The Semiotic Interpretation (SI) of QM pushes further the Von Neumann point of view that `experience only makes statements of this type: an observer has made a certain observation; and never any like this: a physical quantity has a certain value.' The supposition that the observables of a system `possess' objective values is purely idealistic. According to the SI view, the state- vector collapse cannot result from the Schroedinger evolution of a system (even with its environment), but only from the empirical production of a mathematical symbol, irreducible to the quantum level. The production of a symbol always takes some time. Thus the state-vector collapse cannot be instantaneous (Schneider 1994), a specific prediction of the present model. From this interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, the appearances of the body are the result of state-vector collapses of several types, i.e. the production of different kinds of symbols. In fact the universe of symbols is very rich: a symbol can have a conceptual `value' (like in physics and then give rise to a measurement), or other qualitative values (like in many human behaviors). In the latter case, the Semiotic Interpretation of QM gives a way to understand how a mental representation can modify the state of the body.
The Semiotic Interpretation (SI) of QM pushes further the Von Neumann point of view that experience only makes statements of this type: an observer has made a certain observation; and never any like this: a physical quantity has a certain value.' The supposition that the observables of a system possess' objective values is purely idealistic. According to the SI view, the state- vector collapse cannot result from the Schroedinger evolution of a system (even with its environment), but only from the empirical production of a mathematical symbol, irreducible to the quantum level. The production of a symbol always takes some time. Thus the state-vector collapse cannot be instantaneous (Schneider 1994), a specific prediction of the present model. From this interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, the appearances of the body are the result of state-vector collapses of several types, i.e. the production of different kinds of symbols. In fact the universe of symbols is very rich: a symbol can have a conceptual `value' (like in physics and then give rise to a measurement), or other qualitative values (like in many human behaviors). In the latter case, the Semiotic Interpretation of QM gives a way to understand how a mental representation can modify the state of the body.
This book is a treat, a collection of essays about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics that is guaranteed to move the needle: serious, original, and relatively accessible. The essays develop cutting-edge views by thought-leading authors on questions that matter for the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mind, and while to follow along you need to know what supervenience is and what an eigenstate is, the majority of essays should be accessible to advanced undergraduates (i.e., those who have taken a rigorous introductory course in quantum mechanics as well as a course or two in the philosophy of mind).Why care about the relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics? If you are coming from physics, your point of entry is probably the measurement problem. When you let quantum systems evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, they enter into superpositions of mutually incompatible states. How can this be reconciled with the testimony of our senses that such systems are always in one state or the other when we measure them (with a probability distribution given by the Born rule)? This is the measurement problem, and it concerns consciousness because it draws from the testimony of our senses.If you are coming from the philosophy of mind, your primary concern is probably the mind-body problem: the task of accounting for how consciousness arises out of or fits into physical reality. If consciousness is reducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to establish that reduction? If consciousness is irreducible, how might the details of quantum mechanics make it harder, or easier, to explain why consciousness exists, or to find some work for it to do in the world? You may also be concerned with the structure and function of consciousness: for example, you may hold that minds can do things that classical digital computers cannot, and take it that we must look to the quantum realm to discover how.If you are not already entrenched, you might just wonder what kind of world we live in. The mechanistic philosophy of centuries past seemed to disenchant the world, rendering it a place of barren corpuscles banging into one another, leaving no room for mind or meaning, except perhaps as patterns in the collisions, or useless epiphenomena. But quantum mechanics and its relativistic generalizations force a rethinking of the mechanistic picture from the ground up. Once the dust has settled—if it ever does—we may find reasons to relegate consciousness once again to the shadows. But we may also find reasons to give it pride of place. If you are after scientific reasons to reenchant the world, this is a good place to look.The entries in this volume address these questions and others besides. The volume is organized into three parts. The first part contains four essays about the idea that consciousness causes (or constrains) quantum collapse. The second part contains eight essays discussing other ways that consciousness might contribute to theories of quantum mechanics. The third part contains five essays about how quantum mechanics might contribute to an ultimate theory of consciousness. I’ll follow the book’s order.In chapter 1, David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen develop a new consciousness-triggered collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics. On their approach, consciousness has a strict physical correlate (perhaps given by quantum integrated information theory), it is approximately superposition-resistant, and collapse dynamics are continuous (à la Philip Pearle). They respond to the standard objections that a consciousness-collapse link makes the collapse mechanism imprecise and requires dualism, as well as to worries about Quantum Zeno, among others. Crucially, their approach allows that superpositions of consciousness are possible: their motivation is to give the view a run for its money and to find work for consciousness to do in the universe, not to rid the world of all traces of superposed consciousness. One question: In taking consciousness itself to be superposition-resistant (rather than the environmental systems it asks questions about, as Henry Stapp suggests), we appear to favor internalism over externalism. What would an externalist variant look like? Another question: How exactly would experimental results—for example, that simple enough systems with maximal Φ remain in coherent superposition—constrain our theoretical options? If to accommodate this we have to impose an experimentally determined threshold for the minimal absolute Φ for consciousness, will that mean that on the physicalist version of the view, the property we privilege for superposition-resistance is just an arbitrary collection of atoms?In chapter 2, Elias Okon and Miguel Angel Sebastian defend a consciousness-collapse theory that they call the Subjective-Objective collapse model. Like Chalmers and McQueen, Okon and Sebastian invoke a Pearle-style continuous collapse dynamics and think of consciousness as only weakly superposition-resistant. A key contribution is the treatment of a worry about multiple realizability (i.e., the way that some property of biological neurons and some other property of artificial neurons might both realize the state of being in pain). The problem is that it is not straightforward to define Hermitian operators whose eigenstates are disjunctions of the eigenstates of other Hermitian operators: you must ensure orthogonality (“being red or being a circle” is not orthogonal to “being red or being square”). In answer, the authors point out that we don’t need each multiply realizable phenomenal state to be an eigenstate of our collapse operator; it suffices that each way of realizing each phenomenal state is an eigenstate. One question is whether this problematizes the dancing qualia argument. A second worry is that we still must find a suitable basis for Hilbert space. But theories of consciousness may constrain both position and momentum: for example, both distances between neurons and how energy is transferred. We can talk about wave packets, but these will not get us eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.In chapter 3, J. Acacio de Barros and Carlos Montemayor suggest that if a mentality-triggered collapse theory is what you want, you should opt for intentionality rather than phenomenality. This is because, first, we have evidence from psychophysics that there is unconscious perception. Second, the first-personal data that motivate collapse theory concern intentionality: we remember only recording definite values; our decisions about what to measure affect the outcomes we see. First question: Can the reasons we have for thinking that there is unconscious intentionality extend into a case for unconscious primitive intentionality? Another question is how the proposal here would differ from Stapp’s treatment of what questions a mind asks of the universe. A third is how we contend with Quantum Zeno, the effect that forces both Chalmers-McQueen and Okon-Angel Sebastian to say that consciousness is only weakly superposition-resistant. Those authors note the possibility that the relevant superposed states of consciousness might overflow access consciousness (in Ned Block’s sense). We may have an easier time ensuring that access conscious states only rarely enter into superposition, if we set them back from our front line of superposition-resistant states.In chapter 4, Adrian Kent explores objective collapse theories—mass-dependent continuous spontaneous localization models. Consciousness may not be in the spotlight on these theories, but they should at least ensure that collapse happens faster than the time it takes for a stimulus (e.g., a system of several photons) to make it from a retinal impact to consciousness. Angelo Bassi, Dirk-André Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi (2010) argue that for a range of theories this constraint is respected, with collapse for a system of several photos happening at around 100 ms. Kent problematizes their argument, showing that their estimation may be off by an order of magnitude or more. Kent’s point is compelling: more work is needed to refine the estimate and to conceptually clarify the import of the constraints from perception.Part 2 consists of eight essays on various ways that consciousness might figure in or constrain quantum theories. In chapter 5, Phillip Goff argues that 3N-dimensional wave function monism cannot accommodate ground truths about consciousness, pressing on worries that the view imposes too few structural constraints to allow for the unambiguous recovery of ordinary 3D reality. While I agree that wave function monistic accounts of ordinary reality (e.g., Albert’s functionalism or Ney’s priority monism) yield an explanatory gap (even given the 3D-ish structure of GRW jumps), I was puzzled here. All type-B physicalists confront an explanatory gap where consciousness is concerned. Isn’t this a point in support of wave function monism, since it amounts to a companions-in-guilt argument against opposition from other type-B materialists?In chapter 6, Peter Lewis raises some sensible worries about the use of phenomenal consciousness as an unanalyzed primitive or special case in quantum theory. He objects to the suggestion made by some Bohmians that we can be directly aware of the particles in our brains. Another target is John von Neumann, who appeals to intuitions about psychophysical connections to justify a collapse hypothesis. These are nice points: I would be curious to know whether Lewis thinks they apply to the justifications for mentalistic collapse theories from part 1.In chapter 7, Jenann Ismael first argues that the hard problem of consciousness is of no concern to physics per se: “If consciousness enters the problem space of physics, it does so by making a difference to the behavior of physical objects.” She then offers some clarifying remarks about how we might reconcile Van Gelder-style dynamicist conceptions of mentality with (virtual) machine functionalism. I find much to agree with here, though I do wonder how strictly to take Ismael’s claims about the irrelevance of the hard problem. If there is a tie between two theories of physics over predictive accuracy, elegance, and naturalness, but one yields a more satisfying analysis of consciousness than the other, are we not even allowed to treat that as a tie-breaker?In chapter 8, Shan Gao defends a mentalistic characterization of the measurement problem in reply to Andrea Oldofredi (2019). The question is whether the key premise of the measurement problem should be that measurements take on definite values or only that we (definitely) experience them as taking on definite values. Of course, our reasons for thinking that they do arise from our seeing or remembering that they do, but we can distinguish between the claim and our evidence for it. Gao argues that the underlying mentalistic claims are more inextricable from the dilemma than that. Many dilemmas involve premises for which the evidence is perceptual, though they make no mention of perception. Here, however, solutions to the problem require special attention to the nature of that evidence.In chapter 9, Paul Skokowski illustrates one reason that we must pay special attention to the nature of that evidence. Jeffrey A. Barrett’s (1999) bare theory is a minimalistic reading of Everett on which measurement outcomes are only definite if they obtain on all branches. One question is whether this means that observers have blatantly false disjunctive beliefs: let someone measure an electron’s spin and then ask, Do you believe that you got a definite measurement outcome, either “UP” or “DOWN”? The observer will say yes, because on each branch they saw one and not the other. However, by the lights of the theory, this disjunctive belief is false. Skokowski’s insight is that while the observer definitely says yes, it does not follow (by the lights of the bare theory) that the observer has a (definite) false belief, since the neural realizer for the disjunctive belief will be different on each branch and therefore not correspond to a common eigenstate (compare the worry from chapter 2 about multiple realizability). But isn’t this just to move from the frying pan to the fire, as it seems now that our observer has no (definite) beliefs at all?In chapter 10, Michael Silberstein and W. M. Stuckey advocate for a psi-epistemicist perspective that vindicates many phenomenological intuitions, including the one that experimental outcomes are definite (and intersubjectively consistent). The approach requires that we rethink naïve realism about the wave function and that we rethink mind-body duality, in favor of a neutral monist ontology governed by constraints. This is an exciting approach, though I’m not fully clear on how to differentiate neutral monism from its idealist, dual aspect, or panpsychist cousins.In chapter 11, Michael Bitbol suggests a phenomenology-first approach to interpreting quantum mechanics. Bitbol favors a QBist participatory realism, tempered by phenomenology, that could perhaps also be described as neutral monist. He notes that the phenomenology of embodiment (à la Merleau-Ponty) acquaints us with how something can be both active and passive, both minded and incarnate, and he traces the error of believing in a separate, physical world (an error participatory realism corrects) to the tendency of self-separation: the tendency to try to project ourselves beyond ourselves, discussed in Heidegger, Sartre, and Michel Henry. These phenomenological insights are enlightening, though I am still not quite clear on how the underlying (neutral?) ontology works. Who, precisely, are the observers? Do electrons have feelings, or are they just fictions we use to cope with ours?In chapter 12, Lucien Hardy describes an experiment in which humans might be used to determine the settings in a Bell experiment. Hardy suggests that the outcome may be a violation of quantum theory consistent with the Bell inequality. He argues that this result would support (superdeterministic) mind-body dualism and also could serve as a new more objective Turing test. This is a fascinating proposal: it remains only to do the experiment.This brings us to part 3: accounts that move from quantum mechanics to consciousness, rather than conversely. In chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff give a comprehensive account of the current state of their ORCH-OR theory of quantum collapse and consciousness. Among other things we find here a nice presentation of Goodstein’s theorem as an example of a theorem that is noncomputable but easy enough for humans to understand, and a nice discussion of how retroactivity might equip us with something to say to Benjamin Libet about the role of consciousness in action selection. I’ll note, though, that I asked ChatGPT to explain Goodstein to me and it did a fairly good job, suggesting something like understanding. On Libet, I’m not sure what exactly we need retrocausality for: Why not just content ourselves that awareness of the action plan leaves time for a veto, as Libet and others have suggested?In chapter 15, Basil J. Hiley and Paavo Pylkkänen explore another route to a comprehensive theory of consciousness, drawing from the materials of a theory of quantum reality. Here, that theory is the Bohmian implicate order picture, with special attention to the notion of active information that arises there. This is another approach with neutral monist overtones, but here the wave function of a system behaves something like a customized hylomorphic form for the system while at the same time imbuing it with intentionality. There are interesting claims here about the continuity between life and mind, the unity of consciousness, and protopanpsychism, as well as some speculation of how the theory might align with the various scientific theories of consciousness inspired by psychophysics, like higher-order or global workspace theories.In chapter 16, William Seager offers a helpful discussion of the kinds of intelligibility at issue in these debates, distinguishing between mundane, mathematical, and metaphysical intelligibility, weaving together insights from Leibniz and others to argue that a Bohmian approach offers the best bet for a metaphysically intelligible world view. I sympathize with the positive aspects of his argument, though I think that other papers in this volume showcase the metaphysical intelligibility of rival approaches.Finally, in chapter 17, Lee Smolin describes a completion of quantum mechanics, also echoing Leibniz, which could support a theory of quantum gravity and which offers a new conception of consciousness: the causal theory of views, alongside the principle of precedence. This yields a novel sort of protopanpsychism in which the world is a collection of (background-independent) causal views, where views are conscious when they have a few extra features, including being unprecedented and being maximal. This is an exciting approach. One question is how we reconcile the claim that experiential states are maximal with the (mental) problem of the many, the problem that there are ties between composites (that differ over a stray ion or two) over which has best claim to be me.In closing, this is a fantastic volume. I commend Shan Gao for his editorial work: he would make a wonderful DJ. There are subtle symmetries in the way that each entry segues to the next, and the collection has a remarkable coherence.
The newly revised edition of this well-known book categorizes prevalent views on measurement as described by quantum mechanics, discusses basics agreed to by many who on other issues disagree, and describes some of the problems. Although many paragraphs rest unchanged from the first (1991) edition, results found since 1991 are used to reorganize and sharpen the focus of the book, so that even the old paragraphs are now understood differently and more clearly. One advance in the second edition is a new and more general no-go theorem; another is separation of formal derivations from interpretation. The dozen or so definitions essential to following the book even casually are stated clearly. By this means the authors succeed pretty well in achieving their stated desire to make the book comprehensible to those who do not share their philosophic predispositions. While I differ in philosophy from the authors, attending to their discussion uncovered weaknesses in my own thinking and improved it. The mathematical language of quantum mechanics expresses a system under measurement by states (as rays in a Hilbert space) and a hamiltonian operator, distinct from the apparatus that produces outcomes, which is expressed by a positive operator-valued (POV) measure. In this way quantum language separates state preparation from state measurement. Often the Hilbert space is viewed as a tensor product of subspaces, allowing further conceptual separations. The authors take the stance that quantum mechanics calls for splitting the empirical world into parts, the most essential being (1) objective systems S (to be observed) and (2) apparatus A (preparation and registration devices that produces outcomes (or, as the authors write, definite pointer values) of the observed system). In some interpretations, one or both of an observer and an environment appear as additional parts. What is to be included in the system S versus the apparatus A is not specified by the language, but is open to the theoretician; a probe, for example, can be analysed as either part of the apparatus or as part of the system, as was discussed by von Neumann in work cited by the authors. With what should a theory of measurement be concerned? A broad division of approaches is defined by how one answers the question: should one try to do away with the cut between measuring apparatus and system? The authors phrase this as a choice of REFERENT, a term which in my mind puts them on shaky semantic ground; anyway The Quantum Theory of Measurement is concerned with implications of the `yes'. The book unfolds with the power of a tragedy, in which the logical consequences lead, step-by-step, to the statement and proof of theorem 6.2.1, which, roughly speaking, asserts the non-existence of a solution to the problem of getting definite pointer values from measuring apparatus that exhibits the superposition demanded by its description as a quantum system. Possible responses to this theorem are discussed, among them the many-worlds interpretation and a modification of quantum mechanics that elevates decoherence to a principle. Citations of the literature are thorough, and many points of view are crisply summarized. The book is indispensable to both those who work in the broad direction chosen by the authors and to those who wish to set any other direction in context.
The concept of a quantum state represents one of the most fundamental pillars of the paradigm of quantum theory.'3 Contrary to its mathematical elegance and convenience in calculations, the physical interpretation of a quantum state is not so transparent. The problem is that the quantum state (described either by a state vector, or density operator or a phase-space probability density distribution) does not have a well defined objective status, i.e. a state vector is not an objective property of a particle. According to Peres (see,1 p. 374): "There is no physical evidence whatsoever that every physical system has at every instant a well defined state. .. In strict interpretation of quantum theory these mathematical symbols [i.e., state vectorsi represent statistical information enabling us to compute the probabilities of occurrence of specific events." Once this point of view is adopted then it becomes clear that any "measurement" or a reconstruction of a density operator (or its mathematical equivalent) can be understood exclusively as an expression of our knowledge about the quantum mechanical state based on a certain set of measured data. To be more specific, any quantum-mechanical reconstruction scheme is nothing more than an a posteriori estimation of the density operator of a quantum-mechanical (microscopic) system based on data obtained with the help of a macroscopic measurement apparatus.3 The quality of the reconstruction depends on the "quality" of the measured data and the efficiency of the reconstruction procedure with the help of which the data analysis is performed. In particular, we can specify three different situations. Firstly, when all system observables are precisely measured. In this case the complete reconstruction of an initially unknown state can be performed (we will call this the reconstruction on the complete observation level) . Secondly, when just part of the system observables is precisely measured then one cannot perform a complete reconstruction of the measured state. Nevertheless, the reconstructed density operator still uniquely determines mean values of the measured observables (we will denote this scheme as reconstruction on incomplete observation levels) . Finally, when measurement does not provide us with sufficient information to specify the exact mean values (or probability distributions) but only the frequencies of appearances of eigenstates of the measured observables, then one can perform an estimation (e.g. reconstruction based on quantum Bayesian inference) which is the "best" with respect to the given measured data and the a priori knowledge about the state of the measured system.
The book presents a multidisciplinary analysis of the context of quantum physics experiments and the function of the human mind that makes it possible to demonstrate that an object-based model of reality formed at the level of the unconscious is the basis of our worldview. The consciousness experiences a ''time flow'' because of the specific features of perception in the form of a model with a sequential fixation of events. Together with the need to relate objects in terms of the model, this generates a space-time representation of the world around us. Acceptance of a mental character of our construct of reality allows for resolution of the problems in quantum physics and its paradoxes, thereby opening the way to an insight into reality. The presented material is organized in a specific order to facilitate the reader's understanding. First, the fact that if there are no objects in the area of quantum mechanics, then they belong to the corresponding model rather than the reality is proved by case studies of the most discussed and relevant paradoxes of quantum physics. The authors consider a topological variant in constructing an object-based space that describes the physical properties of an object that are the most verified in science and describable with mathematical relations. The functionality of the proposed construct is tested by deriving the ''laws'' of conservation of energy and momentum in a relativistic form. The book is oriented towards experts in physics and psychology, advanced students, and readers interested in state-of-the-art science and the philosophy connected to it.
Abstract: The standard formulation of Quantum Mechanics has raised from its beginning animated discussions about the interpretation of the counterintuitive properties of mental objects (wave functions or Schrödinger waves) introduced to represent the properties of the physical objects.Two questions have since then been formulated to which a universally accepted answer is still lacking. The first one (Bohr, von Neumann) concerns the ontological nature of physical reality (the existence of classical objects) and the role of the observer (wave packet collapse) in assessing it. The second one is the non local character of quantum physical quantities (Einstein Podolski Rosen [EPR] long distance correlation of particles). An alternative formulation of Quantum Mechanics, originally proposed in 1932 by Eugene Wigner, taken up by Richard Feynman in 1987, and reelaborated by myself in the years from 1998 to 2003, is possible. The mental objects of standard Quantum Mechanics (Schrödinger waves) no longer appear in this new formulation and are replaced by new ones (Wigner functions) which do not show any more the puzzling properties which worried Einstein. My conclusion from the preceding discussion is that different explanations of a given set of experimental data may be derived according to the different nature of the mental objects introduced to represent the properties of the physical objects involved. The confusion between these two kind of objects may be, however, very misleading. I will finally discuss two examples of this conclusion from Biology
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.