.'s experiment, if we reduce the amount of experimental information about the system and rely on counterfactual reasoning, a joint negative probability distribution can be constructed for the Mach-Zehnder experiment.
If it is possible to detect the path of an atom in a double-slit atom interferometer, then interference will not be observed even if path detection causes no change in the atom's momentum. This fact was explained by Scully et al and Duerr et al by using a principle ofcomplementarity that could not be formulated mathematically, together with a rather peculiar notion of entanglement. We provide an explanation based on considerations of Galilei invariance, without recourse to any notion of complementarity or entanglement. However, we do have to assume that, under conditions of the experiment, composite systems such as atoms and molecules may be regarded as single particles. This assumption is the basis of modern atom and molecule interferometry, but it lacks justification from the first principles of quantum mechanics. In our world-view the welcher Weg problem merely highlights this fact. The empirical validity of this assumption seems to reveal an aspect of quantum mechanics which can justly be termed anti-reductionist, and we conclude that use of unnecessarily strong hypotheses to explain observed phenomena can hide important physical -- and occasionally philosophical -- problems.
As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, the process of observation and acquisition of information or at least the possibility of ‘knowing’ (whether or not we bother to ‘look’) can profoundly change the outcome of an experiment. For example, in the case of the micromaser which-path detector, we do not need to ‘look at’ or ‘interrogate’ the masers in order to lose the interference cross term; it is enough that we could have known. Experiments along these lines provide a dramatic example of the importance of which-path, or ‘Welcher-Weg’, information.
This article presents a general discussion of several aspects of our present understanding of quantum mechanics. The emphasis is put on the very special correlations that this theory makes possible: They are forbidden by very general arguments based on realism and local causality. In fact, these correlations are completely impossible in any circumstance, except for very special situations designed by physicists especially to observe these purely quantum effects. Another general point that is emphasized is the necessity for the theory to predict the emergence of a single result in a single realization of an experiment. For this purpose, orthodox quantum mechanics introduces a special postulate: the reduction of the state vector, which comes in addition to the Schrödinger evolution postulate. Nevertheless, the presence in parallel of two evolution processes of the same object (the state vector) may be a potential source for conflicts; various attitudes that are possible to avoid this problem are discussed in this text. After a brief historical introduction, recalling how the very special status of the state vector has emerged in quantum mechanics, various conceptual difficulties are introduced and discussed. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) theorem is presented with the help of a botanical parable, in a way that emphasizes how deeply the EPR reasoning is rooted into what is often called “scientific method.” In another section the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger argument, the Hardy impossibilities, as well as the Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem are introduced in simple terms. The final two sections attempt to give a summary of the present situation: One section discusses nonlocality and entanglement as we see it presently, with brief mention of recent experiments; the last section contains a (nonexhaustive) list of various attitudes that are found among physicists, and that are helpful to alleviate the conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics.
We always have had a great deal of difficulty in understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents. At least I do, because I'm an old enough man that I haven't got to the point that this stuff is obvious to me … It has not yet become obvious to me that there is no real problem. I cannot define the real problem, therefore I suspect there is no real problem, but I'm not sure there's no real problem. Richard Feynman Max Born and quantum probabilities In this chapter, we will take a short break from our survey of successful applications of quantum mechanics to take a closer look at the foundations of this great edifice of modern physics. In a sense, we are now disobeying Feynman's warning about the results of the double slit experiment of chapter 1. We shall now ask Feynman's ‘forbidden’ question ‘But how can it be like that?’ Nobody disputes that quantum mechanics has been magnificently successful, enabling us to make correct quantitative calculations of atomic and nuclear effects. But there is a great divergence of opinion about the implications of quantum mechanics for the nature of matter, and indeed, of reality itself. To avoid becoming embroiled in a purely philosophical mire, we will focus on two famous paradoxes. The first of these is the ‘Einstein–Podolsky-Rosen’ paradox, named after its originators Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, and usually abbreviated by the initials ‘EPR’. The second paradox is named after ‘Schrödinger's cat’.
A quantised version of Wheeler-Feynman time symmetric absorber theory sheds new light on an old problem at present experiencing a revival of interest. Some photon correlation experiments, when interpreted in terms of quantum electrodynamics, lead to conceptual difficulties of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type. The results imply that one has to abandon either the concept of strict causality, which would make conventional quantum electrodynamics self-inconsistent, or the concept of an objective reality independent of the observer, which has far-reaching philosophical consequences. In terms of absorber theory, on the other thand, there is no need to abandon objective reality and, in fact, such an experiment is directly interpretable as an example of the manifestation of the future on the past, which is the important distinguishing feature of absorber theory.