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Zeitschrift für Naturforschung A

Quantenmechanik und Objektivierbarkeit/ Quantum Mechanics and Objective Reality

Kurt Baumann

Published Dec 1, 1970• 9 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Quantum Mechanics and Objective Reality A Schrödinger function (or a density matrix) can he ascribed only to an object whose isolation time is larger than its time of revolution. This condition can never be satisfied for macroscopic bodies. Consequently, the "cut" between object and observer must not separate a macroscopic body (measuring apparatus) from the rest of the universe. Hence in an analysis of the measuring process, the state vector of the universe must be introduced. An interpretation of this state vector is given which provides an objective description of nature.

DOI
10.1515/zna-1970-1226

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The main theme of this book is the idea that quantum mechanics is valid not only for microscopic objects but also for the macroscopic apparatus used for quantum mechanical measurements. The author demonstrates the intimate relations that exist between quantum mechanics and its interpretation which are induced by the quantum mechanical measurement process. Consequently, the book is concerned both with the philosophical, metatheoretical problems of interpretations and with the more formal problems of quantum object theory. The consequences of this approach turn out to be partly very promising and partly rather disappointing. On the one hand, it is possible to give a rigorous justification of some important parts of interpretation, such as probability, by means of object theory. On the other hand, the problem of the objectification of measurement results leads to inconsistencies which cannot be resolved in an obvious way. This open problem has far-reaching consequences for the possibility of recognising an objective reality in physics.

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arXiv:quant-ph/0401179•International Journal of Quantum Information•Jun 1, 2004•10 citations
Abstract Quantum Mechanics and Objective Reality A Schrödinger function (or a density matrix) can he ascribed only to an object whose isolation time is larger than its time of revolution. This condition can never be satisfied for macroscopic bodies. Consequently, the "cut" between object and observer must not separate a macroscopic body (measuring apparatus) from the rest of the universe. Hence in an analysis of the measuring process, the state vector of the universe must be introduced. An interpretation of this state vector is given which provides an objective description of nature.
The main theme of this book is the idea that quantum mechanics is valid not only for microscopic objects but also for the macroscopic apparatus used for quantum mechanical measurements. The author demonstrates the intimate relations that exist between quantum mechanics and its interpretation which are induced by the quantum mechanical measurement process. Consequently, the book is concerned both with the philosophical, metatheoretical problems of interpretations and with the more formal problems of quantum object theory. The consequences of this approach turn out to be partly very promising and partly rather disappointing. On the one hand, it is possible to give a rigorous justification of some important parts of interpretation, such as probability, by means of object theory. On the other hand, the problem of the objectification of measurement results leads to inconsistencies which cannot be resolved in an obvious way. This open problem has far-reaching consequences for the possibility of recognising an objective reality in physics.
Abstract We argue that the formalism of quantum theory can be given an empirical interpretation (in the sense of a connection with observable phenomena) in the same way as in any other empirical theory. In particular, there is no need to supplement the unitary time evolution governed by a Schrödinger‐type of equation with a “projection postulate” that applies only to measurements. As a consequence, the quantum formalism has the same status as the formalisms of older physical theories, and is capable of the same philosophical interpretations. The most natural interpretation, we argue, is to conceive of the formalism as an objective – although highly abstract – description of reality.
The Semiotic Interpretation (SI) of QM pushes further the Von Neumann point of view that `experience only makes statements of this type: an observer has made a certain observation; and never any like this: a physical quantity has a certain value.' The supposition that the observables of a system `possess' objective values is purely idealistic. According to the SI view, the state- vector collapse cannot result from the Schroedinger evolution of a system (even with its environment), but only from the empirical production of a mathematical symbol, irreducible to the quantum level. The production of a symbol always takes some time. Thus the state-vector collapse cannot be instantaneous (Schneider 1994), a specific prediction of the present model. From this interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, the appearances of the body are the result of state-vector collapses of several types, i.e. the production of different kinds of symbols. In fact the universe of symbols is very rich: a symbol can have a conceptual `value' (like in physics and then give rise to a measurement), or other qualitative values (like in many human behaviors). In the latter case, the Semiotic Interpretation of QM gives a way to understand how a mental representation can modify the state of the body.
Abstract Unlike classical mechanics, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics does not provide an objective space-time picture of the actual history of a physical system. This paper suggests how the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics can be reformulated, without changing the mathematical content of the theory or its detailed agreement with experiment and without introducing any hidden variables, in order to provide an objective, covariant, Lagrangian description of reality which is deterministic and time-symmetric on the microscopic scale. The basis of this description can be expressed either as an action functional or as a summation over Feynman diagrams or paths. The probability laws associated with the quantum-mechanical measurement process, and the asymmetry in time of the principles of macroscopic causality and of the laws of statistical mechanics, are interpreted as consequences of the particular boundary conditions that apply to the actual universe. The objective interpretation does not include the observer and the measurement process among the fundamental concepts of the theory, but it does entail a revision of our ideas of determinism and of time, since in a Lagrangian theory both initial and final boundary conditions on the action functional are required.
The measuring process is the interface of classical and quantum phenomena. A measuring apparatus must be described by quantum mechanics while it interacts with the quantum system under observation. Then, it has to be be given a classical description so that the result of the measurement appears as objective reality. Alternatively, that apparatus may be treated at all times by quantum mechanics. In that case, it never achieves the “objective” status, but it can be measured by a second apparatus which has such a dual description. The question is whether these two different descriptions of the same apparatus are mutually consistent. A detailed analysis leads to the conclusion that not every physical system is a legitimate measuring apparatus. The quantum measurement problem has a satisfactory solution only if the measuring apparatus is properly designed.
Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.