Preliminary accounts on three subjects are produced in Secs. 1, 2, 3. The guiding idea is Universality of Physics , by which we mean that the boundary between the system that is selected, and which is described by Quantum Theory, and the macroscopic environment where the single physical events as well as the events of ordinary life occur, which is described within a Boolean structure, may always be shifted by constructing a Quantum Model also of the environment (to be selected from the “further environment”), as it is set forth in Sec. 1. This introduces the subject of Sec. 2, which examines what should be understood when saying that the quantum component system may be macroscopically or at least “semimacroscopically” interpreted. In its turn this introduces Sec. 3, reporting two still unpublished theorems produced at Camerino 1988, which very closely connect the above requirements on the Quantum Model of with some properties of the operations that the “instrument” performs on , with the result that the macroscopicity conditions of Sec. 2 turn out to be widely model-independent (“environmental”).
Preliminary accounts on three subjects are produced in Secs. 1, 2, 3. The guiding idea is Universality of Physics , by which we mean that the boundary between the system that is selected, and which is described by Quantum Theory, and the macroscopic environment where the single physical events as well as the events of ordinary life occur, which is described within a Boolean structure, may always be shifted by constructing a Quantum Model also of the environment (to be selected from the “further environment”), as it is set forth in Sec. 1. This introduces the subject of Sec. 2, which examines what should be understood when saying that the quantum component system may be macroscopically or at least “semimacroscopically” interpreted. In its turn this introduces Sec. 3, reporting two still unpublished theorems produced at Camerino 1988, which very closely connect the above requirements on the Quantum Model of with some properties of the operations that the “instrument” performs on , with the result that the macroscopicity conditions of Sec. 2 turn out to be widely model-independent (“environmental”).
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Description The Quantum Underlying Entanglement Event Time–Entropy Retention model, abbreviated QUEETER, is a speculative framework designed to explore whether the history of a quantum entanglement event can continue to influence a system after that event has already occurred. The model begins with the familiar idea that two or more quantum systems can become entangled. When systems are entangled, their properties are connected through correlations that cannot always be explained by treating each system independently. These correlations can remain observable even when the systems are separated.In ordinary quantum theory, the present condition of a system is described by its quantum state. For realistic systems, this state is often represented by a density matrix, which contains the measurable probabilities, coherences, and correlations available at a given time. QUEETER asks whether this present-state description is always sufficient. Its central proposal is that an entanglement event may leave behind a temporary historical influence. This influence would depend on when the entanglement event occurred and on the amount of entropy produced or encountered after that event. The model calls this continuing influence event retention, or QUEETER retention.Under this proposal, an entanglement event is not treated merely as an instantaneous preparation step. Instead, it is treated as the beginning of a history that may continue to affect later quantum behavior. An entanglement event is any physical interaction that creates or significantly changes entanglement between quantum systems. This event could occur through a controlled quantum gate, the emission of correlated particles, a collision, a shared interaction, or another physical process capable of generating quantum entanglement. QUEETER assigns importance to the time at which this event occurs. That moment becomes the starting point for the event’s retention history. As time passes, the event becomes older. During that period, the system may also interact with its environment, experience thermal noise, undergo measurements, lose energy, or participate in other irreversible processes. QUEETER proposes that both the age of the event and the entropy associated with its later history may influence how much of the event’s original historical effect remains.Time is one of the central elements of the QUEETER model. The model proposes that the influence of an entanglement event gradually weakens as the event becomes older. A recently created entangled system may therefore possess a stronger event-retention effect than a system whose entanglement was created much earlier. This does not simply mean that older systems are expected to have less entanglement. That ordinary effect is already explained by decoherence, noise, and other forms of environmental disturbance.The stronger QUEETER claim is that event age may affect future behavior even when two systems have been adjusted so that their present measurable quantum states are the same. In other words, two systems could appear identical at the beginning of an experiment but evolve differently because one system’s entanglement event happened more recently than the other’s.Entropy is the second major historical element in QUEETER. In this context, entropy represents the irreversible spreading, loss, or inaccessibility of information during the system’s history. A quantum system may accumulate entropy through interactions with a thermal environment, uncontrolled noise, scattering, dissipation, measurement-like processes, or other physical mechanisms that distribute information into surrounding degrees of freedom. QUEETER proposes that greater accumulated entropy exposure reduces event retention. This means that two entangled systems of the same age might still possess different retention values if one experienced a more disruptive or entropy-producing history. The model therefore distinguishes between the system’s present environment and its environmental history. Two systems may currently be held at the same temperature, exposed to the same controls, and placed in the same apparatus while still having experienced different amounts of entropy production in the past. QUEETER suggests that this difference in past entropy exposure may influence later quantum evolution.QUEETER retention is the proposed remaining influence of the original entanglement event. It is not meant to be identical to entanglement itself. A system may still be entangled even after its QUEETER retention has become very small. Similarly, a nonzero retention value would not automatically prove that the system remains strongly entangled. Entanglement refers to a property of the quantum state, while retention refers to the proposed continuing effect of the event history that created or shaped that state. Retention is also not intended to be the same as ordinary coherence. Quantum coherence describes phase relationships that are already visible in the present quantum state. QUEETER retention is meant to carry information about the event’s age and entropy history, even when that information is not directly visible through ordinary measurements of the present reduced state. The model treats retention as an additional descriptive variable. This variable would be strongest near the time of the entanglement event and would gradually fade as time passes and entropy accumulates.Decoherence describes how quantum coherence and entanglement become weakened when a system interacts with its environment. It explains why quantum behavior becomes difficult to observe in large, warm, or uncontrolled systems. QUEETER does not replace decoherence. Instead, it proposes that the rate or pattern of decoherence may temporarily depend on the retained history of the original entanglement event.In the basic protective version of the model, greater retention slightly slows the loss of observable quantum correlations. As retention fades, the system’s behavior gradually returns to the ordinary decoherence rate. This produces the prediction that a recently entangled system may lose correlations differently from an older but otherwise matched system. However, simply observing different decay rates would not be enough to support QUEETER. Ordinary environmental differences can easily produce such an effect. The systems would need to be carefully matched and tested under the same present conditions.Quantum memory refers to a physical system or degree of freedom that stores quantum information. Examples include atomic ensembles, trapped particles, optical systems, or environmental modes that preserve information about earlier interactions. QUEETER retention is intended to be conceptually different. It is not initially described as a separate physical storage device or memory qubit. It is described as a property associated with the entanglement event and its history. This distinction is difficult to maintain scientifically. If the proposed retention effect can be explained by an unnoticed environmental memory, then QUEETER would not require a new physical theory. It would instead represent a different way of describing an already known memory process. For QUEETER to become genuinely distinct, it would need to predict something that cannot be reproduced by including the relevant environment and memory degrees of freedom in an ordinary quantum model.Non-Markovian quantum dynamics describes situations in which the future behavior of a system depends on its earlier interactions. In a simple memoryless process, the future depends only on the present state. In a non-Markovian process, information can flow between the system and the environment, allowing earlier events to influence later behavior. This area of physics is closely related to the idea behind QUEETER.For that reason, QUEETER cannot claim originality merely because it introduces history-dependent quantum behavior. That general idea is already well established. The proposed distinction is more specific. QUEETER suggests that the time and entropy history of a particular entanglement event may act as an additional effective state variable, even when the ordinary present quantum state and the relevant present environment have been matched. This is a much stronger claim because it suggests that the conventional description may be incomplete unless the event-retention history is included.The basic test of QUEETER uses two groups of entangled quantum systems. The first group has a recent entanglement-event history. The second group has an older entanglement-event history or has experienced more entropy-producing interactions. At first, the groups would naturally have different present states because the older or more disturbed group may have suffered more decoherence. To make the experiment meaningful, researchers would need to match the present quantum states of the two groups. This could involve carefully controlled noise, filtering, state preparation, or other procedures that bring both groups to nearly the same measured density matrix. The experimenters would then place both groups in the same test environment. They would expose the systems to the same controls, the same temperature, the same noise conditions, the same measurement schedule, and the same observation period.The later quantum correlations of the two groups would then be measured. Under the conventional null hypothesis, systems with the same complete relevant state and the same dynamics should produce the same future measurement statistics. Under QUEETER, the systems may evolve differently because their event-retention values are different.The primary QUEETER prediction is that two systems with nearly identical present quantum states may display different future correlation-decay behavior if their entanglement-event histories differ. In the protective version of the model, the system with the more recent and lower-entropy history retains its correlations for slightly longer.
One of the main goals of no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics is to show how results of measurements are objectified, or, in a more poignant terminology, how in a measurement situation facts arise. One needs to show how in their dynamical evolution the measured system and, perhaps more importantly, the measuring apparatus acquire, or at least appear to acquire, the definite properties that are otherwise explained by the collapse of the state. This can be seen as a special case of the problem whether quantum mechanics alone can account for the classical behaviour of macroscopic systems; in particular, the permanent definiteness of at least those properties of macroscopic systems that are directly observable, such as the position of the pointer of a measuring apparatus. In other words, whether quantum mechanics can account for macrofacts of the familiar kind.
Quantum theory permits processes with no definite order of operations, yet the everyday world has a perfectly definite one that everybody agrees on. This paper explains the gap with the same mechanism physics already uses to explain why the world looks classical at all: the environment quietly monitors a system and, in doing so, singles out a preferred set of stable alternatives and stamps redundant copies of the outcome all around. Applied to the order of operations, this monitoring selects definite orders as the surviving, stable possibilities and drives every process toward having a definite order. Because the order is copied into many parts of the surroundings, it becomes objective, a fact that independent observers each read off separately and agree upon. The paper makes the argument in four steps. First, it lets an environment gently blur the order information of the simplest indefinite process and shows that a certificate of indefiniteness weakens and crosses over to zero at a definite time, after which the process is ordered; the ordered set, once reached, is never left again, which is the mark of a genuine selection rule. Second, it proves a selection theorem for the switchable process: a standard criterion picks out the two definite orders as the stable survivors, and does so for any environment that couples through the physical thing that sets the order, not merely for one specially chosen coupling; the resulting blurring turns the process into a plain mixture of the two definite orders. Third, when many independent fragments of the environment each record the order, the order is broadcast redundantly, so it becomes objective in the precise sense that separate observers reading separate fragments all agree without disturbing the process; the order-coherence the process loses is exactly the order-information the environment gains. Fourth, it computes the blurring rate from concrete physical environments and turns it into a sharp observability threshold in terms of mass, separation, surrounding vacuum, and available time, which for proposed gravitational versions of the experiment becomes a crossover mass above which indefinite order could still be seen. The payoff is a physical account of why the large-scale world is causally definite and why observers agree about the order of events: definite causal order is einselected and then redundantly broadcast, exactly as a classical fact is. The paper is careful about scope, distinguishing the moment a process first becomes ordered from the later, fully settled state in which the order has been completely resolved and copied, and noting that macroscopic order-markers sit far inside the definite regime. By tying the disappearance of indefinite order to a computable environmental rate, it converts a foundational puzzle into a concrete experimental threshold that says when indefinite order should, and should not, be observable.