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arXiv:quant-ph/9506040

Does Quantum Mechanics Save Free Will?

László E. Szabó

Published Jun 28, 1995• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support objective indeterminism, since the statistical laws of classical physics allow a deterministic hidden background, while --- as Arthur Fine writes polemizing with Grünbaum --- "{\sl the antilibertarian position finds little room to breathe in a statistical world if we take laws of the quantum theory as exemplars of the statistical laws in such a world. So, it appears that, contrary to what Grünbaum claims, the libertarians' 'could have done otherwise' does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory.}" In this paper I will show that, quite the contrary, quantum mechanics does not save free will. For instance, the EPR experiments are compatible with a deterministic world. They admit a deterministic local hidden parameter description if the deterministic model is 'allowed' to describe not only the measurement outcomes, but also the outcomes of the 'decisions' whether this or that measurement will be performed. So, the derivation of the freedom of the will from quantum mechanics is a tautology: from the assumption that the world is indeterministic it is derived that the world cannot be deterministic.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9506040

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According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support objective indeterminism, since the statistical laws of classical physics allow a deterministic hidden background, while --- as Arthur Fine writes polemizing with Grünbaum --- "{\sl the antilibertarian position finds little room to breathe in a statistical world if we take laws of the quantum theory as exemplars of the statistical laws in such a world. So, it appears that, contrary to what Grünbaum claims, the libertarians' 'could have done otherwise' does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory.}" In this paper I will show that, quite the contrary, quantum mechanics does not save free will. For instance, the EPR experiments are compatible with a deterministic world. They admit a deterministic local hidden parameter description if the deterministic model is 'allowed' to describe not only the measurement outcomes, but also the outcomes of the 'decisions' whether this or that measurement will be performed. So, the derivation of the freedom of the will from quantum mechanics is a tautology: from the assumption that the world is indeterministic it is derived that the world cannot be deterministic.
Both deterministic and indeterministic physical laws are incompatible with control by genuine (non-illusory) free will. We propose that an indeterministic dynamics can be weaklyweaklyweakly compatible with free will (FW), whereby the latter acts by altering the probability distribution over allowed outcomes. In the quantum physical world, such a FW can collapse the wave function, introducing deviations from the Born rule. In principle, this deviation would stand in conflict with both special relativity and (a variant of) the Strong Church-Turing thesis, implying that the brain may be an arena of exotic, non-standard physics. However, in practice, these deviations would not be directly or easily observable, because they occur in sub-neuronal superpositions in the brain, where they would be shrouded in random measurement errors, noise and statistical fluctuations. Our result elucidates the difference between the FW of human observers and that of observed particles in the Free Will Theorem. This difference is a basic reason for why FW (and, in general, consciousness) cannot be recreated by standard artificial intelligence (AI) technology. We propose various neurobiological experiments to test our proposed theory. We speculate that for observers to be aware of a physical theory such as quantum mechanics, FW is necessary and that the theory must therefore not be universal. We suggest that FW may be regarded as a primitive principle in Nature for explaining quantum indeterminism.
Abstract Advancements in neuroscience make the question of free will more pressing. Between physicalist positions, which largely deny free will, and libertarian views, which reject determinism, quantum mechanics initially appeared to offer a middle ground. Even though it was thought to depict a probabilistic reality allowing some degree of freedom in choices, quantum mechanics remains deterministic, albeit with stochastic results. This paper proposes an alternative where quantum mechanics still supports free will as the possibility to do otherwise within a physicalist framework. Through the manyworlds interpretation, I show how the principle of alternative possibilities can be maintained, even when both our decision-making processes and the external world follow physical laws.
Abstract Is the world deterministic and can we ever know whether it is or is not so? This chapter critically evaluates recent results that bear on these issues, and points out the relation to probabilities. While results from classical physics are neither fully relevant nor conclusive, quantum mechanics is often assumed to establish indeterminism beyond doubt. However, whether the quantum world is indeterministic crucially depends on how the measurement problem is solved. There are both deterministic and indeterministic contenders in this field, some of them empirically equivalent to another one. This is shown using the deterministic Bohm theory and Nelsonsion mechanics, which is indeterministic. Two arguments that purport to establish indeterminism and that rely on Gleason's theorem and on Conway and Kochen's recent Free Will Theorem are shown to be wanting.
If the quantum mechanical description of reality is not complete and a hidden variable theory is possible, what arises is the problem to explain where the rates of the outcomes of statistical experiments come from, as already noticed by Landé and Popper. In this paper this problem is investigated, and a new "paradigm" about the nature of dynamical and statistical laws is proposed. This paradigm proposes some concepts which contrast with the usual intuitive view of evolution and of physical law, such as: initial conditions could play no privileged role in determining the evolution of the universe; the statistical distribution of the particles emitted by a source could depend on the future interactions of the particles; indeterministic trajectories can be defined by the least action principle. This paradigm is applied to the analysis of the two-slit experiment and of the EPR paradox, and a coherent picture for these phenomena is proposed; this new picture shows how the well known difficulties in completing the quantum mechanical description of reality could be overcome.
If there's one lesson that philosophers seem to have learned from quantum mechanics it is that the quantum realm is governed by indeterministic laws. However, in 1952 David Bohm constructed a deterministic theory and proved that it is empirically equivalent to quantum mechanics. One of the three conditions that are together sufficient for the empirical adequacy of Bohm's theory is the statistical postulate. This postulate demands a very particular initial condition to hold for ensembles of quantum systems. I argue that the statistical postulate requires a justification. A justification would consist of showing how the dynamics of Bohm's theory is able to generate the initial conditions specified by the statistical postulate. I examine two deterministic justifications of the statistical postulate, one by Valentini and the other by Durr, Goldstein and Zanghi. I explain precisely the ways in which they are lacking. The basic problem is that crucial dynamical details are missing, ones needed to complete the justification. Whether these missing bits can be filled in is an open question. Until a justification is at hand, and its application to real-world ensembles is clarified, the empirical adequacy of Bohm's theory remains an open question. Bohm himself proposed a stochastic or indeterministic justification for the statistical postulate. It has been shown that the dynamics of this stochastic theory does not have the resources to justify the statistical postulate. In addition I show that the mathematical argument Bohm uses in his justification is flawed. Other stochastic theories do justify the statistical postulate but have other problems. The issue of indeterminism in the quantum realm is far from settled. Bohm's deterministic dynamics enables an investigation into the limits (if any) of a deterministic dynamics for the quantum realm. The properties of Bohm's deterministic equations of motion remain largely unknown. What we do know is that if the quantum realm is indeterministic it will not be for any of the reasons we have so far been given.
The predictions of quantum mechanics are probabilistic. Quantum probabilities are extracted using a postulate of the theory called the Born rule, the status of which is central to the "measurement problem" of quantum mechanics. Efforts to justify the Born rule from other physical principles, and thus elucidate the measurement process, have involved lengthy statistical or information-theoretic arguments. Here we show that Bohm's deterministic formulation of quantum mechanics allows the Born rule for measurements on a single system to be derived, without any statistical assumptions. We solve a simple example where the creation of an ensemble of identical quantum states, together with position measurements on those states, are described by Bohm's quantum dynamics. The calculated measurement outcomes agree with the Born-rule probabilities, which are thus a consequence of deterministic evolution. Our results demonstrate that quantum probabilities can emerge from simple dynamical laws alone, and they support the view that there is no underlying indeterminism in quantum phenomena.