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Perspectives in biology and medicine

The Physicist's Conception of Nature by Werner Heisenberg (review)

George Gamow

Published Sep 1, 1959• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

is all about, and not bothering to familiarize themselves in specific detail with the vast accumulation of behavioral data upon which the conclusions ofpsychoanalysis are based. Though specialists in scientific method, they refuse to look through Galileo's telescope [p. 349]. Hospers examines with skill and calmness many of die totally illogical arguments used in this conference, permitting one to end the volume with a faintly restored faith that one day there will be "a free, critical interchange ofviews on die scientific status of psychoanalysis" between philosophers ofscience and psychoanalysts. Ifthere is any lesson to be drawn from this kind ofexhibition, it is that diere is no substitute for firsthand knowledge ofthe method and data ofa discipline as a prerequisite for any critical discussion ofits merit and validity. This may seem like an utterly banal dictum, yet the facts are that it is too often casually disregarded when it comes to the sciences ofhuman behavior. Any taxicab driver will freely volunteer opinions about reasons forjuvenile delinquency, sexual perversions, drug addiction, or dreams—but rarely about astral physics, genetics, or C14 dating. There is a good reason for this; all such matters touch one personally to varying degrees. But the philosopher (and, even more importandy, the physician) must be cautious not to confuse this personal interest and ¦ involvement with the scientific knowledge and detachment necessary for critical judgment . The latter come about only through long experience and diligent study. George L. Engel University ofRochester The Physicist's Conception ofNature. ByWerner Heisenberg.Translated from the German by ArnoldJ. Pomerans. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1958. Pp. 192. $3.75. This book, written by a famous German scientist, the founder ofquantum mechanics, die discoverer of die uncertainty relations, and die Nobel prize winner in physics for 1933, does not do much credit to die author. The first 67 pages comprise three chapters which apparendy represent an attempt to amalgamate the three speechesdelivered or three articles written on three different occasions at diree different times. It is difficult to date die first two chapters, but die diird one must have been written in 1948, since in it the author refers to a conversation which he had had "some diirty years ago" during die Communist revolt in Munich (1918). The first chapter of the book presents die idea of the three stages of die evolution ofhuman diought about the surrounding world. According to die author, during olden times (ofKepler, etc.) scientists saw die world as die work ofGod. During the nineteendi century die world was existing all for itself, independent ofman. Since the discovery of the uncertainty relations, die man looking at the surrounding world sees his own image in it. The second chapter represents a discussion ofuncertainty relations and contains several interesting ideas (for example, about past and future difference in die case ofvery short time intervals) which may be ofgreat interest to a person trained in die modern quantum theory but will pass unnoticed by a general reader. 158 Book Reviews Perspectives in Biology and Medicine · Autumn 1939 The third chapter discusses die relative advantages ofclassical (i.e., Greek grammar, etc.) and scientific education and presents arguments in favor ofdie former: "Thus, we may say in favour ofclassical education diat it is always a good diing to know the roots, even ifthey may not always be of practical use" (p. 52). However, by die end of the chapter (p. 67) die audior comes to die conclusion: "It does not matter whedier we prefer a classical or a scientific education. What alone matters is our unshakable faidi in the West." The remaining 115 pages ofthe text contain a masterful selection ofquotations from Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Oswald, De Broglie, and others which are supposed to illustrate die ideas ofdie author expressed in die first 67 pages. G. GAMOW University ofColorado The Autobiography of Charles Darwin, 1809-1882. Edited, with Appendix and notes, by his granddaughter Nora Barlow. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. Pp. 253. $4.50. Darwin's autobiography was written mainly in 1876, six years before his death, with additional material inserted during his last yean. When first published in 1887, as part ofthe Life and Letters ofCharles Darwin, edited by his son Francis, it...

DOI
10.1353/pbm.1959.0047

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BOOK REVIEWS 425 sense is concerned, mathematical logic distorts and hides the nature and role of the proper method or organon of philosophical knowledge; and, with its technical formal symbolism, simply obstructs the language of such reasoning. No important point in logic itself, or in any branch of philosophy , is illumined simply by being formulated in the symbolism of mathematical logic. And the major part of logic, logic considered on the part of matter, is necessarily a closed book to the formalism of mathematical logic. Philosophy and mathematical logic are not really made for each other; incompatibility would necessarily follow from their marriage. But it is quite otherwise with respect to the role mathematical logic plays in experimental science. It is the appropriate tool experimental science needs for its investigation of the quantitative and relational aspects of things. It is the calculus needed for the dialectical exploration of the experimental scientist. It is as such a calculus that mathematical logic really works and where its fruitful application is realized. Divorced from the role it plays for experimental science, mathematical logic seems to become merely a game of arbitrarily constructed systems of purely formal rules of procedure within the web of mathematical imagination. Such a formulation of what the excellence of mathematical logic consists in (as well as what it does not consist in) is certainly open to further investigation and consideration. In any case, it seems to me that both traditional and mathematical logicians would benefit seeing the proper excellence of each rather than trying to have one simply obliterated by the other. Of one thing, nevertheless, I am certain: serious traditional and mathematical logicians should read Professor Veatch's book for a thorough, conscientious, and able discussion of the relation and contrast between traditional and mathematical logic. It is a necessary step in achieving a balanced judgment and evaluation of both, the indispensable prerequisite for any fruitful discussion. JoHN A. OEsTERLE College of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science. By WERNER HEISENBERG. Translated by F. C. Hayes. New York: Pantheon Books, 19M~. Pp. HW. $!il.75. This little volume contains eight lectures which were delivered at different places and times between the years 1934 and 1948. The message which it contains is noteworthy both because of the great authority of the author in the field of theoretical physics and because it is full, frank and informative statement of the historic aims of mathematical physics and a critical account of the present achievement of this science. 426 BOOK REVIEWS Although the so-called classical physics originated chiefly from the work of Galileo and Newton in the seventeenth century, the author of these lectures sees the whole development of modern physics as an effort to solve the problem first posed by the ancient Greek philosophers who asked: what are all things made of? Pythagoras was first to realize the mathematical order in musical notes, and Democritus said that all things are made of atoms. These are the terms of the historic problem and of its solution through mathematical physics. The ancient physicists were seeking a single material principle by which everything might be explained and understood in the clear light of mathematical formulation. Modern science has accepted from antiquity the idea of a pattern in the world which is capable of mathematical description . But we must not think that pure theoretical understanding is the only goal. Such an understanding is humanly unsatisfying, and seeks an outlet in technical applications. The mathematical formulation is itself an abstract control of things, and it enables man to make nature serve his own purposes. Furthermore, it gives a real insight into the interrelations of things, and will help man to appreciate his appropriate position in nature. Here in two words, understanding and control, we have the aims of this type of science. The understanding must be crystal clear, that is, mathematical in form. It must be a universal understanding, attaining to the principle of all things and revealing the real interrelations of things and man's position in the universe. Control also must in a sense be universal , that is, sufficient to enable man to make nature serve his own purpose...

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is all about, and not bothering to familiarize themselves in specific detail with the vast accumulation of behavioral data upon which the conclusions ofpsychoanalysis are based. Though specialists in scientific method, they refuse to look through Galileo's telescope [p. 349]. Hospers examines with skill and calmness many of die totally illogical arguments used in this conference, permitting one to end the volume with a faintly restored faith that one day there will be "a free, critical interchange ofviews on die scientific status of psychoanalysis" between philosophers ofscience and psychoanalysts. Ifthere is any lesson to be drawn from this kind ofexhibition, it is that diere is no substitute for firsthand knowledge ofthe method and data ofa discipline as a prerequisite for any critical discussion ofits merit and validity. This may seem like an utterly banal dictum, yet the facts are that it is too often casually disregarded when it comes to the sciences ofhuman behavior. Any taxicab driver will freely volunteer opinions about reasons forjuvenile delinquency, sexual perversions, drug addiction, or dreams—but rarely about astral physics, genetics, or C14 dating. There is a good reason for this; all such matters touch one personally to varying degrees. But the philosopher (and, even more importandy, the physician) must be cautious not to confuse this personal interest and ¦ involvement with the scientific knowledge and detachment necessary for critical judgment . The latter come about only through long experience and diligent study. George L. Engel University ofRochester The Physicist's Conception ofNature. ByWerner Heisenberg.Translated from the German by ArnoldJ. Pomerans. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1958. Pp. 192. 3.75. This book, written by a famous German scientist, the founder ofquantum mechanics, die discoverer of die uncertainty relations, and die Nobel prize winner in physics for 1933, does not do much credit to die author. The first 67 pages comprise three chapters which apparendy represent an attempt to amalgamate the three speechesdelivered or three articles written on three different occasions at diree different times. It is difficult to date die first two chapters, but die diird one must have been written in 1948, since in it the author refers to a conversation which he had had "some diirty years ago" during die Communist revolt in Munich (1918). The first chapter of the book presents die idea of the three stages of die evolution ofhuman diought about the surrounding world. According to die author, during olden times (ofKepler, etc.) scientists saw die world as die work ofGod. During the nineteendi century die world was existing all for itself, independent ofman. Since the discovery of the uncertainty relations, die man looking at the surrounding world sees his own image in it. The second chapter represents a discussion ofuncertainty relations and contains several interesting ideas (for example, about past and future difference in die case ofvery short time intervals) which may be ofgreat interest to a person trained in die modern quantum theory but will pass unnoticed by a general reader. 158 Book Reviews Perspectives in Biology and Medicine · Autumn 1939 The third chapter discusses die relative advantages ofclassical (i.e., Greek grammar, etc.) and scientific education and presents arguments in favor ofdie former: "Thus, we may say in favour ofclassical education diat it is always a good diing to know the roots, even ifthey may not always be of practical use" (p. 52). However, by die end of the chapter (p. 67) die audior comes to die conclusion: "It does not matter whedier we prefer a classical or a scientific education. What alone matters is our unshakable faidi in the West." The remaining 115 pages ofthe text contain a masterful selection ofquotations from Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Oswald, De Broglie, and others which are supposed to illustrate die ideas ofdie author expressed in die first 67 pages. G. GAMOW University ofColorado The Autobiography of Charles Darwin, 1809-1882. Edited, with Appendix and notes, by his granddaughter Nora Barlow. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. Pp. 253. 4.50. Darwin's autobiography was written mainly in 1876, six years before his death, with additional material inserted during his last yean. When first published in 1887, as part ofthe Life and Letters ofCharles Darwin, edited by his son Francis, it...
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
BOOK REVIEWS 425 sense is concerned, mathematical logic distorts and hides the nature and role of the proper method or organon of philosophical knowledge; and, with its technical formal symbolism, simply obstructs the language of such reasoning. No important point in logic itself, or in any branch of philosophy , is illumined simply by being formulated in the symbolism of mathematical logic. And the major part of logic, logic considered on the part of matter, is necessarily a closed book to the formalism of mathematical logic. Philosophy and mathematical logic are not really made for each other; incompatibility would necessarily follow from their marriage. But it is quite otherwise with respect to the role mathematical logic plays in experimental science. It is the appropriate tool experimental science needs for its investigation of the quantitative and relational aspects of things. It is the calculus needed for the dialectical exploration of the experimental scientist. It is as such a calculus that mathematical logic really works and where its fruitful application is realized. Divorced from the role it plays for experimental science, mathematical logic seems to become merely a game of arbitrarily constructed systems of purely formal rules of procedure within the web of mathematical imagination. Such a formulation of what the excellence of mathematical logic consists in (as well as what it does not consist in) is certainly open to further investigation and consideration. In any case, it seems to me that both traditional and mathematical logicians would benefit seeing the proper excellence of each rather than trying to have one simply obliterated by the other. Of one thing, nevertheless, I am certain: serious traditional and mathematical logicians should read Professor Veatch's book for a thorough, conscientious, and able discussion of the relation and contrast between traditional and mathematical logic. It is a necessary step in achieving a balanced judgment and evaluation of both, the indispensable prerequisite for any fruitful discussion. JoHN A. OEsTERLE College of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota Philosophic Problems of Nuclear Science. By WERNER HEISENBERG. Translated by F. C. Hayes. New York: Pantheon Books, 19M~. Pp. HW. $!il.75. This little volume contains eight lectures which were delivered at different places and times between the years 1934 and 1948. The message which it contains is noteworthy both because of the great authority of the author in the field of theoretical physics and because it is full, frank and informative statement of the historic aims of mathematical physics and a critical account of the present achievement of this science. 426 BOOK REVIEWS Although the so-called classical physics originated chiefly from the work of Galileo and Newton in the seventeenth century, the author of these lectures sees the whole development of modern physics as an effort to solve the problem first posed by the ancient Greek philosophers who asked: what are all things made of? Pythagoras was first to realize the mathematical order in musical notes, and Democritus said that all things are made of atoms. These are the terms of the historic problem and of its solution through mathematical physics. The ancient physicists were seeking a single material principle by which everything might be explained and understood in the clear light of mathematical formulation. Modern science has accepted from antiquity the idea of a pattern in the world which is capable of mathematical description . But we must not think that pure theoretical understanding is the only goal. Such an understanding is humanly unsatisfying, and seeks an outlet in technical applications. The mathematical formulation is itself an abstract control of things, and it enables man to make nature serve his own purposes. Furthermore, it gives a real insight into the interrelations of things, and will help man to appreciate his appropriate position in nature. Here in two words, understanding and control, we have the aims of this type of science. The understanding must be crystal clear, that is, mathematical in form. It must be a universal understanding, attaining to the principle of all things and revealing the real interrelations of things and man's position in the universe. Control also must in a sense be universal , that is, sufficient to enable man to make nature serve his own purpose...
In a recent number of Blackfriars (July, 1949) Dr A. W. Gledhill has discussed very competently some aspects of the statistical method as used in modern physics. He has tried to show there ‘that modern physical theory does not contradict the principle of causality’. Having made a study of this subject over quite a number of years, the writer, while agreeing with some of Dr Gledhill’s conclusions, feels nevertheless that there are a few points which have not been covered as adequately as the importance of the subject for modern philosophy seems to warrant. In order to understand the controversy about the validity or non-validity of the principle of causality, which has been initiated by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, it is necessary to realise, first of all, that when a physicist speaks about causality, he usually does not mean the same thing as a scholastic philosopher. In scholastic philosophy one distinguishes different kinds of causes, such as the material, the efficient, the final, as well as the formal and exemplary causes. The classical physicist, on the other hand, since the time of Galileo, admits only efficient causes. Let us therefore give a brief sketch of the development of this concept of scientific causality and show the reasons for this limitation. The purpose of a scientific theory is the prediction of events among the natural objects which form the field of enquiry of the particular science concerned. Evidently, the more certain the prediction, the better the theory on which it is based.
MAN AND THE INDETERMINACIES* JOHN R. PLATTf Understanding the external world is the objective of science, and accurate prediction is the test ofit. Ifwe really understand genetics, we can breed better hybrid corn. Ifwe really understand geology, we can locate minerals and oil. If we really understand the motion of the atmosphere and its water vapor, we can predict the weather. But some ofthe most thought-provoking problems ofscience are those involving "indeterminacy," where accurate prediction for some reason becomes impossible. It is as though a sign said, "Nonsense!—Your prying or your prediction at this point interferes with itself, so your supposed observations orpredictions can no longer be made objectively or meaningfully ." Many ofthese problems are a little bit like my answer to your question whether I will wear my red tie tomorrow morning. I may tell you that I will, but this is an intention, not an objective prediction like predicting rain—and you will immediately show that you know this by laughing at me ifI try to bet with you on it. It is obvious that my knowledge ofthe prediction and the bet would change my performance, and I am likely to wear the red tie or not, as the case may be,just so I will win—or to do the converse to prove my unpredictability. Everyone knows, really, that predictions of one's own conscious decisions are not objective predictions in any scientific sense. The most famous case ofindeterminacy, where getting data for a prediction interacts with the outcome in somewhat the same way, is that of the Heisenberg "uncertainty principle" in atomic physics, which upset the whole philosophical world forty years ago. But indeterminacy and * A chapter from the book The Step to Man, published byJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.,June, 1966; reprinted by permission. t Acting Director, Mental Health Research Institute, University ofMichigan, Ann Arbor. 67 related questions of prediction also touch many other problems, for example , in areas such as biology and psychology. It is interesting to look at some ofthese problems to seejust what goes wrong with deterministic predictions, and why. This gives us a much clearer view ofwhat questions objective science can meaningfully ask and what it cannot, and what parts oflife must be left out ofthe scientific equation. It appears that several of the non-classical conclusions may be ofcentral importance in understanding the relations between manandman and between man and the universe. The Areas ofDeterminism The concept ofdeterminismis closely bound up with the concept ofthe "isolated system." An isolated system, in astronomy or physics or chemistry , is a body or collection ofbodies—for example, the sun and planets, or the chemicals in a flask—which are supposed to interact in some respect only with each other. It is a system which an observer can either start off or can observe accurately at some initial time, and which can then continue to be observed indefinitely without any appreciable disturbance to its motions or behavior from interactions with the observer himself or with the rest ofthe universe. These conditions are evidently essential in order for determinism to hold, that is, in order for our specification of the initial state ofthe system to suffice for determining its final state accurately at any later time. Ofcourse, isolation from the surroundings is never perfect. The chemicals in the flask boil offinto the air. The earth's tides slow down the moon by amounts that can be measured. Nevertheless, the "isolated system" is a useful and accurate approximation for most ofthe problems we know how to solve in physics and chemistry and engineering; and in fact, that is why we know how to solve them. Ifwe correct for the small disturbances , Newton's laws will predict eclipses and the motions ofplanets or man-made satellites for years or centuries ahead. The planets are heavy bodies, not much affected by the dust in their paths or the sunbeams by which we observe them. Few other predictions in science are as certain as those of the planets, but in most cases the uncertainties are not believed to be due to any breakdown of determinism. Forecasting the weather, for example, is difficult apparently because of the great complexity of...
It has been shown that the criticism of Pauli as well as of Susskind and Glogover may be avoided if the standard quantum-mechanical mathematical model has been suitably extended. There is not more any reason for Einstein's citicism, either, if in addition to some new results concerning Bell's inequalities and Belifante's argument are taken into account. The ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics (or the hidden-variable theory) should be preferred, which is also supported by the already published results of experiments with three polarizers. Greater space in the text has been devoted also to the discussion of epistemological problems and some philosophical consequences.