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Electronic colloquium on computational complexity

Concurrent Knowledge-Extraction in the Public-Key Model.

Moti M. Yung, Yunlei Zhao

Published Jan 1, 2007• 5 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Knowledge extraction is a fundamental notion, modeling knowledge possession in a computational complexity sense. The notion provides a tool for cryptographic protocol design and analysis, enabling one to argue about the internal state of protocol players. We define and investigate the relative power of the notion of “concurrent knowledge-extraction ” (CKE) in the concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK) bare public-key (BPK) model, namely we investigate how to formally treat knowledge possessions for parties interacting over the Internet (say). We further investigate the implementation of a generic scheme for this new notion of CKE concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK-CKE) arguments for N P in this model. Concurrent knowledge-extraction in the public-key model essentially means that for any N P statement whose validation is successfully conveyed by a possibly malicious prover to an honest verifier (with registered public-key) employing concurrent interactions, the prover “must know” the corresponding witness. It is shown that under any one-way function (OWF), concurrent knowledge-extraction is strictly stronger than concurrent soundness in the BPK model (as is demonstrated by concrete attacks). Then, in light of our concurrent interleaving and malleating attacks, we formalize

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Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science•Oct 1, 2006•82 citations
Knowledge extraction is a fundamental notion, modeling knowledge possession in a computational complexity sense. The notion provides a tool for cryptographic protocol design and analysis, enabling one to argue about the internal state of protocol players. We define and investigate the relative power of the notion of “concurrent knowledge-extraction ” (CKE) in the concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK) bare public-key (BPK) model, namely we investigate how to formally treat knowledge possessions for parties interacting over the Internet (say). We further investigate the implementation of a generic scheme for this new notion of CKE concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK-CKE) arguments for N P in this model. Concurrent knowledge-extraction in the public-key model essentially means that for any N P statement whose validation is successfully conveyed by a possibly malicious prover to an honest verifier (with registered public-key) employing concurrent interactions, the prover “must know” the corresponding witness. It is shown that under any one-way function (OWF), concurrent knowledge-extraction is strictly stronger than concurrent soundness in the BPK model (as is demonstrated by concrete attacks). Then, in light of our concurrent interleaving and malleating attacks, we formalize
We consider a type of zero-knowledge protocols that are of interest for their practical applications within networks like the Internet: efficient zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge that remain secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks. In an effort to reduce the setup assumptions required for efficient zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge that remain secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks, we consider a model, which we call the Authenticated Public-Key (APK) model. The APK model seems to significantly reduce the setup assumptions made by the CRS model (as no trusted party or honest execution of a centralized algorithm are required), and can be seen as a slightly stronger variation of the Bare Public-Key (BPK) model from \cite{CGGM,MR}, and a weaker variation of the registered public-key model used in \cite{BCNP}. We then define and study man-in-the-middle attacks in the APK model. Our main result is a constant-round concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for any polynomial-time relation (associated to a language in NP\mathcal{NP}NP), under the (minimal) assumption of the existence of a one-way function family. Furthermore,We show time-efficient instantiations of our protocol based on known number-theoretic assumptions. We also note a negative result with respect to further reducing the setup assumptions of our protocol to those in the (unauthenticated) BPK model, by showing that concurrently non-malleable zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge in the BPK model are only possible for trivial languages.
A zero-knowledge protocol allows a prover to convince a verifier of the correctness of a statement without disclosing any other information to the verifier. It is a basic tool and widely used in many other cryptographic applications. However, when stand-alone zero-knowledge protocols are used in complex environments, e.g., the Internet, the basic properties may not be sufficient. This is why researchers considered security of zero-knowledge protocols under concurrent composition and manin-the-middle attacks. Moreover, it is very likely that an adversary might break computers that run the protocol and get internal information of the parties. It is thus necessary to take account of the security of zero-knowledge protocols when adaptive corruptions are allowed. Previous adaptively secure zero-knowledge protocols work either in a stand-alone setting, or in a concurrent setting with trusted setup assumptions. In this paper, we study adaptive security of zero-knowledge protocols under both concurrent self composition and man-in-the-middle attacks in the plain model (i.e., without any set-up assumptions). We provide a construction of adaptively secure concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge proof/argument for every language in NP.
In this paper we resolve an open problem regarding resettable zero knowledge in the bare public-key (BPK for short) model: Does there exist constant round resettable zero knowledge argument with concurrent soundness for NP\mathcal{NP}NP in BPK model without assuming \emph{sub-exponential hardness}? We give a positive answer to this question by presenting such a protocol for any language in NP\mathcal{NP}NP in the bare public-key model assuming only collision-resistant hash functions against \emph{polynomial-time} adversaries.
We provide the first construction of a concurrent and non-malleable zero knowledge argument for every language in NP. We stress that our construction is in the plain model with no common random string, trusted parties, or super-polynomial simulation. That is, we construct a zero knowledge protocol Pi such that for every polynomial-time adversary that can adaptively and concurrently schedule polynomially many executions of Pi, and corrupt some of the verifiers and some of the provers in these sessions, there is a polynomial-time simulator that can simulate a transcript of the entire execution, along with the witnesses for all statements proven by a corrupt prover to an honest verifier Our security model is the traditional model for concurrent zero knowledge, where the statements to be proven by the honest provers are fixed in advance and do not depend on the previous history (but can be correlated with each other); corrupted provers, of course, can chose the statements adaptively. We also prove that there exists some functionality F (a combination of zero knowledge and oblivious transfer) such that it is impossible to obtain a concurrent non-malleable protocol for F in this model. Previous impossibility results for composable protocols ruled out existence of protocols for a wider class of functionalities {including zero knowledge!) but only if these protocols were required to remain secure when executed concurrently with arbitrarily chosen different protocols (Lindell, FOCS 2003) or if these protocols were required to remain secure when the honest parties' inputs in each execution are chosen adaptively based on the results of previous executions (Lindell, TCC2004). We obtain an Otilde(n) -round protocol under the assumption that one-to-one one-way functions exist. This can be improved to Otilde(k log n) rounds under the assumption that there exist k-round statistically hiding commitment schemes. Our protocol is a black-box zero knowledge protocol