In this paper some consequences of the strengthened interpretative rules of quantum mechanics, which were proposed in an earlier paper, are obtained. It is also seen that, in general, the usual interpretative rules are too weak to obtain these results. For example, it is proved from the strengthened rules that if f:R → R is a Borel function which is also τ-definable, then for each observable A the procedure ``measure A and compute f(A outcome)'' is an f(A) measurement procedure. It is also shown that there exist Borel f and observables A such that the above procedure is not an f(A) measurement procedure. Two methods of measuring the sum A + B of two observables are then considered: The measurement of A and B on different systems followed by addition of the results and (if A and B commute) the simultaneous measurement of A and B on the same system followed by addition. It is proved from the strengthened rules that the first method is not a valid measurement procedure and the second is valid. Besides these, other processes such as procedures for preparing mixtures of different states, and the empirical generation of probability measures from outcome sequences are considered.
In this paper some consequences of the strengthened interpretative rules of quantum mechanics, which were proposed in an earlier paper, are obtained. It is also seen that, in general, the usual interpretative rules are too weak to obtain these results. For example, it is proved from the strengthened rules that if f:R → R is a Borel function which is also τ-definable, then for each observable A the procedure ``measure A and compute f(A outcome)'' is an f(A) measurement procedure. It is also shown that there exist Borel f and observables A such that the above procedure is not an f(A) measurement procedure. Two methods of measuring the sum A + B of two observables are then considered: The measurement of A and B on different systems followed by addition of the results and (if A and B commute) the simultaneous measurement of A and B on the same system followed by addition. It is proved from the strengthened rules that the first method is not a valid measurement procedure and the second is valid. Besides these, other processes such as procedures for preparing mixtures of different states, and the empirical generation of probability measures from outcome sequences are considered.
The usual interpretative rules of quantum mechanics are presented and are shown to be too weak. The reason is that they do not include the intuitive requirement of randomness of the outcome sequence obtained from an infinite repetition of measuring an observable on a state. A strengthening of the rules is proposed which includes, in essence, a precise definition of randomness. The resultant rule is seen to be intuitively more satisfying than the usual rules and to include the expectation value rule and to include essentially all of the spectrum rule of the usual rules. It also suggests that the relationship between the foundations of mathematics and quantum mechanics may be quite deep and complex.
Quantum mechanics has several deficiencies as a complete theoretical description of the measurement process. Among them is the fact that the quantum mechanical description of correlations between the single measurements of a sequence is quite problematic. A single measurement is defined to be a preparation followed by an observation. In particular, one feels that an infinite sequence of such single measurements which corresponds to the measurement of a question O on a state η where η does not lie entirely in an eigenspace of O should generate a random output sequence. However, quantum mechanics seems to say nothing about this. In this paper, physical theories are defined in such a manner that correlations between single measurements are explicitly included. In particular, a physical theory is considered to be a mapping U, with domain in the set [Qsτ] of infinite instruction strings for carrying out infinite sequences of single measurements and range in the set of probability measures defined on A, the usual σ algebra of subsets of Ω. Ω is the set of all infinite sequences of natural numbers. A fundamental property which any valid physical theory must satisfy is that it agrees with experiment. It is proposed and discussed here that much of the intuitive meaning of agreement between a theory U and experiment with respect to H is given by the statement ∀Qsτ [U(Qsτ) defined⇒E(H,U(Qsτ),ψQsτ)],where U(Qsτ) is the probability measure U associates with the infinite instruction string Qsτ and ψQsτ is the outcome sequence obtained by carrying out Qsτ. E(H, U(Qsτ),ψQsτ) is the statement that all formulas in H with one free sequence variable which are true on Ω almost everywhere with respect to U(Qsτ) are true for ψQsτ. H is a subclass of the class of all formulas in a formal language L. A theorem is proved which states that, if U(Qsτ) corresponds to a nontrivial product probability measure and U H-agrees with experiment, then the outcome sequence ψQsτ is H-random. H-randomness is defined here in terms of the statement E(H, P, φ). Another property of a valid physical theory, which is defined here, is that, for some Qsτ, U(Qsτ) must be determinable on much of AH from ψQsτ. Sufficient conditions for this property to hold are given. AH is the class of all H definable subsets of Ω. Some properties of the statement E(H, P, φ) are given. Among other things, it is proved that, if E(H, P, φ) holds and P is a nontrivial probability measure on A, then φ is not definable in H.
In classical mechanics, as we know, all observables commute with each other and therefore belong to the same “commuting set.” This means that – in principle – we can measure all observables simultaneously. Then, the state manifests itself as a collection of properties (of values of observables) (see Sec. 1.1), and as such it is observable. On the other hand, quantum-mechanical observables may not commute (see Subsec. 2.1.5). As a consequence, the state is not just a collection of observable values (see also Sec. 2.3) so that we may ask ourselves whether it is observable or not, and therefore raise the following question: What is the nature of the wave function? Is it simply a mathematical tool, i.e. does it only represent the sum of all that we can know about a system? Or does it have an ontological status? Since the early days of quantum mechanics, this question has been very popular. As a first attempt, de Broglie tried to interpret the wave function as describing, in classical terms, a wave field that envelopes a classical particle (see also Subsec. 16.3.2). This theory should predict the existence of empty waves, but several experiments have shown negative results (see also the end of Sec. 9.6). More recently, many physicists have tried to propose some methods in order to measure the wave function. Here we shortly report on some of these proposals and discuss to what extent the quantum state can be measured.
The newly revised edition of this well-known book categorizes prevalent views on measurement as described by quantum mechanics, discusses basics agreed to by many who on other issues disagree, and describes some of the problems. Although many paragraphs rest unchanged from the first (1991) edition, results found since 1991 are used to reorganize and sharpen the focus of the book, so that even the old paragraphs are now understood differently and more clearly. One advance in the second edition is a new and more general no-go theorem; another is separation of formal derivations from interpretation. The dozen or so definitions essential to following the book even casually are stated clearly. By this means the authors succeed pretty well in achieving their stated desire to make the book comprehensible to those who do not share their philosophic predispositions. While I differ in philosophy from the authors, attending to their discussion uncovered weaknesses in my own thinking and improved it. The mathematical language of quantum mechanics expresses a system under measurement by states (as rays in a Hilbert space) and a hamiltonian operator, distinct from the apparatus that produces outcomes, which is expressed by a positive operator-valued (POV) measure. In this way quantum language separates state preparation from state measurement. Often the Hilbert space is viewed as a tensor product of subspaces, allowing further conceptual separations. The authors take the stance that quantum mechanics calls for splitting the empirical world into parts, the most essential being (1) objective systems S (to be observed) and (2) apparatus A (preparation and registration devices that produces outcomes (or, as the authors write, definite pointer values) of the observed system). In some interpretations, one or both of an observer and an environment appear as additional parts. What is to be included in the system S versus the apparatus A is not specified by the language, but is open to the theoretician; a probe, for example, can be analysed as either part of the apparatus or as part of the system, as was discussed by von Neumann in work cited by the authors. With what should a theory of measurement be concerned? A broad division of approaches is defined by how one answers the question: should one try to do away with the cut between measuring apparatus and system? The authors phrase this as a choice of REFERENT, a term which in my mind puts them on shaky semantic ground; anyway The Quantum Theory of Measurement is concerned with implications of the `yes'. The book unfolds with the power of a tragedy, in which the logical consequences lead, step-by-step, to the statement and proof of theorem 6.2.1, which, roughly speaking, asserts the non-existence of a solution to the problem of getting definite pointer values from measuring apparatus that exhibits the superposition demanded by its description as a quantum system. Possible responses to this theorem are discussed, among them the many-worlds interpretation and a modification of quantum mechanics that elevates decoherence to a principle. Citations of the literature are thorough, and many points of view are crisply summarized. The book is indispensable to both those who work in the broad direction chosen by the authors and to those who wish to set any other direction in context.
In the present interpretation terms such as ‘measurement,’ ‘observation,’ ‘find,’ ‘classical,’ and ‘apparatus’ do not appear in the formulation of quantum mechanics. Yet it must of course be true that quantum mechanics can be used to predict features of the results of measurements – in particular their statistics. What is required, then, is an account in quantum mechanical terms of those physical interactions capable of being used to perform measurements of quantum dynamical variables, from which it follows that the predicted probabilities for specified behavior of certain quantum systems in these interactions coincide with what, on a more conventional interpretation, are simply postulated as the quantum mechanical probabilities for various measurement results on a system with a given quantum state. It is necessary to see how this consequence may be derived, not only in order to explicate the Born rules, but also to explain the role of quantum states within the present interpretation. The first step toward the required account is to analyze the nature of an interaction capable of being used to perform a measurement of the value of a quantum dynamical variable in a quantum system. Any such interaction will be called an M-type interaction, whether or not it is in fact used to perform a measurement.
In a quantum-Bayesian take on quantum mechanics, the Born Rule cannot be interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, we argue that it should be seen as an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, we show how to view the Born Rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements on a physical system, but explicitly in terms of prior probabilities for and conditional probabilities consequent upon the imagined outcomes of a special counterfactual reference measurement. This interpretation is seen particularly clearly by representing quantum states in terms of probabilities for the outcomes of a fixed, fiducial symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurement. We further explore the extent to which the general form of the new normative rule implies the