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Journal of Modern Optics

Theory of single-photon detectors employing smart strategies of detection

João Batista Rosa Silva, Rubens Viana Ramos

Published Nov 20, 2005• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Single-photon detectors have become more important with the advent of set-ups for optical communication using single-photon pulses, mainly quantum key distribution. The performance of quantum key distribution systems depends strongly on the performance of single-photon detectors. In this paper, aiming to overcome the afterpulsing that limits strongly the maximal transmission rate of quantum key distribution systems, three smart strategies for single-photon detection are discussed using analytical and numerical procedures. The three strategies are: hold-off time conditioned to avalanche presence, termed the Norwegian strategy, using one avalanche photodiode, using two raffled avalanche photodiodes and using two switched avalanche photodiodes. Finally we give examples using these strategies in a quantum key distribution set-up.

DOI
10.1080/09500340500227828

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Single-photon detectors have become more important with the advent of set-ups for optical communication using single-photon pulses, mainly quantum key distribution. The performance of quantum key distribution systems depends strongly on the performance of single-photon detectors. In this paper, aiming to overcome the afterpulsing that limits strongly the maximal transmission rate of quantum key distribution systems, three smart strategies for single-photon detection are discussed using analytical and numerical procedures. The three strategies are: hold-off time conditioned to avalanche presence, termed the Norwegian strategy, using one avalanche photodiode, using two raffled avalanche photodiodes and using two switched avalanche photodiodes. Finally we give examples using these strategies in a quantum key distribution set-up.
The application of quantum key distribution (QKD) has raised particular demands for single-photon detectors. One of the most promising candidates at the low-loss optical fibre communications windows is the planar geometry InGaAs/InP single-photon avalanche diode. These detectors have been modelled, fabricated and characterised at 1.55 µm wavelength. Their performance in terms of single-photon detection efficiency, dark count rate, timing jitter and afterpulsing behaviour are reported and compared with the best commercially available, linear multiplication avalanche photodiodes operated in Geiger-mode. Their use in the application of QKD is discussed.
In recent years, the security of avalanche photodiodes as single photon detectors for quantum key distribution has been subjected to much scrutiny. The most prominent example of this surrounds the vulnerability of such devices to blinding under strong illumination. We focus on self-differencing avalanche photodiodes, single photon detectors that have demonstrated count rates exceeding 1 GCounts/s resulting in secure key rates over 1 MBit/s. These detectors use a passive electronic circuit to cancel any periodic signals thereby enhancing detection sensitivity. However this intrinsic feature can be exploited by adversaries to gain control of the devices using illumination of a moderate intensity. Through careful experimental examinations, we define here a set of criteria for these detectors to avoid such attacks.
By employing real-time monitoring of single-photon avalanche photodiodes we demonstrate how two types of practical eavesdropping strategies, the after-gate and time-shift attacks, may be detected. Both attacks are identified with the detectors operating without any special modifications, making this proposal well suited for real-world applications. The monitoring system is based on accumulating statistics of the times between consecutive detection events, and extracting the afterpulse and overall efficiency of the detectors in real-time using mathematical models fit to the measured data. We are able to directly observe changes in the afterpulse probabilities generated from the after-gate and faint after-gate attacks, as well as different timing signatures in the time-shift attack. We also discuss the applicability of our scheme to other general blinding attacks.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD), rooted in quantum mechanics, offers information-theoretic security. However, practical systems open security threats due to imperfections, notably bright-light blinding attacks targeting single-photon detectors. Here, we propose a concise, robust defense strategy for protecting single-photon detectors in QKD systems against blinding attacks. Our strategy uses a dual approach: detecting the bias current of the avalanche photodiode (APD) to defend against continuous-wave blinding attacks, and monitoring the avalanche amplitude to protect against pulsed blinding attacks. By integrating these two branches, the proposed solution effectively identifies and mitigates a wide range of bright light injection attempts, significantly enhancing the resilience of QKD systems against various bright-light blinding attacks. This method fortifies the safeguards of quantum communications and offers a crucial contribution to the field of quantum information security.
The current theoretical analysis model for high-dimensional quantum key distribution (QKD) was developed without carefully considering the dead time and after-pulse of the single-photon detectors. Here, we propose a new model that accounts for these two effects. With this model, we analyze the effects of various properties of the single-photon detector on the performance of the high-dimensional quantum key distribution and show numerically that the high-dimensional quantum key distribution can be achieved up to 180 km with InGaAs/InP-type single-photon detectors. This work can improve our understanding of the factors that determine the performance of high-dimensional quantum key distribution and will help to promote the application of single-photon detectors based on avalanche photodiodes in high-dimensional quantum key distribution.
The implementation and commercialization of quantum cryptography technologies have to face some challenges related to the development of single-photon detectors operating at 1550 nm. The main requirements are: i) high detection efficiency; ii) low noise; iii) high count rate; iv) low timing jitter. Different technologies are currently available for single-photon detection at 1550 nm, but semiconductor devices (like Single-Photon Avalanche Diode, SPAD) offer a photon detection efficiency that is inherently higher than any photocathode employed in vacuum tube detectors. Additionally InGaAs/InP SPADs can detect single photons at 1550 nm with low noise when moderately cooled by means of thermo-electric coolers. Consequently, InGaAs/InP SPAD can be the enabling technology of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, provided that the maximum count rate is increased above 1 Mcps. The main limit is the afterpulsing effect that usually sets too long (< 10 μs) a hold-off time after each avalanche ignition. We present the developments achieved in InGaAs/InP SPAD device design, fabrication technology and front-end electronics, aimed at decreasing the afterpulsing effect, while not impairing photon detection efficiency and timing jitter. The new InGaAs/InP SPADs provide count rates higher than 1 Mcps and temporal response with 60 ps Full-Width at Half Maximum and very short (30 ps time constant) tail. The front-end electronics includes a wide-band pulse generator able to gate the SPAD up to 133 MHz repetition rate. Eventually, a fast avalanche-quenching scheme minimizes quenching time to less than 1 ns, thus effectively reducing afterpulsing by decreasing the total charge flowing through the junction.