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American Journal of Physics

Objectivity, retrocausation, and the experiment of Englert, Scully, and Walther

Ulrich Mohrhoff

Published Apr 1, 1999• 42 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In a recent contribution to this journal [Am. J. Phys. 64, 1468–1475 (1996)] I wrongly asserted that retrocausation in the Englert, Scully, and Walther (ESW) experiment (a double-slit interference experiment with atoms) can occur only until the atom arrives at the screen. In their response, Englert, Scully, and Walther [preceding paper] point out my fallacy but give an incomplete analysis of its origin. In this paper I trace this fallacy to a deep-seated preconception about time and reality. I show that among the two possible realistic interpretations of standard quantum mechanics, the reality-of-states view and the reality-of-phenomena view, only the latter is viable. It follows that retrocausation is a necessary feature of any realistic account of the ESW experiment based on standard quantum mechanics. Finally I eludicate the sense in which the spatial properties of quantum systems are objective, and show that they are extrinsic rather than intrinsic.

DOI
10.1119/1.19258

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In a recent contribution to this journal [Am. J. Phys. 64, 1468–1475 (1996)] I wrongly asserted that retrocausation in the Englert, Scully, and Walther (ESW) experiment (a double-slit interference experiment with atoms) can occur only until the atom arrives at the screen. In their response, Englert, Scully, and Walther [preceding paper] point out my fallacy but give an incomplete analysis of its origin. In this paper I trace this fallacy to a deep-seated preconception about time and reality. I show that among the two possible realistic interpretations of standard quantum mechanics, the reality-of-states view and the reality-of-phenomena view, only the latter is viable. It follows that retrocausation is a necessary feature of any realistic account of the ESW experiment based on standard quantum mechanics. Finally I eludicate the sense in which the spatial properties of quantum systems are objective, and show that they are extrinsic rather than intrinsic.
A two-slit experiment with atoms, proposed by Englert, Scully, and Walther, appears to permit experimenters to choose, after each atom has made its mark on the screen, whether the atom has passed through a particular slit or has, in some sense, passed through both of them. Through a misleading wording these authors even appear to endorse this interpretation. In actual fact, this choice exists only until the atom hits the screen. The said experiment thus is a ‘‘delayed-choice’’ experiment only in the semantically contingent sense of Wheeler.
The delayed-choice experiments of the type introduced by Wheeler and extended by Englert, Scully, Süssmann and Walther (ESSW) (1992 Z. Naturf. a 47 1175–86), and others, have formed a rich area for investigating the puzzling behaviour of particles undergoing quantum interference. The surprise provided by the original delayed-choice experiment led Wheeler to the conclusion that 'no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon', a radical explanation which implied that 'the past has no existence except as it is recorded in the present'. However Bohm et al (1985 Nature 315 294–97) have shown that the Bohm interpretation (BI) gives a straightforward account of the behaviour of the particle without resorting to such a radical explanation. The subsequent modifications of this experiment led both Aharonov and Vaidman (1996 Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal ed J T Cushing, A Fine and S Goldstein (Dordrecht: Kluwer) pp 141–54) and ESSW to conclude that the resulting Bohm-type trajectories in these new situations produce unacceptable properties. For example, if a cavity is placed in one arm of the interferometer, it will be excited by a particle travelling down the other arm. In other words, it is the particle that does not go through the cavity that gives up its energy! If this analysis is correct, this behaviour would be truly bizarre and could only be explained by an extreme non-local transfer of energy that is even stronger than that required in an Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR)-type process. In this paper, we show that this conclusion is not correct and that if the BI is used correctly, it gives a local explanation, which actually corresponds exactly to the standard quantum mechanics explanation offered by ESSW.
There is a very common fallacy, here called the separation fallacy, that is involved in the interpretation of quantum experiments involving a certain type of separation such as the: double-slit experiments, which-way interferometer experiments, polarization analyzer experiments, Stern-Gerlach experiments, and quantum eraser experiments. It is the separation fallacy that leads not only to flawed textbook accounts of these experiments but to flawed inferences about retrocausality in the context of "delayed choice" versions of separation experiments.
This paper presents a foundational thought experiment and proposes a radical ontological framework for interpreting quantum mechanics and the nature of time. It moves beyond conventional interpretations by testing them against a novel scenario: a hypothetical "time machine" (device 𝒲) capable of passively reading the past state of a quantum system without interacting with it. The central testbed is the classic double-slit experiment. In Stage 1, performed at time T_0, the experiment is run without any path detection, yielding the standard interference pattern. In Stage 2, at a later time T_0 + ΔT, the device 𝒲 is used to retroactively "read" the precise state of the system at the moment the electron passed the slit plane. The pivotal question is: What information about the electron's path will 𝒲 find? The analysis demonstrates that established interpretations face significant paradoxes: The Copenhagen Interpretation risks falling into retrocausality, as the mere potential for future path-information readout could retroactively collapse the interference pattern. The Many-Worlds Interpretation leads to internal inconsistency, as the deterministic, single-path history observed within a given branch by 𝒲 contradicts the interference pattern observed in that same branch's past. The de Broglie-Bohm (dBB) Interpretation, while positing a hidden trajectory, struggles with the mechanism of how 𝒲 could read this information without interacting with the guiding pilot wave, which is essential for the interference effect. As a resolution, the paper proposes a new ontological model based on a geometric, discrete conception of reality. The core tenets are: Fundamental Entities: Reality is a dynamic network of "p-gluons," postulated as geometric quanta of spacetime. Discrete Frames: Observable reality is not continuous but consists of a sequential generation of discrete, global "frames" (K_i). Each frame is a complete geometric snapshot of the entire p-gluon network's configuration. The Axiom of Record Economy (AOZ): This is the central formal postulate. At each generative step, at most one frame from the space of locally possible states (ℋ_poss) is physically realized. A frame is generated if and only if it satisfies a condition of global consistency with the entire history, as determined by a fundamental "algorithm of reality" (𝒜). Crucially, states in ℋ_poss that are not selected for generation attain no ontological status whatsoever; they are abstract possibilities, not unrecorded facts. Emergent Time: Observable time is not a fundamental background parameter but an emergent measure of the rate (Ḳ) at which these global frames are generated. Within this Frame-Recording Ontology, the time-machine paradox finds an elegant and decisive solution: In the double-slit experiment without a detector, the only configuration consistent (via algorithm 𝒜) with the future observation of an interference pattern is a global superposed state. This state, describable as an extended pattern of geometric correlations in the p-gluon network encompassing both slits, is the one and only frame generated (K_T0). Deterministic "path" frames (electron at S_1 or S_2) are not generated; they remain unrealized abstractions. Therefore, when device 𝒲 reads the past, it accesses the sole ontological record: frame K_T0. It finds no geometric data corresponding to a classical path because such data was never physically recorded. The answer is not "the information is hidden" (epistemology), but "the corresponding fact was never generated" (ontology). The paper elaborates on the non-anthropomorphic, non-teleological nature of algorithm 𝒜, framing it as a constraining structure akin to a variational principle rather than a conscious selector. It discusses the model's implications for the measurement problem (reinterpreted as the generation of a "classical" frame), nonlocality, and its philosophical shift from epistemic to ontological indeterminacy. Methodology: The work is developed using the author's "Pencil Case Philosophy" or "Sonar Modeling" approach. This methodology begins by constructing minimal axiomatic building blocks (p-gluons, AOZ, 𝒜), activates the system, and rigorously traces its logical consequences without prior commitment to reproducing existing theoretical frameworks.
This article reconsiders the double-slit experiment by establishing a new type of relationship between it and the concept of entanglement. While the role of entanglement in the double-slit experiment has been considered, this particular relationship appears to have been missed in preceding discussions of the experiment, even by Bohr, who extensively used it to support his argument concerning quantum physics. The main reason for this relationship is the different roles of the diaphragm with slits in two setups, S1 and S2, defining the double-slit experiment as a quantum experiment. In S1, in each individual run of the experiment one can in principle (even if not actually) know throughout which slit the quantum object considered has passed; in S2 this knowledge is in principle impossible, which impossibility is coextensive with the appearance of the interference pattern, once a sufficient number of individual runs of the experiment have taken place. The article offers the following argument based on two new concepts, an "experimentally quantum object" and an "ontologically quantum object." In S1 the diaphragm can be treated as part of an observational arrangement and thus considered as a classical object, while the object passing through one or the other slit is considered as an "ontologically quantum object," defined as an object necessary to establish a quantum phenomenon. By contrast, in S2, the diaphragm can, via the concept of Heisenberg-von-Neumann cut, be treated as an "experimentally quantum object," defined as an object treatable by quantum theory, even while possibly being an ontologically classical object. This interaction is not an observation but a quantum entanglement between these two quantum objects, one ontologically and one experimentally quantum. This argument is grounded in a particular interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum theory, which belongs to the class of interpretations designated here as "reality without realism" (RWR) interpretations. The article also argues that wave-particle complementarity, with which the concept of complementarity is often associated, plays little, if any, role in quantum physics, or in Bohr's thinking, and may be misleading in considering the double-slit experiment, often explained by using this complementarity.