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Tsinghua Science & Technology

Simplified design for concurrent statistical zero-knowledge arguments

Puwen Wei, Guoyan Zhang, Lijiang Zhang, Xiaoyun Wang

Published Apr 1, 2009• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper shows that the protocol presented by Goyal et al. can be further simplified for a one-way function, with the simplified protocol being more practical for the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Goyal et al. provided a general transformation from any honest verifier statistical zero-knowledge argument to a concurrent statistical zero-knowledge argument. Their transformation relies only on the existence of one-way functions. For the simplified transformation, the witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge protocols in “parallel” not only plays the role of preamble but also removes some computational zero-knowledge proofs, which Goyal et al. used to prove the existence of the valid openings to the commitments. Therefore, although some computational zero-knowledge proofs are replaced with a weaker notion, the witness indistinguishable protocol, the proof of soundness can still go through.

DOI
10.1016/s1007-0214(09)70038-0

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This paper shows that the protocol presented by Goyal et al. can be further simplified for a one-way function, with the simplified protocol being more practical for the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Goyal et al. provided a general transformation from any honest verifier statistical zero-knowledge argument to a concurrent statistical zero-knowledge argument. Their transformation relies only on the existence of one-way functions. For the simplified transformation, the witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge protocols in “parallel” not only plays the role of preamble but also removes some computational zero-knowledge proofs, which Goyal et al. used to prove the existence of the valid openings to the commitments. Therefore, although some computational zero-knowledge proofs are replaced with a weaker notion, the witness indistinguishable protocol, the proof of soundness can still go through.
We provide the first construction of a concurrent and non-malleable zero knowledge argument for every language in NP. We stress that our construction is in the plain model with no common random string, trusted parties, or super-polynomial simulation. That is, we construct a zero knowledge protocol Pi such that for every polynomial-time adversary that can adaptively and concurrently schedule polynomially many executions of Pi, and corrupt some of the verifiers and some of the provers in these sessions, there is a polynomial-time simulator that can simulate a transcript of the entire execution, along with the witnesses for all statements proven by a corrupt prover to an honest verifier Our security model is the traditional model for concurrent zero knowledge, where the statements to be proven by the honest provers are fixed in advance and do not depend on the previous history (but can be correlated with each other); corrupted provers, of course, can chose the statements adaptively. We also prove that there exists some functionality F (a combination of zero knowledge and oblivious transfer) such that it is impossible to obtain a concurrent non-malleable protocol for F in this model. Previous impossibility results for composable protocols ruled out existence of protocols for a wider class of functionalities {including zero knowledge!) but only if these protocols were required to remain secure when executed concurrently with arbitrarily chosen different protocols (Lindell, FOCS 2003) or if these protocols were required to remain secure when the honest parties' inputs in each execution are chosen adaptively based on the results of previous executions (Lindell, TCC2004). We obtain an Otilde(n) -round protocol under the assumption that one-to-one one-way functions exist. This can be improved to Otilde(k log n) rounds under the assumption that there exist k-round statistically hiding commitment schemes. Our protocol is a black-box zero knowledge protocol
We propose the first black-box construction of non-malleable commitments according to the standard notion of non-malleability with respect to commitment. Our construction additionally only requires a constant number of rounds and is based only on (black-box use of) one-way functions. Prior to our work, no black-box construction of non-malleable commitments was known (except for relaxed notions of security) in any (polynomial) number of rounds based on any cryptographic assumption. This closes the wide gap existent between black-box and non-black-box constructions for the problem of non-malleable commitments. Our construction relies on (and can be seen as a generalization of) the recent non-malleable commitment scheme of Goyal (STOC 2011). We also show how to get black-box constructions for a host of other cryptographic primitives. We extend our construction to get constant-round concurrent non-malleable commitments, constant-round multi-party coin tossing, and non-malleable statistically hiding commitments (satisfying the notion of non-malleability with respect to opening). All of the mentioned results make only a black-box use of one-way functions. Our primary technical contribution is a novel way of implementing the proof of consistency typically required in the constructions of non-malleable commitments (and other related primitives). We do this by relying on ideas from the ``zero-knowledge from secure multi-party computation" paradigm of Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai (STOC 2007). We extend in a novel way this ``computation in the head" paradigm (which can be though of as bringing powerful error-correcting codes into purely computational setting). To construct a non-malleable commitment scheme, we apply our computation in the head techniques to the recent (constant-round) construction of Goyal. Along the way, we also present a simplification of the construction of Goyal where a part of the protocol is implemented in an information theoretic manner. Such a simplification is crucial for getting a black-box construction. This is done by making use of pair wise-independent hash functions and strong randomness extractors. We show that our techniques have multiple applications, as elaborated in the paper. Hence, we believe our techniques might be useful in other settings in future.
In this work, we consider the long-standing open question of constructing constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocols in the plain model. Resolving this question is known to require non-black-box techniques. We consider non-black-box techniques for zero-knowledge based on knowledge assumptions, a line of thinking initiated by the work of Hada and Tanaka (CRYPTO 1998). Prior to our work, it was not known whether knowledge assumptions could be used for achieving security in the concurrent setting, due to a number of significant limitations that we discuss here. Nevertheless, we obtain the following results: 1. We obtain the first constant round concurrent zero-knowledge argument for \textbf{NP} in the plain model based on a new variant of knowledge of exponent assumption. Furthermore, our construction avoids the inefficiency inherent in previous non-black-box techniques such that those of Barak (FOCS 2001); we obtain our result through an efficient protocol compiler. 2. Unlike Hada and Tanaka, we do not require a knowledge assumption to argue the soundness of our protocol. Instead, we use a discrete log like assumption, which we call Diffie-Hellman Logarithm Assumption, to prove the soundness of our protocol. 3. We give evidence that our new variant of knowledge of exponent assumption is in fact plausible. In particular, we show that our assumption holds in the generic group model. 4. Knowledge assumptions are especially delicate assumptions whose plausibility may be hard to gauge. We give a novel framework to express knowledge assumptions in a more flexible way, which may allow for formulation of plausible assumptions and exploration of their impact and application in cryptography.
Commitment schemes are fundamental building blocks in cryptography, and have wide applications in constructing various protocols. Non-malleable commitment considers concurrent executions of a commitment scheme against a man-in-the-middle adversary. In this paper, we investigate non-malleability of statistically hiding commitment schemes, and present the first concurrent non-malleable statistically hiding commitment scheme. Our protocol admits black-box simulation, and relies on the robust (stand-alone) non-malleable commitment and specially designed witness indistinguishable proofs to achieve concurrent non-malleability. Based on the one-way function assumption, the commit phase of our protocol needs polynomial rounds, and the decommit phase needs super-logarithmic rounds.
Knowledge extraction is a fundamental notion, modeling knowledge possession in a computational complexity sense. The notion provides a tool for cryptographic protocol design and analysis, enabling one to argue about the internal state of protocol players. We define and investigate the relative power of the notion of “concurrent knowledge-extraction ” (CKE) in the concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK) bare public-key (BPK) model, namely we investigate how to formally treat knowledge possessions for parties interacting over the Internet (say). We further investigate the implementation of a generic scheme for this new notion of CKE concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK-CKE) arguments for N P in this model. Concurrent knowledge-extraction in the public-key model essentially means that for any N P statement whose validation is successfully conveyed by a possibly malicious prover to an honest verifier (with registered public-key) employing concurrent interactions, the prover “must know” the corresponding witness. It is shown that under any one-way function (OWF), concurrent knowledge-extraction is strictly stronger than concurrent soundness in the BPK model (as is demonstrated by concrete attacks). Then, in light of our concurrent interleaving and malleating attacks, we formalize
We show that if any one-way function exists, then 3-round concurrent zero-knowledge arguments for all NP problems can be built in a model where a short auxiliary string with a prescribed distribution is available to the players. We also show that all known efficient identification schemes using specialized assumptions can be modified to work in this model with no essential loss of efficiency. We argue that the assumptions of the model will be satisfied in most practical scenarios where public key cryptography is used, in particular our construction works given any secure public key infrastructure. Finally, we point out that in a model with preprocessing (and no auxiliary string) proposed earlier, concurrent zero-knowledge for NP can be based on any one-way function.