Secure transmission is one of the most important aspects of wireless communications systems. In contrast to traditional cryptographic methods, physical layer security exploits the propagation channel to ensure security. It has been proven that a time-varying reciprocal channel can be used to generate secret keys which are secure even when an eavesdropper is located near one of the communicating nodes [1]. For line-of-sight (LOS) and slow-fading channels, reconfigurable aperture (RECAP) antennas have demonstrated their utility for physical layer security [2].
Secure transmission is one of the most important aspects of wireless communications systems. In contrast to traditional cryptographic methods, physical layer security exploits the propagation channel to ensure security. It has been proven that a time-varying reciprocal channel can be used to generate secret keys which are secure even when an eavesdropper is located near one of the communicating nodes [1]. For line-of-sight (LOS) and slow-fading channels, reconfigurable aperture (RECAP) antennas have demonstrated their utility for physical layer security [2].
The ability of parasitic reconfigurable aperture (RECAP) antennas to generate secret keys is investigated, which allows physical-layer reciprocal channel key generation (RCKG) methods to be employed even in the case of static and line-of-sight channels. Since the artificial channel fluctuations created by RECAP structures are not necessarily Gaussian, a numerical procedure for computing available and secure key bits is developed that is applicable to channels with arbitrary fading. It is identified that for limited RECAP complexity, a reduced-complexity brute-force attack is possible, and a lower bound on the required RECAP complexity to avoid this possibility is developed. Numerical examples of a 9×9 parasitic RECAP with varying levels of complexity illustrate the importance of controlling the reflection coefficient to ensure Gaussian statistics, the need for sufficient complexity to attain maximum secure key bits, and the importance of placing the RECAP on the node near the eavesdropper.
Physical layer security is emerging as a promising means of ensuring secrecy in wireless communications. The key idea is to exploit the characteristics of wireless channels such as fading or noise to transmit a message from the source to the intended receiver while keeping this message confidential from eavesdroppers. Topics covered in Trusted Communications with Physical Layer Security for 5G and Beyond include secrecy metrics for physical layer security over fading channels; trusted wireless communications with spatial multiplexing; directional modulation enabled physical layer wireless security; secure waveform for 5G systems; confidential and energy efficient communications using physical layer security; secure data networks with channel uncertainty; antenna selection strategies for wiretap channels; physical layer security for massive MIMO systems, millimeter wave cellular networks, non-orthogonal multiple access, multiuser relay networks, cognitive radio networks, MIMOME-OFDM systems; wirelessly powered communication systems and D2D-enabled cellular networks; and security solutions and applications at the physical layer, including case studies of secret key generation and secrecy coding in communication nodes and terminals.
The potential of automatically generating secret keys by randomly changing the state of a reconfigurable antenna is investigated through direct measurement. Measurements are performed with a 5×5 parasitic reconfigurable aperture (RECAP) antenna at 2.54 GHz in an indoor laboratory environment, illustrating that keys can be generated with physical-layer reciprocal channel key generation (RCKG) even in static or line-of-sight (LOS) conditions. Details of the parasitic array, varactor-diode reconfigurable elements, and network-analyzer based measurement setup are presented. Analysis of the data shows that secure key bits is lower when an eavesdropper is in the LOS path between legitimate nodes as opposed to a direction perpendicular to that path. It is also illustrated that the statistics of fading induced with the reconfigurable array are not strictly Gaussian for LOS channels. Encouragingly, measurements show that around 80% of generated key bits are secure even in the worst case conditions.
Wireless communications are naturally exposed to important security risks due to their broadcast nature. In contrast with wired communications, no physical medium is isolating the transmission surroundings to a specific path. Traditional methods to reach the goals of communications security rely on algorithms at protocol stack level, which are based on mathematically derived cryptographic protocols. With the tremendous proliferation of wireless devices, and the increase in computational power available for decryption, traditional cryptographic measures may be compromised. To protect communications at the lowest level, physical layer (PHY) security methods have been proposed recently. These techniques aim to ensure secure communications by exploiting the unique characteristics of the physical medium between communicating nodes, effectively reducing the decryption capabilities of an eavesdropper to intercept transmissions. This thesis explains within a general framework the most important PHY layer security schemes. First we explore approaches which utilize the knowledge of the unique channel between communicating nodes to distort a transmitted signal with various kinds of randomizations, in such a way that the intended receivers are unaffected by the distortion, but any other observer will be exposed to it. These techniques, however, introduce several trade-offs between transmission resources and the effectiveness in achieving secrecy. Of particular interest for this investigation is a class of methods which can be referred to as "security enhancing techniques", in which minimal priors about the potential eavesdroppers locations and capabilities are assumed. In this thesis, a wave-based approach to the communication secrecy problem is introduced. An interesting perspective is provided by studying the relation between electromagnetic theory and information theory, the so-called electromagnetic information theory. This allows to properly identify the unavoidable limitations imposed by the laws of electromagnetics to our ability to communicate securely. The proposed model can be extended to the analysis of different signal distortion methodologies and different channel conditions. The resulting approach is highly relevant to the study of PHY layer security methods since it is physically fundamental as well as architecture independent, which leads to a consolidating point of view of the secrecy problem. In addition, the thesis presents computer simulation results which shed insight on the security possibilities and limitations of three different security scenarios, which are termed MISO (multiple-input, single-output) (with single eavesdropper), MISOME (multiple-input, single-output, multiple eavesdropper), and MIMOME (multiple-input, multiple-output, multiple-eavesdropper).
Traditionally, antenna systems have been designed to achieve reliable wireless communication, while the problem of securing that communication from eavesdropping was left to mathematical cryptography. Recent research into physical layer encryption shows that jointly designing for reliability and secrecy at the physical layer may be a better solution. Physical layer encryption involves techniques that ensure a signal is information-theoretically secure, meaning that an eavesdropper with infinite time and computational resources will not be able to decode a message. Such techniques include purposely broadcasting artificial noise, transmitting direction-dependent signals, and opportunistic communications. This work addresses different methods for broadcasting artificial noise using fixed arrays, including tradeoffs with power usage and computational complexity. In addition, a method of producing direction-dependent distortion using reconfigurable arrays is also shown. These two methods are combined and shown to be more secure and power-efficient than either in isolation. An analysis of secrecy rates through mutual information makes it possible to compare the performance of all the various secure communication techniques. Simulations with various wireless channels as well as an experimental test using a fixed and reconfigurable array are presented.
The wireless channel is inherently an open medium which exposes wireless communication users to the risk of interception. The vulnerabilities of the wireless channel have led to the search for innovative and efficient security solutions at different levels of the network protocol. In particular, the physical layer level allows for implementing some security functions, such as key generation and exchange, by exploiting the intrinsic randomness of the wireless communication channel. In this paper, we analyze the effect of wireless channel and of antenna characteristics on physical layer security (PLS) key generation. The aim is to put in evidence the relation between physical quantities, such as radio channel characteristics or antenna directivity, with higher level secrecy performance indicators, such as the key mismatch between the different communication nodes and the key randomness. For this purpose, we developed a comprehensive numerical model, which implements all the different steps, from signal generation and wireless propagation modeling to key generation through spectral quantization. The reported results show that the multipath richness of the radio channel, as in outdoor urban scenarios, improves the PLS secrecy performances with respect to simpler propagation scenarios. Moreover, we show that the use of more directive antennas in the legitimate communication link improves secrecy. An opposite effect is achieved when the directivity of the eavesdropper antenna is increased, thus improving its ability to perform passive attacks.