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Banach Center Publications

Axioms for quantum probability

Luigi Accardi

Published Jan 1, 2006• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

The date of birth of the \new" quantum mechanics (as opposed to the old semiclassical theory) is usually identi ed with the publication of Heisenberg's paper where the commutation relations were rst introduced (1925). One year after it became clear, with the emergence of the statistical interpretation, that this theory was as much a new mechanics as a new probability calculus.

DOI
10.4064/bc73-0-1

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Abstract Birkhoff and von Neumann make it clear what the goal of their October, 1936 paper, “The logic of quantum mechanics”, is: “The object of the present paper is to discover what logical structure one may hope to find in physical theories which, like quantum mechanics, do not conform to classical logic. Our main conclusion, based on admittedly heuristic arguments, is that one can reasonably expect to find a calculus of propositions which is formally indistinguishable from the calculus of linear subspaces with respect to set products, linear sums, and orthogonal complements-and resembles the usual calculus of propositions with respect to and, or, and not.” (Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936, p.823; underline added). Specifically, “Up to now, we have only discussed formal features of logical structure which seem to be common to classical dynamics and the quantum theory. We now turn to the central difference between them-the distributive identity of the propositional calculus: L6: a U (b ꓵ c) = (a U b) ꓵ (a U c) and a ꓵ (b U c) = (a ꓵ b) U (a ꓵ c) which is a law in classical, but not in quantum mechanics.” (Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936, p.830; underline added) Continuing, Birkhoff and von Neumann comment: “From a deeper mathematical viewpoint, L6 is the characteristic property of set-combination. More precisely, every "field" of sets is isomorphic with a Boolean algebra, and conversely.21 This throws new light on the well-known fact that the propositional calculi of classical mechanics are Boolean algebras.” (Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936, p.831). Birkhoff and von Neumann then show on p.831 that the distributive law breaks down in quantum mechanics and that the generalized distributive law of logic breaks down in the related field “in the quotient algebra of the field of Lebesgue measurable sets by the ideal of sets of Lebesgue measure 0, which is so fundamental in statistics and the formulation of the ergodic principle.” (ibid., p.831). However, it must be noted that Birkhoff and von Neumann are talking about the Jevons-Pierce-Schroder interpretation (two -valued) of Boole’s original approach (four -valued), which Boole completely rejected. (See Hailperin, 1986, 1996), The reason for this rejection is that the Jevons-Peircean approach required strict complementation, which translated into additivity and linearity in probability assessments, as opposed to Boole’s realization that real world decision making required sub additivity and non-linearity, Thereafter, we will refer to the Jevons-Pierce-Schroder approach as Jevons’s approach to the interpretation of Boolean logic, which uses standard classical logic to underpin discussions of standard probability logic. Jevons’s approach removed the basic algebra which Boole combined with his new relational, propositional logic, so as to deal with indeterminate, imprecise probabilities, which are nonstandard. Jevons’s approach can’t deal with the non-standard probability logics used by Boole in chapters XVIII-XX of The Laws of Thought (1854) and by Keynes in chapters XII, XV-XVII of the A Treatise on Probability (1921) in order to deal with indeterminate, interval valued probabilities.

•Jun 7, 2026•0 citations
The date of birth of the \new" quantum mechanics (as opposed to the old semiclassical theory) is usually identi ed with the publication of Heisenberg's paper where the commutation relations were rst introduced (1925). One year after it became clear, with the emergence of the statistical interpretation, that this theory was as much a new mechanics as a new probability calculus.
Quantum mechanics is usually described in the terminology of probability theory even though the properties of the probability spaces associated with it are fundamentally different from the standard ones of probability theory. For example, Kolmogorov's axioms are not general enough to encompass the non-commutative situations that arise in quantum theory. There have been many attempts to generalise these axioms to meet the needs of quantum mechanics. The focus of these attempts has been the observation, first made by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), that the propositions associated with a quantum-mechanical system do not form a Boolean σ-algebra. There is almost universal agreement that the probability space associated with a quantum-mechanical system is given by the set of subspaces of a separable Hilbert space, but there is disagreement over the algebraic structure that this set represents. In the most popular model for the probability space of quantum mechanics the propositions are assumed to form an orthocomplemented lattice (Mackey (1963), Jauch (1968)). The fundamental concept here is that of a partial order, that is a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive but not symmetric. The partial order is interpreted as embodying the logical concept of implication in the set of propositions associated with the physical system. Although this model provides an acceptable mathematical expression of the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics in that the subspaces of a separable Hilbert space give a representation of an ortho-complemented lattice, it has several deficiencies which will be discussed later.
When quantum mechanics is understood as a new generalized theory of probability - to be called the quantum probability theory - mysteries and controversies regarding quantum mechanics are dissolved. In the classical probability theory, that a measurement of some system requires an additional measurement apparatus is of insignificant importance - in the quantum probability theory, this comes to change. For one central single reason around a particular classical probability equation, the generalized probability view has not gained much traction, despite the fact that this essentially echoes (and provides logical underpinnings of) the conventional wisdom that `quantum mechanics just works as it is.' A classical probability axiom is just an initial intuition - there is no reason why we have to dogmatically cling onto axioms that can clearly be generalized. Issues with the principle of indifference in the classical probability theory are emphasized, along with the quantum reconstruction project of deriving quantum mechanics from epistemic requirements and potential quantum gravity consequences from the principle of maximum entropy.
In an attempt to give an exact mathematical formulation of Bohr's Correspondence Principle, Heisenberg (June 1925) discovered the rules governing the behaviour of quantum-theoretical magnitudes. In fall 1925 Born, Heisenberg and Jordan and, independently, Dirac, formulated consistent algebraic schemes of quantum mechanics. Early in 1926 Schrödinger developed wave mechanics. In quick succession were discovered: Born's probability interpretation of the wave function, the transformation theory of Dirac, Jordan and F. London, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Relations and Bohr's Principle of Complementarity. By September 1927 the basis of a complete theory of atomic phenomena had been established. Aspects of this development, in which Heisenberg played a central role, are presented here as a tribute to his memory.
There is a peculiar similarity between Probability Theory and Quantum Mechanics: both subjects are mature and successful, yet both remain subject to controversy about their foundations and interpretation. I first present a classification of the various interpretations of probability, arguing that they should not be thought of as rivals, but rather as applications of a general theory to different kinds of subject matter. An axiom system that makes conditional probability the fundamental concept is put forward as being superior to Kolmogorov's axioms. I then discuss the relevance to quantum theory of the various interpretations of probability, the applicability of classical probability theory within quantum mechanics, and the relations between the interpretation of probability and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Abstract Birkhoff and von Neumann make it clear what the goal of their October, 1936 paper, “The logic of quantum mechanics”, is: “The object of the present paper is to discover what logical structure one may hope to find in physical theories which, like quantum mechanics, do not conform to classical logic. Our main conclusion, based on admittedly heuristic arguments, is that one can reasonably expect to find a calculus of propositions which is formally indistinguishable from the calculus of linear subspaces with respect to set products, linear sums, and orthogonal complements-and resembles the usual calculus of propositions with respect to and, or, and not.” (Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936, p.823; underline added). Specifically, “Up to now, we have only discussed formal features of logical structure which seem to be common to classical dynamics and the quantum theory. We now turn to the central difference between them-the distributive identity of the propositional calculus: L6: a U (b ꓵ c) = (a U b) ꓵ (a U c) and a ꓵ (b U c) = (a ꓵ b) U (a ꓵ c) which is a law in classical, but not in quantum mechanics.” (Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936, p.830; underline added) Continuing, Birkhoff and von Neumann comment: “From a deeper mathematical viewpoint, L6 is the characteristic property of set-combination. More precisely, every "field" of sets is isomorphic with a Boolean algebra, and conversely.21 This throws new light on the well-known fact that the propositional calculi of classical mechanics are Boolean algebras.” (Birkhoff and von Neumann, 1936, p.831). Birkhoff and von Neumann then show on p.831 that the distributive law breaks down in quantum mechanics and that the generalized distributive law of logic breaks down in the related field “in the quotient algebra of the field of Lebesgue measurable sets by the ideal of sets of Lebesgue measure 0, which is so fundamental in statistics and the formulation of the ergodic principle.” (ibid., p.831). However, it must be noted that Birkhoff and von Neumann are talking about the Jevons-Pierce-Schroder interpretation (two -valued) of Boole’s original approach (four -valued), which Boole completely rejected. (See Hailperin, 1986, 1996), The reason for this rejection is that the Jevons-Peircean approach required strict complementation, which translated into additivity and linearity in probability assessments, as opposed to Boole’s realization that real world decision making required sub additivity and non-linearity, Thereafter, we will refer to the Jevons-Pierce-Schroder approach as Jevons’s approach to the interpretation of Boolean logic, which uses standard classical logic to underpin discussions of standard probability logic. Jevons’s approach removed the basic algebra which Boole combined with his new relational, propositional logic, so as to deal with indeterminate, imprecise probabilities, which are nonstandard. Jevons’s approach can’t deal with the non-standard probability logics used by Boole in chapters XVIII-XX of The Laws of Thought (1854) and by Keynes in chapters XII, XV-XVII of the A Treatise on Probability (1921) in order to deal with indeterminate, interval valued probabilities.