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Physics Today

Albert Einstein to Max Born

Albert Einstein

Published Aug 1, 2005• 3 citations
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Abstract

Translated by Irene Born Newton-John In this letter to his old friend, now at Edinburgh University, Einstein first responds to Born’s description of a local physician “who wouldn’t hurt a fly, but [states] that no sacrifice is too great [for] the realization of Marxist ideals, not even the destruction of millions of human lives.” And then it’s back to the old quarrel about quantum mechanics. (See Born’s comment below.) Princeton, 15 September 1950Dear Born,… People such as your Bolshevik doctor come by their fantastic attitude as a result of their objection to the harshness, injustice and absurdity of our own social order (escape from reality). If he happened to be living in Russia, no doubt he would be a rebel there as well, only in that case he would take care not to tell you about it. Nevertheless it seems to me that our own people here [in the US] make an even worse job of their foreign policy than the Russians. And the idiotic public can be talked into anything. And they really are very shortsighted, for technological superiority is transitory, and if it comes to an all-out conflict, the decisive factor is sheer numerical superiority.There is nothing analogous in relativity to what I call incompleteness of description in the quantum theory. Briefly it is because the ψ-function is incapable of describing certain qualities of an individual system, whose “reality” none of us doubt (such as a microscopic parameter). Take a (macroscopic) body that can rotate freely about an axis. Its state is fully determined by an angle. Let the initial conditions (angle and angular momentum) be defined as precisely as the quantum theory allows. The Schrödinger equation then gives the ψ-function for any subsequent time interval. If this is sufficiently large, all angles become (in practice) equally probable. But if an observation is made (e.g. by flashing a torch), a definite angle is found (with sufficient accuracy). This does not prove that the angle had a definite value before it was observed—but we believe this to be the case, because we are committed to the requirements of reality on the macroscopic scale. Thus, the ψ-function does not express the real state of affairs perfectly in this case. This is what I call “incomplete description.”So far, you may not object. But you will probably take the position that a complete description would be useless because there is no mathematical relationship for such a case. I do not say that I am able to disprove this view. But my instinct tells me that a complete formulation of the relationships is tied up with complete description of its factual state. I am convinced of this although, up to now, success is against it. I also believe that the current formulation is true in the same sense as e.g. thermodynamics, i.e. as far as the concepts used are inadequate. I do not expect to convince you, or anybody else. I just want you to understand the way I think.I see from … your letter that you, too, take the quantum theoretical description as incomplete (referring to an ensemble). But you are, after all, convinced that no (complete) laws exist for a complete description, according to the positivistic maxim: esse est percipi [to be is to be perceived]. Well, this is a programmatic attitude, not knowledge. This is where our attitudes really differ. For the time being, I am alone in my views—as Leibniz was with respect to the absolute space of Newton’s theory.… I have not changed my attitude to the Germans, which, by the way, dates not just from the Nazi period. All human beings are more or less the same from birth. The Germans, however, have a far more dangerous tradition than any of the other so-called civilized nations.Kind regards,Yours,A. E. Born’s 1969 comment: 1 1. M. Born, The Born–Einstein Letters 1916–1955: Friendship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 184 Original letter © Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This is probably the clearest presentation of Einstein’s philosophy of reality. … He calls my way of describing the physical world “incomplete.” In his eyes, that is a flaw which he hopes to see removed, while I am prepared to put up with it. I have in fact always regarded it as a step forward, because an exact description of the state of a physical system presupposes that one can make statements of infinite precision about it, and this seems absurd to me. REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Born, The Born–Einstein Letters 1916–1955: Friendship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 184 Original letter © Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Google Scholar© 2005 American Institute of Physics.

DOI
10.1063/1.2062900

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Albert Einstein to Hedi and Max Born

Albert Einstein

Translated by Irene Born Newton-John; closing comment by Max Born. 1 1. M. Born, The Born—Einstein Letters 1916-1955: Friendship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 79. Letter © Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This letter antedates by a year or two the “new” quantum mechanics of Werner Heisenberg, Max Born, Pasqual Jordan, and Erwin Schrödinger. Einstein begins with a response to a letter about Japan by Born’s wife, Hedi—a letter that has since been lost. But then, as he would for the next 30 years, Einstein launches into his differences with Max on the interpretation of quantum phenomena. If atomic phenomena are truly random, he grumbles, he’d rather be a croupier. Berlin, 29 April 1924Dear Borns,Your letter, dear Mrs. Born, was really excellent. Indeed, what causes the sense of well-being inspired by Japanese society and art is that the individual is so harmoniously integrated into his wider environment that he derives his experiences not from the self, but mainly from the community. Each of us longed for this when we were young, but we had to resign ourselves to its impossibility. For, of all the communities available to us there is not one I would want to devote myself to, except for the society of the true searchers, which has very few living members at any time.… Bohr’s opinion about radiation is of great interest. But I should not want to be forced into abandoning strict causality without defending it more strongly than I have so far. I find the idea quite intolerable that an electron exposed to radiation should choose, of its own free will, not only its moment to jump off, but also its direction. In that case, I would rather be a cobbler, or even an employee in a gaming house, than a physicist. Certainly my attempts to give tangible form to the quanta have foundered again and again, but I am far from giving up hope. And even if it never works, there is always that consolation that this lack of success is entirely mine. … With best wishes.YoursEinstein… Your pretty remark [Mrs. Born, about subject unknown] makes me want to stroke your head, if that is at all permissible in the case of a married lady. Max Born’s 1969 comments:’ The letter from my wife to which Einstein replied is missing. The basic reason for the dispute between [Einstein and me] on the validity of statistical laws was as follows: Einstein was firmly convinced that physics can supply us with knowledge of the objectively existing world. Together with many other physicists, I have been gradually converted, as a result of experiences in the field of atomic quantum phenomena, to the point of view that this is not so. At any given moment, our knowledge of the objective world is only a crude approximation from which, by applying certain rules such as the probability laws of quantum mechanics, we can predict unknown (e.g. future) conditions. REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<1. M. Born, The Born—Einstein Letters 1916-1955: Friendship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 79. Letter © Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Google Scholar© 2005 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 1, 2005•0 citations

Albert Einstein to Max Born

Albert Einstein

Translated by Irene Born Newton-John Commentary by Max Born [1882–1970] 1 1. M. Born, The Born–Einstein Letters 1916–1955: Freindship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 88. Original letter © The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Hedi [Born, Max’s wife] had sent her play, A Child of America, to Einstein, asking his opinion. 2 2. For discussion of the relationship between Einstein and Max and Hedi Born, see N. T. Greenspan, The End of the Uncertain World: The Life and Science of Max Born, Basic Books, New York (2005). Einstein’s son-in-law, who had married the eldest of his stepdaughters, Ilse, was the then well-known and respected author and critic, Rudolf Kayser. 4 December 1926Dear Born,You will have to be a little patient. My son-in-law is certain to read the play, and I will write to you. But the poor man has to economize with his strength, as his heart is in poor condition. I have reminded him again to give an opinion on the play as soon as possible. I liked the beginning of the play very much, and I think its impact will not be lost on him. Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells me that it is not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, but does not really bring us any closer to the secret of the “Old One.” I, at any rate, am convinced that He is not playing at dice. Waves in three-dimensional space whose velocity is regulated by potential energy (for example, rubber bands) … I am working very hard at deducing the equations of motion of material points regarded as singularities, given the differential equation of general relativity. With best wishes,Yours,A. Einstein Einstein’s verdict on quantum mechanics came as a hard blow to me. He rejected it not for any definite reason, but rather by referring to an “inner voice.” This rejection plays an important part in later letters. It was based on a basic difference of philosophical attitude, which separated Einstein from the younger generation to which I felt that I belonged, although I was only a few years younger than Einstein. REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. M. Born, The Born–Einstein Letters 1916–1955: Freindship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 88. Original letter © The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Google Scholar2. For discussion of the relationship between Einstein and Max and Hedi Born, see N. T. Greenspan, The End of the Uncertain World: The Life and Science of Max Born, Basic Books, New York (2005). Google Scholar© 2005 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•May 1, 2005•7 citations

My life with Einstein, December 2005

N. David Mermin

On 25 March 1935, the Physical Review received a paper from Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen, with the title “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?” A few days later, on 30 March 1935, I was born. My life with Einstein was off to a promising start. Some would call it an inauspicious start. Abraham Pais, for example, says in his otherwise admirable biography of Einstein [1] that “the only part of this article that will ultimately survive, I believe, is this last phrase [ No reasonable definition of reality could be expected to permit this ], which so poignantly summarizes Einstein's views on quantum mechanics in his later years.” But today, in this centenary of the Einstein annus mirabilis, as the EPR paper and I both turn 70, it is, in fact, the most cited of all Einstein's papers [2]. The debate over its conceptual implications rages hotter than ever, and for the first time, practical (well, for the moment still gedanken practical) applications of the EPR effect have emerged in cryptography and in other areas of quantum information processing. Being only five weeks old, I was unprepared to pay attention to the article that appeared in the New York Times on 4 May 1935 under an elaborate set of headlines and subheads: And I was completely oblivious to the stern rebuke from Einstein himself, published three days later in the Times , which declared that “any information upon which the article … is based was given to you without my authority. It is my invariable practice to discuss scientific matters only in the appropriate forum and I deprecate advance publication of any announcement in regard to such matters in the secular press.” Apparently Podolsky had tipped off the Times to the article, which did not appear in the sacred press until the 15 May issue of Physical Review. It is not clear that Einstein ever forgave him, and I wish I had been old enough to send Podolsky a cross letter myself. Anyone growing up in America in the 1940s knew that the preeminent genius of our age, and perhaps of any other, lived in Princeton, New Jersey, had a predilection for baggy sweaters, and was always badly in need of a haircut—as far ahead of his time in dress and grooming as he was ahead in science during his 1905 annus mirabilis.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jan 5, 2016•0 citations

A Midrash upon Quantum Mechanics

Dietrick E. Thomsen

The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.

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Oblivions and Flaws in Quantum Physics and Some Alternatives

Mirwais Rashid

One critic of Quantum Physics was, reportedly, Albert Einstein, to whom this quote is ascribed: “Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells me that it is not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, but does not really bring us any closer to the secret of the 'old one'. I, at any rate, am convinced that He does not throw dice”. In this booklet, criticisms towards some claims of some Nobel Prize Laureates in Physics, such as Max Planck, Louis de Broglie, Erwin Schrodinger, Max Born, Werner Heisenberg, Paul Dirac, Richard Feynman, Gerardus 't Hooft, are explained with detailed math.'s physical descriptions as to where these famous physicists were wrong. In Chapter 1 of this booklet it is shown that Maxwell's equations and Classic Physics, can explain some of the phenomena such as the Photoelectric Effect satisfyingly. In Chapter 2 it is explained that, though well encouraging, still taking the Nobel Prizes' money would be unethical and immoral, since that money was initially earned by the sale of dynamite which was also used, unfortunately, for killings. Justice would have been if that money would have been given to its victims or to their surviving families.

LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing eBooks•Feb 13, 2018•0 citations

Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, and Reality

Robert M. Wald

Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.

Classical and Quantum Gravity•Apr 21, 2011•28 citations
Translated by Irene Born Newton-John In this letter to his old friend, now at Edinburgh University, Einstein first responds to Born’s description of a local physician “who wouldn’t hurt a fly, but [states] that no sacrifice is too great [for] the realization of Marxist ideals, not even the destruction of millions of human lives.” And then it’s back to the old quarrel about quantum mechanics. (See Born’s comment below.) Princeton, 15 September 1950Dear Born,… People such as your Bolshevik doctor come by their fantastic attitude as a result of their objection to the harshness, injustice and absurdity of our own social order (escape from reality). If he happened to be living in Russia, no doubt he would be a rebel there as well, only in that case he would take care not to tell you about it. Nevertheless it seems to me that our own people here [in the US] make an even worse job of their foreign policy than the Russians. And the idiotic public can be talked into anything. And they really are very shortsighted, for technological superiority is transitory, and if it comes to an all-out conflict, the decisive factor is sheer numerical superiority.There is nothing analogous in relativity to what I call incompleteness of description in the quantum theory. Briefly it is because the ψ-function is incapable of describing certain qualities of an individual system, whose “reality” none of us doubt (such as a microscopic parameter). Take a (macroscopic) body that can rotate freely about an axis. Its state is fully determined by an angle. Let the initial conditions (angle and angular momentum) be defined as precisely as the quantum theory allows. The Schrödinger equation then gives the ψ-function for any subsequent time interval. If this is sufficiently large, all angles become (in practice) equally probable. But if an observation is made (e.g. by flashing a torch), a definite angle is found (with sufficient accuracy). This does not prove that the angle had a definite value before it was observed—but we believe this to be the case, because we are committed to the requirements of reality on the macroscopic scale. Thus, the ψ-function does not express the real state of affairs perfectly in this case. This is what I call “incomplete description.”So far, you may not object. But you will probably take the position that a complete description would be useless because there is no mathematical relationship for such a case. I do not say that I am able to disprove this view. But my instinct tells me that a complete formulation of the relationships is tied up with complete description of its factual state. I am convinced of this although, up to now, success is against it. I also believe that the current formulation is true in the same sense as e.g. thermodynamics, i.e. as far as the concepts used are inadequate. I do not expect to convince you, or anybody else. I just want you to understand the way I think.I see from … your letter that you, too, take the quantum theoretical description as incomplete (referring to an ensemble). But you are, after all, convinced that no (complete) laws exist for a complete description, according to the positivistic maxim: esse est percipi [to be is to be perceived]. Well, this is a programmatic attitude, not knowledge. This is where our attitudes really differ. For the time being, I am alone in my views—as Leibniz was with respect to the absolute space of Newton’s theory.… I have not changed my attitude to the Germans, which, by the way, dates not just from the Nazi period. All human beings are more or less the same from birth. The Germans, however, have a far more dangerous tradition than any of the other so-called civilized nations.Kind regards,Yours,A. E. Born’s 1969 comment: 1 1. M. Born, The Born–Einstein Letters 1916–1955: Friendship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 184 Original letter © Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This is probably the clearest presentation of Einstein’s philosophy of reality. … He calls my way of describing the physical world “incomplete.” In his eyes, that is a flaw which he hopes to see removed, while I am prepared to put up with it. I have in fact always regarded it as a step forward, because an exact description of the state of a physical system presupposes that one can make statements of infinite precision about it, and this seems absurd to me. REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Born, The Born–Einstein Letters 1916–1955: Friendship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 184 Original letter © Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Google Scholar© 2005 American Institute of Physics.
Translated by Irene Born Newton-John; closing comment by Max Born. 1 1. M. Born, The Born—Einstein Letters 1916-1955: Friendship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 79. Letter © Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This letter antedates by a year or two the “new” quantum mechanics of Werner Heisenberg, Max Born, Pasqual Jordan, and Erwin Schrödinger. Einstein begins with a response to a letter about Japan by Born’s wife, Hedi—a letter that has since been lost. But then, as he would for the next 30 years, Einstein launches into his differences with Max on the interpretation of quantum phenomena. If atomic phenomena are truly random, he grumbles, he’d rather be a croupier. Berlin, 29 April 1924Dear Borns,Your letter, dear Mrs. Born, was really excellent. Indeed, what causes the sense of well-being inspired by Japanese society and art is that the individual is so harmoniously integrated into his wider environment that he derives his experiences not from the self, but mainly from the community. Each of us longed for this when we were young, but we had to resign ourselves to its impossibility. For, of all the communities available to us there is not one I would want to devote myself to, except for the society of the true searchers, which has very few living members at any time.… Bohr’s opinion about radiation is of great interest. But I should not want to be forced into abandoning strict causality without defending it more strongly than I have so far. I find the idea quite intolerable that an electron exposed to radiation should choose, of its own free will, not only its moment to jump off, but also its direction. In that case, I would rather be a cobbler, or even an employee in a gaming house, than a physicist. Certainly my attempts to give tangible form to the quanta have foundered again and again, but I am far from giving up hope. And even if it never works, there is always that consolation that this lack of success is entirely mine. … With best wishes.YoursEinstein… Your pretty remark [Mrs. Born, about subject unknown] makes me want to stroke your head, if that is at all permissible in the case of a married lady. Max Born’s 1969 comments:’ The letter from my wife to which Einstein replied is missing. The basic reason for the dispute between [Einstein and me] on the validity of statistical laws was as follows: Einstein was firmly convinced that physics can supply us with knowledge of the objectively existing world. Together with many other physicists, I have been gradually converted, as a result of experiences in the field of atomic quantum phenomena, to the point of view that this is not so. At any given moment, our knowledge of the objective world is only a crude approximation from which, by applying certain rules such as the probability laws of quantum mechanics, we can predict unknown (e.g. future) conditions. REFERENCESection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCE <<1. M. Born, The Born—Einstein Letters 1916-1955: Friendship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 79. Letter © Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Google Scholar© 2005 American Institute of Physics.
Translated by Irene Born Newton-John Commentary by Max Born [1882–1970] 1 1. M. Born, The Born–Einstein Letters 1916–1955: Freindship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 88. Original letter © The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Hedi [Born, Max’s wife] had sent her play, A Child of America, to Einstein, asking his opinion. 2 2. For discussion of the relationship between Einstein and Max and Hedi Born, see N. T. Greenspan, The End of the Uncertain World: The Life and Science of Max Born, Basic Books, New York (2005). Einstein’s son-in-law, who had married the eldest of his stepdaughters, Ilse, was the then well-known and respected author and critic, Rudolf Kayser. 4 December 1926Dear Born,You will have to be a little patient. My son-in-law is certain to read the play, and I will write to you. But the poor man has to economize with his strength, as his heart is in poor condition. I have reminded him again to give an opinion on the play as soon as possible. I liked the beginning of the play very much, and I think its impact will not be lost on him. Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells me that it is not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, but does not really bring us any closer to the secret of the “Old One.” I, at any rate, am convinced that He is not playing at dice. Waves in three-dimensional space whose velocity is regulated by potential energy (for example, rubber bands) … I am working very hard at deducing the equations of motion of material points regarded as singularities, given the differential equation of general relativity. With best wishes,Yours,A. Einstein Einstein’s verdict on quantum mechanics came as a hard blow to me. He rejected it not for any definite reason, but rather by referring to an “inner voice.” This rejection plays an important part in later letters. It was based on a basic difference of philosophical attitude, which separated Einstein from the younger generation to which I felt that I belonged, although I was only a few years younger than Einstein. REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. M. Born, The Born–Einstein Letters 1916–1955: Freindship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain Times, Macmillan, New York (2005), p. 88. Original letter © The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Google Scholar2. For discussion of the relationship between Einstein and Max and Hedi Born, see N. T. Greenspan, The End of the Uncertain World: The Life and Science of Max Born, Basic Books, New York (2005). Google Scholar© 2005 American Institute of Physics.
On 25 March 1935, the Physical Review received a paper from Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen, with the title “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?” A few days later, on 30 March 1935, I was born. My life with Einstein was off to a promising start. Some would call it an inauspicious start. Abraham Pais, for example, says in his otherwise admirable biography of Einstein [1] that “the only part of this article that will ultimately survive, I believe, is this last phrase [ No reasonable definition of reality could be expected to permit this ], which so poignantly summarizes Einstein's views on quantum mechanics in his later years.” But today, in this centenary of the Einstein annus mirabilis, as the EPR paper and I both turn 70, it is, in fact, the most cited of all Einstein's papers [2]. The debate over its conceptual implications rages hotter than ever, and for the first time, practical (well, for the moment still gedanken practical) applications of the EPR effect have emerged in cryptography and in other areas of quantum information processing. Being only five weeks old, I was unprepared to pay attention to the article that appeared in the New York Times on 4 May 1935 under an elaborate set of headlines and subheads: And I was completely oblivious to the stern rebuke from Einstein himself, published three days later in the Times , which declared that “any information upon which the article … is based was given to you without my authority. It is my invariable practice to discuss scientific matters only in the appropriate forum and I deprecate advance publication of any announcement in regard to such matters in the secular press.” Apparently Podolsky had tipped off the Times to the article, which did not appear in the sacred press until the 15 May issue of Physical Review. It is not clear that Einstein ever forgave him, and I wish I had been old enough to send Podolsky a cross letter myself. Anyone growing up in America in the 1940s knew that the preeminent genius of our age, and perhaps of any other, lived in Princeton, New Jersey, had a predilection for baggy sweaters, and was always badly in need of a haircut—as far ahead of his time in dress and grooming as he was ahead in science during his 1905 annus mirabilis.
The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.
One critic of Quantum Physics was, reportedly, Albert Einstein, to whom this quote is ascribed: “Quantum mechanics is certainly imposing. But an inner voice tells me that it is not yet the real thing. The theory says a lot, but does not really bring us any closer to the secret of the 'old one'. I, at any rate, am convinced that He does not throw dice”. In this booklet, criticisms towards some claims of some Nobel Prize Laureates in Physics, such as Max Planck, Louis de Broglie, Erwin Schrodinger, Max Born, Werner Heisenberg, Paul Dirac, Richard Feynman, Gerardus 't Hooft, are explained with detailed math.'s physical descriptions as to where these famous physicists were wrong. In Chapter 1 of this booklet it is shown that Maxwell's equations and Classic Physics, can explain some of the phenomena such as the Photoelectric Effect satisfyingly. In Chapter 2 it is explained that, though well encouraging, still taking the Nobel Prizes' money would be unethical and immoral, since that money was initially earned by the sale of dynamite which was also used, unfortunately, for killings. Justice would have been if that money would have been given to its victims or to their surviving families.
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.