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Reports on Progress in Physics

Realism and the physical world

A. J. Leggett

Published Jan 29, 2008• 205 citations
Publisher

Abstract

I consider the extent to which the applicability of the concept of classical realism is constrained, irrespective of the validity or not of the quantum formalism, by existing experiments both in the EPR–Bell setup, including recent experiments testing ‘nonlocal realistic’ theories, and in the area of ‘macroscopic quantum coherence’. Unless we are willing to sacrifice one or more other intuitively plausible notions such as that of the conventional ‘arrow of time’, it appears impossible, in either context, to maintain the classical notion of realism.

DOI
10.1088/0034-4885/71/2/022001

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Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists. For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world. I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality. But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models. To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state. The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrödinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse. I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense. Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.

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I consider the extent to which the applicability of the concept of classical realism is constrained, irrespective of the validity or not of the quantum formalism, by existing experiments both in the EPR–Bell setup, including recent experiments testing ‘nonlocal realistic’ theories, and in the area of ‘macroscopic quantum coherence’. Unless we are willing to sacrifice one or more other intuitively plausible notions such as that of the conventional ‘arrow of time’, it appears impossible, in either context, to maintain the classical notion of realism.
Our everyday experiences support the hypothesis that physical systems exist independently of the act of observation. Concordant theories are characterized by the objective realism assumption whereby the act of measurement simply reveals preexisting well-defined elements of reality. In stark contrast quantum mechanics portrays a world in which reality loses its objectivity and is in fact created by observation. Quantum contextuality as first discovered by Bell [1] and Kochen-Specker [2] captures aspects of this philosophical clash between classical and quantum descriptions of the world. Here we briefly summarize some of the more recent advances in the field of quantum contextuality. We approach quantum contextuality through its close relation to Bell type nonlocal scenarios and highlight some of the rapidly developing tests and experimental implementations.
We discuss the recently observed “loophole free” violation of Bell’s inequalities in the framework of a physically realist view of quantum mechanics (QM), which requires that physical properties are attributed jointly to a system, and to the context in which it is embedded. This approach is clearly different from classical realism, but it does define a meaningful “quantum realism” from a general philosophical point of view. Consistently with Bell test experiments, this quantum realism embeds some form of non-locality, but does not contain any action at a distance, in agreement with QM.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
This paper discusses the extent to which existing experiments test the validity of extrapolating the formalism of quantum mechanics to the macroscopic level, and in particular to what extent they confirm that linear superpositions of macroscopically distinguishable states actually exist in nature (so that even at the macrolevel, "realistic" classical concepts are not always applicable). It is concluded that the "Bell's-theorem" experiments can be interpreted as evidence for this conclusion only with some rather strong supplementary assumptions. On the other hand, recent experiments on superconducting devices, while affording strong circumstantial evidence in favor of the validity of the extrapolation of the quantum formalism at least to this level, do not directly test the principle of superposition of macrostates independently of this formalism. Currently envisaged experiments on such devices may, however, if feasible definitively test the principle against a large class of alternative, "macro-realistic" hypotheses.
Recent experiments of Gröblacher et al proved the violation of a Leggett-type inequality that was claimed to be valid for a broad class of non-local hidden-variable theories. The impossibility of constructing a non-local and realistic theory, unless it entails highly counterintuitive features, seems thus to have been experimentally proved. This would bring us close to a definite refutation of realism. Indeed, realism was proved to be also incompatible with locality, according to a series of experiments testing Bell inequalities. The present paper addresses the said experiments of Gröblacher et al and presents an explicit, contextual and realistic, model that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics. It thus violates the Leggett-type inequality that was established with the aim of ruling out a supposedly broad class of non-local models. We can thus conclude that plausible contextual, realistic, models are still tenable. This restates the possibility of a future completion of quantum mechanics by a realistic and contextual theory which is not in a class containing only highly counterintuitive models. The class that was ruled out by the experiments of Gröblacher et al is thus proved to be a limited one, arbitrarily separating models that physically belong in the same class.
Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists. For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world. I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality. But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models. To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state. The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrödinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse. I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense. Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.