Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Philosophy of Science

Identity, Superselection Theory, and the Statistical Properties of Quantum Fields

David John Baker

Published Apr 1, 2013• 13 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The permutation symmetry of quantum mechanics is widely thought to imply a sort of metaphysical underdetermination about the identity of particles. Despite claims to the contrary, this implication does not hold in the more fundamental quantum field theory, where an ontology of particles is not generally available. Although permutations are often defined as acting on particles, a more general account of permutation symmetry can be formulated using superselection theory. As a result, permutation symmetry applies even in field theories with no particle interpretation. The quantum mechanical account of permutations acting on particles is recovered as a special case.

DOI
10.1086/670296

Related papers

Particles, Objects, and Physics

Justin C. Pniower

This thesis analyses the ontological nature of quantum particles. In it I argue that quantum particles, despite their indistinguishability, are objects in much the same way as classical particles. This similarity provides an important point of continuity between classical and quantum physics. I consider two notions of indistinguishability, that of indiscernibility and permutation symmetry. I argue that neither sort of indistinguishability undermines the identity of quantum particles. I further argue that, when we understand in distinguishability in terms of permutation symmetry, classical particles are just as indistinguishable as quantum particles; for classical physics also possesses permutation symmetry.

•Jan 1, 2005•5 citations

On the Significance of Permutation Symmetry

Nick Huggett

There has been considerable recent philosophical debate over the implications of many particle quantum mechanics for the metaphysics of individuality (cf. Huggett [1997]). In this paper I look at things from a rather different perspective: by investigating the significance of permutation symmetry. I consider how various philosophical positions link up to the physical postulate of the indistinguishability of permuted states-permutation invariance-and how this postulate is used to explain quantum statistics. I offer an explanation of the statistics that relies on the neglected parallel between permutations and covariant spatial transformation. And I explore the parallel, showing that a further kind of symmetry explains why permutations are invariant when spatial symmetries are not.

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Sep 1, 1999•17 citations

Understanding permutation symmetry

Steven French, Dean P. Rickles

\noindent In our contribution to this volume we deal with \emph{discrete} symmetries: these are symmetries based upon groups with a discrete set of elements (generally a set of elements that can be enumerated by the positive integers). In physics we find that discrete symmetries frequently arise as `internal', non-spacetime symmetries. Permutation symmetry is such a discrete symmetry arising as the mathematical basis underlying the statistical behaviour of ensembles of certain types of indistinguishable quantum particle (e.g., fermions and bosons). Roughly speaking, if such an ensemble is invariant under a permutation of its constituent particles (i.e., permutation symmetric) then one doesn't `count' those permutations which merely `exchange' indistinguishable particles; rather, the exchanged state is identified with the original state. This principle of invariance is generally called the `indistinguishability postulate' [IP], but we prefer to use the term `permutation invariance' [PI]. It is this symmetry principle that is typically taken to underpin and explain the nature of (fermionic and bosonic) quantum statistics (although, as we shall see, this characterisation is not uncontentious), and it is this principle that has important consequences regarding the metaphysics of identity and individuality for particles exhibiting such statistical behaviour.

arXiv:quant-ph/0301020•Cambridge University Press eBooks•Dec 4, 2003•76 citations

Are quantum particles objects?

Simon W. Saunders

It is widely believed that particles in quantum mechanics are metaphysically strange; they are not individuals (the view of Cassirer 1956), in some sense of the term, and perhaps they are not even objects at all, a suspicion raised by Quine(1976a, 1990). In parallel it is thought that this di¤erence, and especially the status of quantum particles as indistinguishable, accounts for the di¤erence between classical and quantum statistics- a view with long historical credentials. 1 ‘Indistinguishable’here mean permutable; that states of a¤airs di¤ering only in permutations of particles are the same- which, satisfyingly, are described by quantum entanglements, so clearly in a way that is conceptually new. And, indeed, distinguishable particles in quantum mechanics, for which permutations yield distinct states, do obey classical statistics, so there is something to this connection. But it cannot be the whole story if, as I will argue, at least in one notable tradition, classical particle descriptions may also be permutable (so classical

Analysis•Jan 1, 2006•230 citations

The Non-Reflexive Formulation of Quantum Mechanics: the Whys and the Hows

Décio Krause

In the non-reflexive formulation of quantum physics, attention is given to a metaphysical view of quantum objects (q-objects) as non-individuals, characterised as entities to which the standard notion of identity lacks sense. The reference to the nature of q-objects is usually omitted in other interpretations and the most we can find is some vague reference to “to each [quantum] system we associate a Hilbert space”, and nothing more is said about them; we need to infer from the theory their characteristics, and it gives us several alternatives. One of them, to be justified here in broad aspects, is the non-individual view. It is important to enlighten that we are not trying to just find a way to deal with quantum entities but to defend a possible ontology of non-individuals, which can be applied also to ‘particles’ arising from quantum fields. Our account is based on two assumptions: (i) the ‘classical theory of identity’ does not apply to q-objects, and (ii) their non-individuality must be attributed from the start, that is, as a primitive notion and not ‘made a posteriori’ say by assuming symmetry principles. The underlying logic is called non-reflexive because the reflexive law of identity \(\forall{x{({x = x})}}\) is supposed not to hold for q-objects. Since all the details demand a lot of space, here we only sketch and justify our view. The references provide a more detailed account.

Qeios•Mar 19, 2025•0 citations

Identical Particles in Quantum Mechanics Revisited

Robert C. Hilborn, Candice L. Yuca

The treatment of identical particles in quantum mechanics rests on two (related) principles: the spin‐statistics connection and the Symmetrization Postulate. In light of recent theories (such as q‐deformed commutators) that allow for ‘small’ violations of the spin‐statistics connection and the Symmetrization Postulate, we revisit the issue of how quantum mechanics deals with identical particles and how it supports or fails to support various philosophical stances concerning individuality. As a consequence of the expanded possibilities for quantum statistics, we argue that permutation symmetry is best formulated as a formal property of the state function describing the system of particles rather than as a property of the individual particles.1 Introduction2 Philosophical background2.1 Important terminology2.1.1 Identity2.1.2 Indistinguishability2.1.3 Indiscernibility2.2 When are particles indistinguishable?2.3 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and quantum mechanics2.4 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and logic2.5 Particle history2.6 Transcendental individuality3 Some quantum formalism3.1 The Principle of Permutation Invariance and the Symmetrization Postulate3.2 The configuration‐space approach3.3 Commutators and anticommutators, and identical particle statistics3.4 Q‐mutators4 Identical particle statistics: a holistic point of view5 Conclusions

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Sep 1, 2002•20 citations
The permutation symmetry of quantum mechanics is widely thought to imply a sort of metaphysical underdetermination about the identity of particles. Despite claims to the contrary, this implication does not hold in the more fundamental quantum field theory, where an ontology of particles is not generally available. Although permutations are often defined as acting on particles, a more general account of permutation symmetry can be formulated using superselection theory. As a result, permutation symmetry applies even in field theories with no particle interpretation. The quantum mechanical account of permutations acting on particles is recovered as a special case.
This thesis analyses the ontological nature of quantum particles. In it I argue that quantum particles, despite their indistinguishability, are objects in much the same way as classical particles. This similarity provides an important point of continuity between classical and quantum physics. I consider two notions of indistinguishability, that of indiscernibility and permutation symmetry. I argue that neither sort of indistinguishability undermines the identity of quantum particles. I further argue that, when we understand in distinguishability in terms of permutation symmetry, classical particles are just as indistinguishable as quantum particles; for classical physics also possesses permutation symmetry.
There has been considerable recent philosophical debate over the implications of many particle quantum mechanics for the metaphysics of individuality (cf. Huggett [1997]). In this paper I look at things from a rather different perspective: by investigating the significance of permutation symmetry. I consider how various philosophical positions link up to the physical postulate of the indistinguishability of permuted states-permutation invariance-and how this postulate is used to explain quantum statistics. I offer an explanation of the statistics that relies on the neglected parallel between permutations and covariant spatial transformation. And I explore the parallel, showing that a further kind of symmetry explains why permutations are invariant when spatial symmetries are not.
\noindent In our contribution to this volume we deal with \emph{discrete} symmetries: these are symmetries based upon groups with a discrete set of elements (generally a set of elements that can be enumerated by the positive integers). In physics we find that discrete symmetries frequently arise as `internal', non-spacetime symmetries. Permutation symmetry is such a discrete symmetry arising as the mathematical basis underlying the statistical behaviour of ensembles of certain types of indistinguishable quantum particle (e.g., fermions and bosons). Roughly speaking, if such an ensemble is invariant under a permutation of its constituent particles (i.e., permutation symmetric) then one doesn't `count' those permutations which merely `exchange' indistinguishable particles; rather, the exchanged state is identified with the original state. This principle of invariance is generally called the `indistinguishability postulate' [IP], but we prefer to use the term `permutation invariance' [PI]. It is this symmetry principle that is typically taken to underpin and explain the nature of (fermionic and bosonic) quantum statistics (although, as we shall see, this characterisation is not uncontentious), and it is this principle that has important consequences regarding the metaphysics of identity and individuality for particles exhibiting such statistical behaviour.
It is widely believed that particles in quantum mechanics are metaphysically strange; they are not individuals (the view of Cassirer 1956), in some sense of the term, and perhaps they are not even objects at all, a suspicion raised by Quine(1976a, 1990). In parallel it is thought that this di¤erence, and especially the status of quantum particles as indistinguishable, accounts for the di¤erence between classical and quantum statistics- a view with long historical credentials. 1 ‘Indistinguishable’here mean permutable; that states of a¤airs di¤ering only in permutations of particles are the same- which, satisfyingly, are described by quantum entanglements, so clearly in a way that is conceptually new. And, indeed, distinguishable particles in quantum mechanics, for which permutations yield distinct states, do obey classical statistics, so there is something to this connection. But it cannot be the whole story if, as I will argue, at least in one notable tradition, classical particle descriptions may also be permutable (so classical
In the non-reflexive formulation of quantum physics, attention is given to a metaphysical view of quantum objects (q-objects) as non-individuals, characterised as entities to which the standard notion of identity lacks sense. The reference to the nature of q-objects is usually omitted in other interpretations and the most we can find is some vague reference to “to each [quantum] system we associate a Hilbert space”, and nothing more is said about them; we need to infer from the theory their characteristics, and it gives us several alternatives. One of them, to be justified here in broad aspects, is the non-individual view. It is important to enlighten that we are not trying to just find a way to deal with quantum entities but to defend a possible ontology of non-individuals, which can be applied also to ‘particles’ arising from quantum fields. Our account is based on two assumptions: (i) the ‘classical theory of identity’ does not apply to q-objects, and (ii) their non-individuality must be attributed from the start, that is, as a primitive notion and not ‘made a posteriori’ say by assuming symmetry principles. The underlying logic is called non-reflexive because the reflexive law of identity ∀x(x=x)\forall{x{({x = x})}}∀x(x=x) is supposed not to hold for q-objects. Since all the details demand a lot of space, here we only sketch and justify our view. The references provide a more detailed account.
The treatment of identical particles in quantum mechanics rests on two (related) principles: the spin‐statistics connection and the Symmetrization Postulate. In light of recent theories (such as q‐deformed commutators) that allow for ‘small’ violations of the spin‐statistics connection and the Symmetrization Postulate, we revisit the issue of how quantum mechanics deals with identical particles and how it supports or fails to support various philosophical stances concerning individuality. As a consequence of the expanded possibilities for quantum statistics, we argue that permutation symmetry is best formulated as a formal property of the state function describing the system of particles rather than as a property of the individual particles.1 Introduction2 Philosophical background2.1 Important terminology2.1.1 Identity2.1.2 Indistinguishability2.1.3 Indiscernibility2.2 When are particles indistinguishable?2.3 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and quantum mechanics2.4 The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and logic2.5 Particle history2.6 Transcendental individuality3 Some quantum formalism3.1 The Principle of Permutation Invariance and the Symmetrization Postulate3.2 The configuration‐space approach3.3 Commutators and anticommutators, and identical particle statistics3.4 Q‐mutators4 Identical particle statistics: a holistic point of view5 Conclusions