Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:quant-ph/0608101 · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

The Bounded-Storage Model in the Presence of a Quantum Adversary

Robert König, Barbara M. Terhal

Published Jan 29, 2008• 75 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

An extractor is a function that is used to extract randomness. Given an imperfect random source X and a uniform seed Y, the output E(X,Y) is close to uniform. We study properties of such functions in the presence of prior quantum information about X, with a particular focus on cryptographic applications. We prove that certain extractors are suitable for key expansion in the bounded-storage model where the adversary has a limited amount of quantum memory. For extractors with one-bit output we show that the extracted bit is essentially equally secure as in the case where the adversary has classical resources. We prove the security of certain constructions that output multiple bits in the bounded-storage model.

DOI
10.1109/tit.2007.913245

Related papers

Near-optimal extractors against quantum storage

Anindya De, Thomas Vidick

We show that Trevisan's extractor and its variants [22,19] are secure against bounded quantum storage adversaries. One instantiation gives the first such extractor to achieve an output length Θ(K-b), where K is the source's entropy and b the adversary's storage, together with a poly-logarithmic seed length. Another instantiation achieves a logarithmic key length, with a slightly smaller output length Θ((K-b)/Kγ) for any γ>0. In contrast, the previous best construction [21] could only extract (K/b)1/15 bits.

ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)•Jun 5, 2010•29 citations

Near-optimal extractors against quantum storage

Anindya De, Thomas Vidick

We show that Trevisan's extractor and its variants \cite{T99,RRV99} are secure against bounded quantum storage adversaries. One instantiation gives the first such extractor to achieve an output length $Θ(K-b)$, where $K$ is the source's entropy and $b$ the adversary's storage, together with a poly-logarithmic seed length. Another instantiation achieves a logarithmic key length, with a slightly smaller output length $Θ((K-b)/K^γ)$ for any $γ>0$. In contrast, the previous best construction \cite{TS09} could only extract $(K/b)^{1/15}$ bits. Some of our constructions have the additional advantage that every bit of the output is a function of only a polylogarithmic number of bits from the source, which is crucial for some cryptographic applications. Our argument is based on bounds for a generalization of quantum random access codes, which we call \emph{quantum functional access codes}. This is crucial as it lets us avoid the local list-decoding algorithm central to the approach in \cite{TS09}, which was the source of the multiplicative overhead.

arXiv:0911.4680•Nov 24, 2009•3 citations

Quantum to Classical Randomness Extractors

Mario Berta, Omar Fawzi, Stephanie Wehner

The goal of randomness extraction is to distill (almost) perfect randomness from a weak source of randomness. When the source yields a classical string X, many extractor constructions are known. Yet, when considering a physical randomness source, X is itself ultimately the result of a measurement on an underlying quantum system. When characterizing the power of a source to supply randomness, it is hence natural to ask how much classical randomness we can extract from a quantum system. To tackle this question, we here take on the study of quantum-to-classical randomness extractors (QC-extractors). We provide constructions of QC-extractors based on measurements in a full set of mutually unbiased bases (MUBs), and certain single qubit measurements. The latter are particularly appealing since they are not only easy to implement, but also appear throughout quantum cryptography. We proceed to prove an upper bound on the maximum amount of randomness that we could hope to extract from any quantum state. Some of our QC-extractors almost match this bound. We show two applications of our results. First, we show that any QC-extractor gives rise to entropic uncertainty relations with respect to quantum side information. Such relations were previously only known for two measurements. In particular, we obtain strong relations in terms of the von Neumann (Shannon) entropy as well as the min-entropy for measurements in (almost) unitary two-designs, a full set of MUBs, and single qubit measurements in three MUBs each. Second, we resolve the central open question in the noisy-storage model by linking security to the quantum capacity of the adversary's storage device. More precisely, we show that any two party cryptographic primitives can be implemented securely as long as the adversary's storage device has sufficiently low quantum capacity. Our protocol does not need any quantum storage to implement, and is technologically feasible using present-day technology.

arXiv:1111.2026•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Jan 24, 2014•50 citations

Non‐malleable Extractor in the Presence of Classical or Quantum Side Information*

Yipeng Liu, Jiansheng Guo, Cui Jingyi

Non-malleable extractor is an important tool for studying the problem of privacy amplification in classical and quantum cryptography with an active adversary. The randomness of the weakly-random source X before privacy amplification always depends on the information adversary has, called side information. We study properties of such extractors in the presence of classical and quantum side information, and show that any non-malleable extractor is essentially secure in the case where the adversary has classical side information. We also prove that non-malleable extractors are quantumproof with uniform seed, or only require the seed to be weakly random.

Chinese Journal of Electronics•Sep 1, 2019•0 citations

Better short-seed extractors against quantum knowledge

Avraham Ben-Aroya, Amnon Ta‐Shma

We construct a strong extractor against quantum storage that works for every min-entropy k, has logarithmic seed length, and outputs Ω(k) bits, provided that the quantum adversary has at most βk qubits of memory, for any β < 12 . Previous constructions required poly-logarithmic seed length to output such a fraction of the entropy and, in addition, required super-logarithmic seed length for small values of k. The construction works by first condensing the source (with minimal entropy-loss) and then applying an extractor that works well against quantum adversaries, when the source is close to uniform. We also obtain an improved construction of a strong extractor against quantum knowledge, in the high guessing entropy regime. Specifically, we construct an extractor that uses a logarithmic seed length and extracts Ω(n) bits from any source over {0, 1}, provided that the guessing entropy of the source conditioned on the quantum adversary’s state is at least (1−β)n, for any β < 12 . Previous constructions required poly-logarithmic seed length to output Ω(n) bits from such sources.

•Apr 21, 2010•3 citations

Quantum Measurement Adversary

Divesh Aggarwal, Naresh Goud Boddu, Rahul Jain +1 more

Multi-source extractors are functions that extract uniform randomness from multiple (weak) sources of randomness. Quantum multi-source extractors were considered by Kasher and Kempe (2010) (for the quantum independent adversary and the quantum bounded storage adversary), Chung et al. (2014) (for the general entangled adversary) and Arnon-Friedman et al. (2016) (for the quantum Markov adversary). One of the main objectives of this work is to unify all the existing quantum multi-source adversary models. We propose two new models of adversaries: 1) the quantum measurement adversary ($\mathsf {qma}$), which generates side information using entanglement and on post-measurement; and 2) the quantum communication adversary ($\mathsf {qca}$), which generates side information using entanglement and communication between multiple sources. We show that: 1)$\mathsf {qma}$is the strongest adversary among all the known adversaries, in the sense that the side information of all other adversaries can be generated by$\mathsf {qma}$; 2) The (generalized) inner-product function (in fact a general class of two-wise independent functions) continues to work as a good extractor with matching parameters as that of Chor and Goldreich (1985) against classical adversaries; 3) A non-malleable extractor proposed by Li (2012) (against classical adversaries) continues to be secure against quantum side information. This result implies a non-malleable extractor result of Aggarwal et al. (2019) with uniform seed. We strengthen their result via a completely different proof to make the non-malleable extractor of Li secure against quantum side information even when the seed is not uniform; 4) A modification (working with weak local randomness instead of uniform local randomness) of the Dodis and Wichs (2009) protocol for privacy-amplification is secure against active quantum adversaries (those who arbitrarily modify the messages exchanged in the protocol). This strengthens on a recent result due to Aggarwal et al. (2019) which uses uniform local randomness; 5) A tight efficiency lower bound for the (generalized) inner-product function (in fact a general class of two-wise independent functions).

arXiv:2106.02766•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Sep 8, 2023•7 citations
An extractor is a function that is used to extract randomness. Given an imperfect random source X and a uniform seed Y, the output E(X,Y) is close to uniform. We study properties of such functions in the presence of prior quantum information about X, with a particular focus on cryptographic applications. We prove that certain extractors are suitable for key expansion in the bounded-storage model where the adversary has a limited amount of quantum memory. For extractors with one-bit output we show that the extracted bit is essentially equally secure as in the case where the adversary has classical resources. We prove the security of certain constructions that output multiple bits in the bounded-storage model.
We show that Trevisan's extractor and its variants [22,19] are secure against bounded quantum storage adversaries. One instantiation gives the first such extractor to achieve an output length Θ(K-b), where K is the source's entropy and b the adversary's storage, together with a poly-logarithmic seed length. Another instantiation achieves a logarithmic key length, with a slightly smaller output length Θ((K-b)/Kγ) for any γ>0. In contrast, the previous best construction [21] could only extract (K/b)1/15 bits.
We show that Trevisan's extractor and its variants \cite{T99,RRV99} are secure against bounded quantum storage adversaries. One instantiation gives the first such extractor to achieve an output length Θ(K−b)Θ(K-b)Θ(K−b), where KKK is the source's entropy and bbb the adversary's storage, together with a poly-logarithmic seed length. Another instantiation achieves a logarithmic key length, with a slightly smaller output length Θ((K−b)/Kγ)Θ((K-b)/K^γ)Θ((K−b)/Kγ) for any γ>0γ>0γ>0. In contrast, the previous best construction \cite{TS09} could only extract (K/b)1/15(K/b)^{1/15}(K/b)1/15 bits. Some of our constructions have the additional advantage that every bit of the output is a function of only a polylogarithmic number of bits from the source, which is crucial for some cryptographic applications. Our argument is based on bounds for a generalization of quantum random access codes, which we call \emph{quantum functional access codes}. This is crucial as it lets us avoid the local list-decoding algorithm central to the approach in \cite{TS09}, which was the source of the multiplicative overhead.
The goal of randomness extraction is to distill (almost) perfect randomness from a weak source of randomness. When the source yields a classical string X, many extractor constructions are known. Yet, when considering a physical randomness source, X is itself ultimately the result of a measurement on an underlying quantum system. When characterizing the power of a source to supply randomness, it is hence natural to ask how much classical randomness we can extract from a quantum system. To tackle this question, we here take on the study of quantum-to-classical randomness extractors (QC-extractors). We provide constructions of QC-extractors based on measurements in a full set of mutually unbiased bases (MUBs), and certain single qubit measurements. The latter are particularly appealing since they are not only easy to implement, but also appear throughout quantum cryptography. We proceed to prove an upper bound on the maximum amount of randomness that we could hope to extract from any quantum state. Some of our QC-extractors almost match this bound. We show two applications of our results. First, we show that any QC-extractor gives rise to entropic uncertainty relations with respect to quantum side information. Such relations were previously only known for two measurements. In particular, we obtain strong relations in terms of the von Neumann (Shannon) entropy as well as the min-entropy for measurements in (almost) unitary two-designs, a full set of MUBs, and single qubit measurements in three MUBs each. Second, we resolve the central open question in the noisy-storage model by linking security to the quantum capacity of the adversary's storage device. More precisely, we show that any two party cryptographic primitives can be implemented securely as long as the adversary's storage device has sufficiently low quantum capacity. Our protocol does not need any quantum storage to implement, and is technologically feasible using present-day technology.
Non-malleable extractor is an important tool for studying the problem of privacy amplification in classical and quantum cryptography with an active adversary. The randomness of the weakly-random source X before privacy amplification always depends on the information adversary has, called side information. We study properties of such extractors in the presence of classical and quantum side information, and show that any non-malleable extractor is essentially secure in the case where the adversary has classical side information. We also prove that non-malleable extractors are quantumproof with uniform seed, or only require the seed to be weakly random.
We construct a strong extractor against quantum storage that works for every min-entropy k, has logarithmic seed length, and outputs Ω(k) bits, provided that the quantum adversary has at most βk qubits of memory, for any β < 12 . Previous constructions required poly-logarithmic seed length to output such a fraction of the entropy and, in addition, required super-logarithmic seed length for small values of k. The construction works by first condensing the source (with minimal entropy-loss) and then applying an extractor that works well against quantum adversaries, when the source is close to uniform. We also obtain an improved construction of a strong extractor against quantum knowledge, in the high guessing entropy regime. Specifically, we construct an extractor that uses a logarithmic seed length and extracts Ω(n) bits from any source over {0, 1}, provided that the guessing entropy of the source conditioned on the quantum adversary’s state is at least (1−β)n, for any β < 12 . Previous constructions required poly-logarithmic seed length to output Ω(n) bits from such sources.
Multi-source extractors are functions that extract uniform randomness from multiple (weak) sources of randomness. Quantum multi-source extractors were considered by Kasher and Kempe (2010) (for the quantum independent adversary and the quantum bounded storage adversary), Chung et al. (2014) (for the general entangled adversary) and Arnon-Friedman et al. (2016) (for the quantum Markov adversary). One of the main objectives of this work is to unify all the existing quantum multi-source adversary models. We propose two new models of adversaries: 1) the quantum measurement adversary (qma\mathsf {qma}qma), which generates side information using entanglement and on post-measurement; and 2) the quantum communication adversary (qca\mathsf {qca}qca), which generates side information using entanglement and communication between multiple sources. We show that: 1)qma\mathsf {qma}qmais the strongest adversary among all the known adversaries, in the sense that the side information of all other adversaries can be generated byqma\mathsf {qma}qma; 2) The (generalized) inner-product function (in fact a general class of two-wise independent functions) continues to work as a good extractor with matching parameters as that of Chor and Goldreich (1985) against classical adversaries; 3) A non-malleable extractor proposed by Li (2012) (against classical adversaries) continues to be secure against quantum side information. This result implies a non-malleable extractor result of Aggarwal et al. (2019) with uniform seed. We strengthen their result via a completely different proof to make the non-malleable extractor of Li secure against quantum side information even when the seed is not uniform; 4) A modification (working with weak local randomness instead of uniform local randomness) of the Dodis and Wichs (2009) protocol for privacy-amplification is secure against active quantum adversaries (those who arbitrarily modify the messages exchanged in the protocol). This strengthens on a recent result due to Aggarwal et al. (2019) which uses uniform local randomness; 5) A tight efficiency lower bound for the (generalized) inner-product function (in fact a general class of two-wise independent functions).