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American Journal of Physics

Restoration of interference and the fallacy of delayed choice: Concerning an experiment proposed by Englert, Scully, and Walther

Ulrich Mohrhoff

Published Dec 1, 1996• 34 citations
Publisher

Abstract

A two-slit experiment with atoms, proposed by Englert, Scully, and Walther, appears to permit experimenters to choose, after each atom has made its mark on the screen, whether the atom has passed through a particular slit or has, in some sense, passed through both of them. Through a misleading wording these authors even appear to endorse this interpretation. In actual fact, this choice exists only until the atom hits the screen. The said experiment thus is a ‘‘delayed-choice’’ experiment only in the semantically contingent sense of Wheeler.

DOI
10.1119/1.18411

Related papers

Objectivity, retrocausation, and the experiment of Englert, Scully, and Walther

Ulrich Mohrhoff

In a recent contribution to this journal [Am. J. Phys. 64, 1468–1475 (1996)] I wrongly asserted that retrocausation in the Englert, Scully, and Walther (ESW) experiment (a double-slit interference experiment with atoms) can occur only until the atom arrives at the screen. In their response, Englert, Scully, and Walther [preceding paper] point out my fallacy but give an incomplete analysis of its origin. In this paper I trace this fallacy to a deep-seated preconception about time and reality. I show that among the two possible realistic interpretations of standard quantum mechanics, the reality-of-states view and the reality-of-phenomena view, only the latter is viable. It follows that retrocausation is a necessary feature of any realistic account of the ESW experiment based on standard quantum mechanics. Finally I eludicate the sense in which the spatial properties of quantum systems are objective, and show that they are extrinsic rather than intrinsic.

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We exploit the notion of the which-slit detector, introduced by Englert, Scully and Walther (ESW), to show that two incompatible properties can be detected together for each particle hitting the screen, without disturbing the centre-of-mass motion of the particle.

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Delayed-choice experiments and the Bohm approach

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The delayed-choice experiments of the type introduced by Wheeler and extended by Englert, Scully, Süssmann and Walther (ESSW) (1992 Z. Naturf. a 47 1175–86), and others, have formed a rich area for investigating the puzzling behaviour of particles undergoing quantum interference. The surprise provided by the original delayed-choice experiment led Wheeler to the conclusion that 'no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon', a radical explanation which implied that 'the past has no existence except as it is recorded in the present'. However Bohm et al (1985 Nature 315 294–97) have shown that the Bohm interpretation (BI) gives a straightforward account of the behaviour of the particle without resorting to such a radical explanation. The subsequent modifications of this experiment led both Aharonov and Vaidman (1996 Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal ed J T Cushing, A Fine and S Goldstein (Dordrecht: Kluwer) pp 141–54) and ESSW to conclude that the resulting Bohm-type trajectories in these new situations produce unacceptable properties. For example, if a cavity is placed in one arm of the interferometer, it will be excited by a particle travelling down the other arm. In other words, it is the particle that does not go through the cavity that gives up its energy! If this analysis is correct, this behaviour would be truly bizarre and could only be explained by an extreme non-local transfer of energy that is even stronger than that required in an Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR)-type process. In this paper, we show that this conclusion is not correct and that if the BI is used correctly, it gives a local explanation, which actually corresponds exactly to the standard quantum mechanics explanation offered by ESSW.

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Recently, Mohrhoff [Am. J. Phys. 64, 1468–1475 (1996)] has analyzed a thought experiment of ours [Nature (London) 351, 111–116 (1991)] where a double-slit interferometer for atoms is supplemented by a pair of which-way detectors. Owing to the quantum nature of these detectors, the experimenter can choose between acquiring which-way knowledge and observing an interference pattern. The latter option makes use of a procedure called “quantum erasure.” Mohrhoff (along with other bright colleagues who have made similar statements) claims erroneously that the experimenter has to make this choice before the atom hits the screen. We readdress this issue here and demonstrate that our original assertion was correct: The experimenter can choose between which-way knowledge and quantum erasure at any time, even after the atom has left its mark on the screen.

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Ruth E. Kastner

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arXiv:1205.3258•ISRN Mathematical Analysis•Dec 2, 2011•10 citations
A two-slit experiment with atoms, proposed by Englert, Scully, and Walther, appears to permit experimenters to choose, after each atom has made its mark on the screen, whether the atom has passed through a particular slit or has, in some sense, passed through both of them. Through a misleading wording these authors even appear to endorse this interpretation. In actual fact, this choice exists only until the atom hits the screen. The said experiment thus is a ‘‘delayed-choice’’ experiment only in the semantically contingent sense of Wheeler.
In a recent contribution to this journal [Am. J. Phys. 64, 1468–1475 (1996)] I wrongly asserted that retrocausation in the Englert, Scully, and Walther (ESW) experiment (a double-slit interference experiment with atoms) can occur only until the atom arrives at the screen. In their response, Englert, Scully, and Walther [preceding paper] point out my fallacy but give an incomplete analysis of its origin. In this paper I trace this fallacy to a deep-seated preconception about time and reality. I show that among the two possible realistic interpretations of standard quantum mechanics, the reality-of-states view and the reality-of-phenomena view, only the latter is viable. It follows that retrocausation is a necessary feature of any realistic account of the ESW experiment based on standard quantum mechanics. Finally I eludicate the sense in which the spatial properties of quantum systems are objective, and show that they are extrinsic rather than intrinsic.
The delayed-choice experiments of the type introduced by Wheeler and extended by Englert, Scully, Süssmann and Walther (ESSW) (1992 Z. Naturf. a 47 1175–86), and others, have formed a rich area for investigating the puzzling behaviour of particles undergoing quantum interference. The surprise provided by the original delayed-choice experiment led Wheeler to the conclusion that 'no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon', a radical explanation which implied that 'the past has no existence except as it is recorded in the present'. However Bohm et al (1985 Nature 315 294–97) have shown that the Bohm interpretation (BI) gives a straightforward account of the behaviour of the particle without resorting to such a radical explanation. The subsequent modifications of this experiment led both Aharonov and Vaidman (1996 Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal ed J T Cushing, A Fine and S Goldstein (Dordrecht: Kluwer) pp 141–54) and ESSW to conclude that the resulting Bohm-type trajectories in these new situations produce unacceptable properties. For example, if a cavity is placed in one arm of the interferometer, it will be excited by a particle travelling down the other arm. In other words, it is the particle that does not go through the cavity that gives up its energy! If this analysis is correct, this behaviour would be truly bizarre and could only be explained by an extreme non-local transfer of energy that is even stronger than that required in an Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR)-type process. In this paper, we show that this conclusion is not correct and that if the BI is used correctly, it gives a local explanation, which actually corresponds exactly to the standard quantum mechanics explanation offered by ESSW.
Recently, Mohrhoff [Am. J. Phys. 64, 1468–1475 (1996)] has analyzed a thought experiment of ours [Nature (London) 351, 111–116 (1991)] where a double-slit interferometer for atoms is supplemented by a pair of which-way detectors. Owing to the quantum nature of these detectors, the experimenter can choose between acquiring which-way knowledge and observing an interference pattern. The latter option makes use of a procedure called “quantum erasure.” Mohrhoff (along with other bright colleagues who have made similar statements) claims erroneously that the experimenter has to make this choice before the atom hits the screen. We readdress this issue here and demonstrate that our original assertion was correct: The experimenter can choose between which-way knowledge and quantum erasure at any time, even after the atom has left its mark on the screen.