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IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences

Adaptively and Unconditionally Secure Conversion Protocols between Ramp and Linear Secret Sharing

Ryo Kikuchi, Dai Ikarashi, Koki Hamada, Koji Chida

Published Jan 1, 2015• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Secret sharing (SS) has been extensively studied as for both secure data storage and a fundamental building block for multiparty computation (MPC). Recently, Kikuchi et al. proposed a passively and unconditionally secure conversion protocol that converts from a share of a ramp scheme to another of homomorphic SS scheme. The share-size of the ramp scheme is small, and the homomorphic SS scheme is a class of SS schemes that includes Shamir's and replicated SS schemes, which are convenient for MPC. Therefore, their protocol is a conversion from an SS scheme whose share-size is small to MPC-friendly SS schemes, and can be applied to reduce the amount of data storage while maintaining extendibility to MPC. We propose five unconditionally and actively secure protocols in the honest majority. In this paper, we consider a privacy and correctness as security requirement and does not consider a robustness: A cheat caused by an active adversary must be detected. These protocols consist of two conversion protocols, two reveal protocols and a protocol generating specific randomness. Main protocols among them are two conversion protocols for bilateral conversion between a ramp scheme and linear SS scheme, and the others are building blocks of the main protocols. Linear SS scheme is a subset of homomorphic SS scheme but includes both Shamir's and replicated SS schemes. Therefore, these main protocols are conversions between an SS scheme whose share-size is small to MPC-friendly SS schemes. These main protocols are unconditionally and actively secure so if MPC protocols used after the conversion are actively secure, the whole system involving SS scheme, conversion, and MPC protocols can be unconditionally and actively secure by using our main protocols. One of our two main protocols is the first to convert from MPC-friendly SS schemes to the ramp scheme. This enhances applications, such as secure backup, of the conversion protocol. Other than the two main protocols, we propose a protocol for generating specific randomnesses and two reveal protocols as building blocks. The latter two reveal protocols are actively and unconditionally secure in the honest majority and requires O(n||F||)-bit communication per revealing, and we believe that it is independently interest.

DOI
10.1587/transfun.e98.a.223

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Secret sharing (SS) has been extensively studied as for both secure data storage and a fundamental building block for multiparty computation (MPC). Recently, Kikuchi et al. proposed a passively and unconditionally secure conversion protocol that converts from a share of a ramp scheme to another of homomorphic SS scheme. The share-size of the ramp scheme is small, and the homomorphic SS scheme is a class of SS schemes that includes Shamir's and replicated SS schemes, which are convenient for MPC. Therefore, their protocol is a conversion from an SS scheme whose share-size is small to MPC-friendly SS schemes, and can be applied to reduce the amount of data storage while maintaining extendibility to MPC. We propose five unconditionally and actively secure protocols in the honest majority. In this paper, we consider a privacy and correctness as security requirement and does not consider a robustness: A cheat caused by an active adversary must be detected. These protocols consist of two conversion protocols, two reveal protocols and a protocol generating specific randomness. Main protocols among them are two conversion protocols for bilateral conversion between a ramp scheme and linear SS scheme, and the others are building blocks of the main protocols. Linear SS scheme is a subset of homomorphic SS scheme but includes both Shamir's and replicated SS schemes. Therefore, these main protocols are conversions between an SS scheme whose share-size is small to MPC-friendly SS schemes. These main protocols are unconditionally and actively secure so if MPC protocols used after the conversion are actively secure, the whole system involving SS scheme, conversion, and MPC protocols can be unconditionally and actively secure by using our main protocols. One of our two main protocols is the first to convert from MPC-friendly SS schemes to the ramp scheme. This enhances applications, such as secure backup, of the conversion protocol. Other than the two main protocols, we propose a protocol for generating specific randomnesses and two reveal protocols as building blocks. The latter two reveal protocols are actively and unconditionally secure in the honest majority and requires O(n||F||)-bit communication per revealing, and we believe that it is independently interest.
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for a set of players to interactively compute a function without revealing their private inputs.MPC is of theoretical and practical importance due to its many interesting applications including voting, sealed-bid auctions and privacy-preserving machine learning.It has been an active research area in cryptography and many different approaches have been proposed to enhance security, functionality and efficiency in the literature.In particular, there are general constructions proving the existence of MPC for arbitrary functions under a set of desirable security notions.However, these general results do not give a satisfactory solution to constructing concrete protocols that are efficient enough to use in practice.It is therefore more effective to give concrete and efficient constructions of MPC protocols tailored to specific functionalities and security notions required in practical applications.In this thesis, we study different approaches to realize efficient MPC for functionalities of practical importance with enhanced security notions including non-threshold adversary structures and malicious security.We attain improvement in communication and round complexity by focusing on specific classes of functions or limited but still non-threshold adversary structures.The main contributions of this thesis consist of five parts, which concern the following specific MPC tasks: non-interactive MPC (NIMPC) for symmetric functions and linear classifiers, homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) for low-degree polynomials, verifiably multiplicative secret sharing (VMSS), private information retrieval (PIR), and distributed noise generation for differential privacy.Concretely, we first propose efficient constructions of NIMPC protocols tailored to symmetric functions and linear classifiers.Our protocols improve the best-known communication complexity of existing protocols.In addition, we reveal that a previously proposed method to enhance security of NIMPC does not satisfy specified security requirements and we also fix the problem.Secondly, we propose constructions of HSS schemes that tolerate multipartite and general adversary structures assuming homomorphic encryption.Our schemes support parallel evaluation of a single low-degree polynomial and hence achieve better communication complexity than if we simply execute the previous HSS schemes in parallel.Thirdly, we present VMSS schemes tolerating multipartite adversary structures.Our schemes have smaller communication complexity than those obtained from the previous constructions applicable to general adversary structures.In the fourth part, we study the optimal communication complexity of error-correcting PIR.We asymptotically characterize it as a function of the database size and as a corollary, obtain more communication-efficient error-correcting PIR schemes than the previous ones.Finally, we provide three kinds of MPC protocols for generating noise drawn from probability distributions providing differential privacy.We improve the round or communication complexity of the previous protocols for distributed noise generation.We also extend our protocols so that they provide differential privacy against malicious adversaries.
We first study the problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) information theoretically secure for a general access structure.We do it in the model where private channels between players and a broadcast channel is given, and where an active, adaptive adversary can corrupt any set of players not in the access structure.In particular, we consider the complexity of protocols for this problem, as a function of the access structure and the number of players.For all access structures where VSS is possible at all, we show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a passive, static adversary.Previously, such a connection was only known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes.We then show an impossibility result indicating that a similar equivalence does hot hold for Multiparty Computation (MPC): we show that even if protocols are given black-box access for free to an idealized secret sharing scheme secure for the access structure in question, it is not possible to handle all relevant access structures efficiently, not even if the adversary is passive and static.In other words, general MPC can only be black-box reduced efficiently to secret sharing if extra properties of the secret sharing scheme used (such as linearity) are assumed.
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) enables parties to compute an arbitrary function without revealing each party's inputs. A typical MPC is secret-sharing based MPC (SS-MPC). In the SS-MPC, each party distributes its inputs, and the computation proceeds with secret shares that look exactly like random numbers distributed among the parties. In the SS-MPC protocol, the parties can compute any function represented as a circuit by using shares locally and communicating among the parties. In particular, when the parties compute a complex function composed of binary and arithmetic circuits, an efficient share conversion protocol facilitates the computation of it. An important conversion protocol is a bit-composition protocol that converts a k-dimensional vector with shares on ℤ2 (i.e., shares of binary sequence) to shares on ℤ2k (i.e., shares of decimal value). Previous studies proposed a maliciously secure bit-composition protocol with robustness, which is a security notion that all parties learn the correct output regardless of the attacker's behaviour. However, its security is dependent on a statistical parameter or proved in the random oracle model. In this paper, we propose a novel bit-composition protocol with robustness independent of a statistical parameter by introducing additional clients generating the pair of shares of random values only in the offline phase (which can be performed without the parties' inputs). Our protocol is based on a maliciously secure four-party protocol with one corruption using replicated secret sharing. The security of our protocol is proved in the standard model (which is a weaker assumption than the random oracle model). Our protocol achieves efficiency and the strongest security simultaneously. We also propose a protocol for the Hamming distance with robustness by modifying our bit-composition protocol. It can achieve a secure iris recognition service via MPC with robustness. Furthermore, we extend our protocol with a constant number of parties and clients to one with an arbitrary number of parties and clients.
In this thesis we study a problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) and Multiparty Computations (MPC) in a model where private channels between the players and a broadcast channel is available. The adversary is active, adaptive and has an unbounded computing power. The thesis is based on two papers [CDD00, CDD 99]. In [CDD00] we assume that the adversary can corrupt any set from a given adversary structure. In this setting we study a problem of doing efficient VSS and MPC given an access to a secret sharing scheme (SS). For all adversary structures where VSS is possible at all, we show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a passive, static adversary. Previously, such a connection was only known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes. We then show
In general, the (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme (SSS) does not allow unconditionally secure multiparty computation (MPC) for n <; 2k - 1 . Therefore, Iwamura research team has been focusing on conditions under which the secure MPC can be performed securely for n <; 2k - 1, and found that their secure MPC protocol for n <; 2k - 1 is allowed under these three conditions against semi-honest adversaries: (1) the secret information does not contain 0 in the secure multiplication; (2) there is a set of distributed values for 1 using random numbers unknown to the adversaries; (3) the position of the values in the set of distributed values handled by each server is fixed during the sequence of computation. However, their protocol is not secure against malicious adversaries while SPDZ, which is representative secure MPC protocol, is secure against malicious adversaries. Therefore, we propose a secure MPC protocol against malicious adversaries based on the protocol of Iwamura research team.
Introduction In this chapter we will show how the protocols we have seen so far can be generalized to be based on general linear secret-sharing schemes. Doing this generalization has several advantages: first, it allows us to design protocols that protect against general adversary structures, a concept we explain later, and second, it allows us to consider protocols in which the field that is used in defining the secret-sharing scheme can be of size independent of the number of players. This turns out to be an advantage for the applications of multiparty computation (MPC) that we consider later but cannot be done for the protocols that we have seen so far: to use Shamir's scheme for n players based on polynomials as we have seen, the field must be of size at least n +1. For now, we will only consider the theory for linear secret sharing that we need to construct the protocols in this chapter. However, we note already that to get full mileage from the more general applications of secret sharing and MPC, we need additional theory, in particular, about the asymptotic behavior of secret-sharing schemes. This material can be found in Chapter 11. General Adversary Structures The corruption tolerance of the protocols that we have seen so far has been characterized by only a single number t , the maximal number of corruptions that can be tolerated. This is also known as the threshold-t model . One way to motivate this might be to think of corruption of a player as something that requires the adversary to invest some amount of resource, such as time or money. If the adversary has only bounded resources, there should be a limit on the corruptions he or she can do. However, characterizing this limit by only an upper bound implicitly assumes that all players are equally hard to corrupt. In reality, this may be completely false: some players may have much better security than others, so a more realistic model might be that the adversary can corrupt a small number of well-protected players or a large number of poorly protected players. However, the threshold model does not allow us to express this.