Originally published in 1981, this book forms volume 15 of the Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Applications. The text provides a clear and thorough treatment of its subject, adhering to a clean exposition of the mathematical content of serious formulations of rational physical alternatives of quantum theory as elaborated in the influential works of the period, to which the authors made a significant contribution. The treatment falls into three distinct, logical parts: in the first part, the modern version of accumulated wisdom is presented, avoiding as far as possible the traditional language of classical physics for its interpretational character; in the second part, the individual structural elements for the logical content of the theory are laid out; in part three, the results of section two are used to reconstruct the usual Hilbert space formulation of quantum mechanics in a novel way.
In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which (it is usually said) is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions.
In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which (it is usually said) is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions.
The term proposition usually denotes in quantum mechanics (QM) an element of (standard) quantum logic (QL). Within the orthodox interpretation of QM the propositions of QL cannot be associated with sentences of a language stating properties of individual samples of a physical system, since properties are nonobjective in QM. This makes the interpretation of propositions problematical. The difficulty can be removed by adopting the objective interpretation of QM proposed by one of the authors (semantic realism, or SR, interpretation). In this case, a unified perspective can be adopted for QM and classical mechanics (CM), and a simple first order predicate calculus L(x) with Tarskian semantics can be constructed such that one can associate a physical proposition (i.e., a set of physical states) with every sentence of L(x). The set
Pf of all physical propositions is partially ordered and contains a subset
PTf of testable physical propositions whose order structure depends on the criteria of testability established by the physical theory. In particular,
PTf turns out to be a Boolean lattice in CM, while it can be identified with QL in QM. Hence the propositions of QL can be associated with sentences of L(x), or also with the sentences of a suitable quantum language
LTQ(x), and the structure of QL characterizes the notion of testability in QM. One can then show that the notion of quantum truth does not conflict with the classical notion of truth within this perspective. Furthermore, the interpretation of QL propounded here proves to be equivalent to a previous pragmatic interpretation worked out by one of the authors, and can be embodied within a more general perspective which considers states as first order predicates of a broader language with a Kripkean semantics.
Our purpose in this chapter is to present the key concepts of quantum mechanics in the language of Hilbert spaces. The reader who has not previously met the physical ideas motivating quantum mechanics, and some of the more elementary applications of Schrödinger's equation, is encouraged to read any of a number of excellent texts on the subject such as [1–4]. Otherwise, the statements given here must to a large extent be taken on trust – not an altogether easy thing to do, since the basic assertions of quantum theory are frequently counterintuitive to anyone steeped in the classical view of physics. Quantum mechanics is frequently presented in the form of several postulates, as though it were an axiomatic system such as Euclidean geometry. As often presented, these postulates may not meet the standards of mathematical rigour required for a strictly logical set of axioms, so that little is gained by such an approach. We will do things a little more informally here. For those only interested in the mathematical aspects of quantum mechanics and the role of Hilbert space see [5–8]. Many of the standard applications, such as the hydrogen atom, will be omitted here as they can be found in all standard textbooks, and we leave aside the enormous topic of measurement theory and interpretations of quantum mechanics. This is not to say that we need be totally comfortable with quantum theory as it stands. Undoubtedly, there are some philosophically disquieting features in the theory, often expressed in the form of socalled paradoxes.