We propose a decision procedure for analysing security of quantum cryptographic protocols, combining an algebraic logic rewrite system with an operational semantics for quantum distributed computations. We apply our approach to reasoning about security properties of a recently developed quantum secret sharing protocol.
We propose a decision procedure for analysing security of quantum cryptographic protocols, combining a classical algebraic rewrite system for knowledge with an operational semantics for quantum distributed computing. As a test case, we use our procedure to reason about security properties of a recently developed quantum secret sharing protocol that uses graph states. We analyze three different scenarios based on the safety assumptions of the classical and quantum channels and discover the path of an attack in the presence of an adversary. The epistemic analysis that leads to this and similar types of attacks is purely based on our classical notion of knowledge.
We propose a decision procedure for analysing security of quantum cryptographic protocols, combining a classical algebraic rewrite system for knowledge with an operational semantics for quantum distributed computing. As a test case, we use our procedure to reason about security properties of a recently developed quantum secret sharing protocol that uses graph states. We analyze three different scenarios based on the safety assumptions of the classical and quantum channels and discover the path of an attack in the presence of an adversary. The epistemic analysis that leads to this and similar types of attacks is purely based on our classical notion of knowledge.
We propose a decision procedure for analysing security of quantum cryptographic protocols, combining a classical algebraic rewrite system for knowledge with an operational semantics for quantum distributed computing. As a test case, we use our procedure to reason about security properties of a recently developed quantum secret sharing protocol that uses graph states. We analyze three different scenarios based on the safety assumptions of the classical and quantum channels and discover the path of an attack in the presence of an adversary. The epistemic analysis that leads to this and similar types of attacks is purely based on our classical notion of knowledge.
We prove that quantum key distribution is secure against several types of attacks within the framework of classical knowledge knowledge for quantum systems, a formal model which was developed in [D'Hondt, E. and P. Panangaden, Reasoning about quantum knowledge, in: Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science, LNCS 3821, 2005, p. 0544c (to appear), quant-ph/0507176]. In particular we rephrase security as a logical property and use meta-logic reasoning on the finite state machine corresponding to the quantum key distribution protocol. While these security issues have been studied before, it is the logical-based approach that is original here.
This paper applies to quantum systems a modelling for the logic of knowledge, originally developed for reasoning about distributed systems, but since then applied to game theory, computer security and artificial intelligence. A formal model of quantum message passing systems is developed and the question of how one might define the semantics of a modal operator for knowledge in this model is considered. It is argued that there are at least two plausible semantics, depending on whether the agents are permitted to make use of their quantum state in determining what they know, and on whether one is dealing with single instances of quantum systems, or ensembles. The framework is illustrated using a number of examples from the quantum computing literature, including protocols for quantum key distribution and teleportation.
This paper applies to quantum systems a modelling for the logic of knowledge, originally developed for reasoning about distributed systems, but since then applied to game theory, computer security and artificial intelligence. A formal model of quantum message passing systems is developed and the question of how one might define the semantics of a modal operator for knowledge in this model is considered. It is argued that there are at least two plausible semantics, depending on whether the agents are permitted to make use of their quantum state in determining what they know, and on whether one is dealing with single instances of quantum systems, or ensembles. The framework is illustrated using a number of examples from the quantum computing literature, including protocols for quantum key distribution and teleportation.