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Bulletin of the American Physical Society

Quantum-Bayesian Coherence

Christopher A. Fuchs

Published Mar 18, 2010• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In a quantum-Bayesian take on quantum mechanics, the Born Rule cannot be interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, we argue that it should be seen as an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, we show how to view the Born Rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements on a physical system, but explicitly in terms of prior probabilities for and conditional probabilities consequent upon the imagined outcomes of a special counterfactual reference measurement. This interpretation is seen particularly clearly by representing quantum states in terms of probabilities for the outcomes of a fixed, fiducial symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurement. We further explore the extent to which the general form of the new normative rule implies the

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In a quantum-Bayesian take on quantum mechanics, the Born Rule cannot be interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, we argue that it should be seen as an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, we show how to view the Born Rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements on a physical system, but explicitly in terms of prior probabilities for and conditional probabilities consequent upon the imagined outcomes of a special counterfactual reference measurement. This interpretation is seen particularly clearly by representing quantum states in terms of probabilities for the outcomes of a fixed, fiducial symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurement. We further explore the extent to which the general form of the new normative rule implies the
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In the quantum-Bayesian interpretation of quantum theory (or QBism), the Born rule cannot be interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, the argument is given that it should be seen as an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, it is shown how to view the Born rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements on a physical system, but explicitly in terms of prior probabilities for and conditional probabilities consequent upon the imagined outcomes of a special counterfactual reference measurement. This interpretation is exemplified by representing quantum states in terms of probabilities for the outcomes of a fixed, fiducial symmetric informationally complete measurement. The extent to which the general form of the new normative rule implies the full state-space structure of quantum mechanics is explored.
Abstract Logical inference leads to one of the major interpretations of probability theory called logical interpretation, in which the probability is seen as a measure of the plausibility of a logical statement under incomplete information. Assuming that our usual inference procedure is working rationally for every set of logical propositions represented in terms of commuting projectors on a given Hilbert space, we extend the logical interpretation to quantum mechanics and derive the Born rule. Our result implies that, from epistemological viewpoints, we can regard quantum mechanics as a natural extension of classical probability theory.
The author summarizes the Quantum Bayesian viewpoint of quantum mechanics, developed originally by C. M. Caves, R. Schack, and himself. It is a view crucially dependent upon the tools of quantum information theory. Work at the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics continues the development and is focused on the hard technical problem of a finding a good representation of quantum mechanics purely in terms of probabilities, without amplitudes or Hilbert-space operators. The best candidate representation involves a mysterious entity called a symmetric informationally complete quantum measurement. Contemplation of it gives a way of thinking of the Born Rule as an addition to the rules of probability theory, applicable when one gambles on the consequences of interactions with physical systems. The article ends by outlining some directions for future work.
The Born rule governs the probability of outcomes of measurements of quantum systems. Many attempts have been made to derive the Born rule from other postulates. We perform such an analysis in an Everett interpretation without any measurement postulates at all. We explain that probability is an ill defined concept and that an agent who nevertheless wishes to make approximate predictions will have no alternative measure to weigh the alternatives without subjecting herself to a dutch book. Our demonstration is complete for projective measurements of pure states in a finite dimensional Hilbert space and we discuss how it might be applied to generalized measurements. A similar demonstration is impossible for mixed states. Nevertheless, following the standard convention, probability for mixed states has the same validity and issues as it does in classical physics.