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Philosophy of Science

Fine's Prism Models for Quantum Correlation Statistics

W. David Sharp, Niall Shanks

Published Dec 1, 1985• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Arthur Fine's use of prism models to provide local and deterministic accounts of quantum correlation experiments is presented and analyzed in some detail. Fine's claim that “there is … no question of the consistency of prism models … with the quantum theory“ (forthcoming, p. 16) is disputed. Our criticisms are threefold: (1) consideration of the possibility of additional analyzer positions shows that prism models entail unacceptably high rejection rates in the relevant experiments; (2) similar considerations show that the models are at best only superficially local and deterministic; and (3) in any case, Fine extracts the quantum correlation statistics from prism models only by resurrecting conceptual problems similar to those that his models were to designed to solve.

DOI
10.1086/289274

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Arthur Fine's use of prism models to provide local and deterministic accounts of quantum correlation experiments is presented and analyzed in some detail. Fine's claim that “there is … no question of the consistency of prism models … with the quantum theory“ (forthcoming, p. 16) is disputed. Our criticisms are threefold: (1) consideration of the possibility of additional analyzer positions shows that prism models entail unacceptably high rejection rates in the relevant experiments; (2) similar considerations show that the models are at best only superficially local and deterministic; and (3) in any case, Fine extracts the quantum correlation statistics from prism models only by resurrecting conceptual problems similar to those that his models were to designed to solve.
The concept of a prism model was introduced by Arthur Fine to be used for local and realistic descriptions of quantum statistics. Recently Feintzeig and Fletcher have shown that a wide class of generalizations of the classical probability model are incapable of replicating the quantum statistics for certain experiments. We employ a modification of their strategy to see under what conditions prism models cannot replicate quantum statistics. In doing so we differentiate two interpretations: one which we can show to be inconsistent in replicating the statistics of certain experiments, and one which commits to unavoidable rejection rates for certain experiments.
This thesis deals with the set of issues commonly known as the 'measurement problem' in quantum mechanics. The main thesis is that the problems are best understood as typically theoretical problems, in the sense that they are not problems directly concerned with the ability of the quantum theory to account for, or represent, actual measurements. This is contrary to the standard view that the quantum measurement problem is in fact about how to fit theory to experiment. I explain how I characterise a theoretical problem and argue against claims that quantum measurement theory is unrealistic or ineffective because it bears so little relation to actual measurement practice: I argue that the quantum theory's analysis of measurement need not be committed to doing for the experimenter what Henry Margenau and other critics think it should do. Its principal aim is to answer two questions. First, it tells us what properties are to be associated to quantum states; secondly, it tells us what, in the theory, a measurement must be if these properties are to emerge. I then discuss some of the specific aspects of the problem of measurement, in particular the results known as insolubility proofs of the quantum measurement problem and the characterisation of the quantum measurement interactions satisfying standard probabilistic constraints. I prove several results here, amongst them characterisations of all interactions jointly satisfying the conditions of unitarity and, first, objectification, then secondly, probability reproducibility conditions. These are the standard conditions which capture our intuitions about quantum measurement. I show how the results lead to negative consequences with respect to the interpretive questions in quantum mechanics. The discussion of these specific aspects of quantum measurements does, on the other hand, suggest a particular strategy for solving the problems. This is found in Arthur Fine's solution to the measurement problem, which is based on the idea of a selective interaction. The discussion of Fine's solution emphasises in general how simply implementing technical strategies is not sufficient to solve the measurement problem in quantum mechanics: further arguments must be given for why the strategy is appropriate, rather than just mathematically satisfactory. I claim that the arguments given by Fine are far from sufficient. The thesis concludes that, although the quantum theory of measurement is immune from Margenau's critique, and retains a theoretical autonomy, it is still plagued by numerous problems: the thesis identifies clearly what some of these problems are and considers some solutions, most of which, however, raise serious philosophical questions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Quantum theory (QT) provides statistical predictions for various physical phenomena. To verify these predictions a considerable amount of data has been accumulated in the 'measurements' performed on the ensembles of identically prepared physical systems or in the repeated 'measurements' on some trapped 'individual physical systems'. The outcomes of these measurements are, in general, some numerical time series registered by some macroscopic instruments. The various empirical probability distributions extracted from these time series were shown to be consistent with the probabilistic predictions of QT. More than 70 years ago the claim was made that QT provided the most complete description of 'individual' physical systems and outcomes of the measurements performed on 'individual' physical systems were obtained in an intrinsically random way. Spin polarization correlation experiments (SPCEs), performed to test the validity of Bell inequalities, clearly demonstrated the existence of strong long-range correlations and confirmed that the beams hitting far away detectors somehow preserve the memory of their common source which would be destroyed if the individual counts of far away detectors were purely random. Since the probabilities describe the random experiments and are not the attributes of the 'individual' physical systems, the claim that QT provides a complete description of 'individual' physical systems seems not only unjustified but also misleading and counter productive. In this paper, we point out that we even do not know whether QT is predictably complete because it has not been tested carefully enough. Namely, it was not proven that the time series of existing experimental data did not contain some stochastic fine structures that could have been averaged out by describing them in terms of the empirical probability distributions. In this paper, we advocate various statistical tests that could be used to search for such fine structures in the data and to answer the title question of this paper. In our opinion a proper understanding of the statistical character of QT and of its limitations is crucial in the domains such as quantum optics and quantum information.
According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support objective indeterminism, since the statistical laws of classical physics allow a deterministic hidden background, while --- as Arthur Fine writes polemizing with Grünbaum --- "{\sl the antilibertarian position finds little room to breathe in a statistical world if we take laws of the quantum theory as exemplars of the statistical laws in such a world. So, it appears that, contrary to what Grünbaum claims, the libertarians' 'could have done otherwise' does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory.}" In this paper I will show that, quite the contrary, quantum mechanics does not save free will. For instance, the EPR experiments are compatible with a deterministic world. They admit a deterministic local hidden parameter description if the deterministic model is 'allowed' to describe not only the measurement outcomes, but also the outcomes of the 'decisions' whether this or that measurement will be performed. So, the derivation of the freedom of the will from quantum mechanics is a tautology: from the assumption that the world is indeterministic it is derived that the world cannot be deterministic.