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Physical Review Letters

Quantum mechanics versus macroscopic realism: Is the flux there when nobody looks?

A. J. Leggett, Anupam Garg

Published Mar 4, 1985• 1,182 citations
Publisher

Abstract

It is shown that, in the context of an idealized ``macroscopic quantum coherence'' experiment, the predictions of quantum mechanics are incompatible with the conjunction of two general assumptions which are designated ``macroscopic realism'' and ``noninvasive measurability at the macroscopic level.'' The conditions under which quantum mechanics can be tested against these assumptions in a realistic experiment are discussed.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.54.857

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It is shown that, in the context of an idealized macroscopic quantum coherence'' experiment, the predictions of quantum mechanics are incompatible with the conjunction of two general assumptions which are designated macroscopic realism'' and ``noninvasive measurability at the macroscopic level.'' The conditions under which quantum mechanics can be tested against these assumptions in a realistic experiment are discussed.
The notion of macroscopic realism has been used in attempts to achieve consistency between physics and everyday experience and to locate some boundary between the realms of classical mechanics and quantum meachanics. Its ostensibly underlying conceptual components, realism and macroscopicity, have most often appeared in the foundations of physics in relation to quantum measurement: reality became a prominent topic of discussion in quantum physics after the notion of element of reality was defined and used by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in that context, and macroscopicity is often explicitly assumed to be an essential property of any measuring apparatus. However, macroscopicity turns out to be a rather vaguer and less consistently understood notion than typically assumed by physicists who have not explicitly explored the notion themselves. For this reason, it behooves those investigating the foundations of quantum mechanics from a realist perspective to look for alternative notions for grounding quantum measurement. Here, the merits of treating the measuring instrument as a ‘natural kind’ as a means of avoiding anthropocentrism in the foundations of quantum measurement are pointed out as a means of advancing quantum measurement theory.
I consider the extent to which the applicability of the concept of classical realism is constrained, irrespective of the validity or not of the quantum formalism, by existing experiments both in the EPR–Bell setup, including recent experiments testing ‘nonlocal realistic’ theories, and in the area of ‘macroscopic quantum coherence’. Unless we are willing to sacrifice one or more other intuitively plausible notions such as that of the conventional ‘arrow of time’, it appears impossible, in either context, to maintain the classical notion of realism.
This paper discusses the extent to which existing experiments test the validity of extrapolating the formalism of quantum mechanics to the macroscopic level, and in particular to what extent they confirm that linear superpositions of macroscopically distinguishable states actually exist in nature (so that even at the macrolevel, "realistic" classical concepts are not always applicable). It is concluded that the "Bell's-theorem" experiments can be interpreted as evidence for this conclusion only with some rather strong supplementary assumptions. On the other hand, recent experiments on superconducting devices, while affording strong circumstantial evidence in favor of the validity of the extrapolation of the quantum formalism at least to this level, do not directly test the principle of superposition of macrostates independently of this formalism. Currently envisaged experiments on such devices may, however, if feasible definitively test the principle against a large class of alternative, "macro-realistic" hypotheses.
The article examines the controversial relation of scientific realism with quantum mechanics. To this end, two distinct discussions are invoked: the discussion about ‘realism’ in the context of quantum mechanics and the discussion about ‘scientific realism’ in the context of the general philosophy of science. The aim is to distinguish them in order, first, to argue that the former—revolving around ‘local realism’ and the theorems of Bell and Kochen–Specker—unjustifiably identifies realism with features of a particular worldview, and thereby fosters the impression that the failure of ‘local realism’ in quantum experiments constitutes a failure of scientific realism too; and, second, in light of the latter discussion, to claim that scientific realism and quantum mechanics can be compatible—there is ground for dealing with quantum measurement simply as a physical mind-independent interaction. Therefore, a realist approach to the theory is possible despite its notorious measurement problem, even if the issue of its interpretation is still disputed.