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Journal of Cryptology

Encryption against Storage-Bounded Adversaries from On-Line Strong Extractors

Chi-Jen Lu

Published Aug 6, 2003• 71 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s00145-003-0217-1

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An extractor is a function that is used to extract randomness. Given an imperfect random source X and a uniform seed Y, the output E(X,Y) is close to uniform. We study properties of such functions in the presence of prior quantum information about X, with a particular focus on cryptographic applications. We prove that certain extractors are suitable for key expansion in the bounded-storage model where the adversary has a limited amount of quantum memory. For extractors with one-bit output we show that the extracted bit is essentially equally secure as in the case where the adversary has classical resources. We prove the security of certain constructions that output multiple bits in the bounded-storage model.
We show that Trevisan's extractor and its variants [22,19] are secure against bounded quantum storage adversaries. One instantiation gives the first such extractor to achieve an output length Θ(K-b), where K is the source's entropy and b the adversary's storage, together with a poly-logarithmic seed length. Another instantiation achieves a logarithmic key length, with a slightly smaller output length Θ((K-b)/Kγ) for any γ>0. In contrast, the previous best construction [21] could only extract (K/b)1/15 bits.