In quantum theory as it is currently formulated the measurement of an observable quantity of a physical system is the occasion for a change of state of the system, except when the state prior to the measurement is an eigenstate of the observable. Two proposals for interpreting this kind of change are examined in detail, and several variant proposals are considered briefly. According to the interpretation proposed by von Neumann, and by London and Bauer the change of state is completed only when the result of the observation is registered in the observer's consciousness. Although this interpretation appears to be free from inconsistencies, it is not supported by psychological evidence and it is difficult to reconcile with the intersubjective agreement of several independent observers. According to the interpretation proposed by Bohr, the change of state is a consequence of the fundamental assumption that the description of any physical phenomenon requires reference to the experimental arrangement. Bohr's proposals are valuable as practical maxims in scientific activity, but they are shown to involve the renunciation of any ontological framework in which all types of events—physical and mental, microscopic and macroscopic—can be located. It is concluded that a satisfactory account of the observation of microphysical quantities is unlikely if the present formulation of quantum theory is rigorously maintained.
In quantum theory as it is currently formulated the measurement of an observable quantity of a physical system is the occasion for a change of state of the system, except when the state prior to the measurement is an eigenstate of the observable. Two proposals for interpreting this kind of change are examined in detail, and several variant proposals are considered briefly. According to the interpretation proposed by von Neumann, and by London and Bauer the change of state is completed only when the result of the observation is registered in the observer's consciousness. Although this interpretation appears to be free from inconsistencies, it is not supported by psychological evidence and it is difficult to reconcile with the intersubjective agreement of several independent observers. According to the interpretation proposed by Bohr, the change of state is a consequence of the fundamental assumption that the description of any physical phenomenon requires reference to the experimental arrangement. Bohr's proposals are valuable as practical maxims in scientific activity, but they are shown to involve the renunciation of any ontological framework in which all types of events—physical and mental, microscopic and macroscopic—can be located. It is concluded that a satisfactory account of the observation of microphysical quantities is unlikely if the present formulation of quantum theory is rigorously maintained.
In quantum theory as it is currently formulated the measurement of an observable quantity of a physical system is the occasion for a change of state of the system, except when the state prior to the measurement is an eigenstate of the observable. Two proposals for interpreting this kind of change are examined in detail, and several variant proposals are considered briefly. According to the interpretation proposed by von Neumann, and by London and Bauer the change of state is completed only when the result of the observation is registered in the observer's consciousness. Although this interpretation appears to be free from inconsistencies, it is not supported by psychological evidence and it is difficult to reconcile with the inter subjective agreement of several independent observers. According to the interpretation proposed by Bohr, the change of state is a consequence of the fundamental assumption that the description of any physical phenomenon requires reference to the experimental arrangement. Bohr's proposals are valuable as practical maxims in scientific theory, but they are shown to involve the renunciation of any ontological framework in which all types of events – physical and mental, microscopic and macroscopic – can be located. It is concluded that a satisfactory account of the observation of microphysical quantities is unlikely if the present formulation of quantum theory is rigorously maintained.
What is a physical object according to the theory of quantum mechanics? The first answer to be considered is that given by Bohr in terms of the concept of complementarity. This interpretation is illustrated by way of an example, the two slit experiment, which highlights some of the associated problems of ontology. One such problem is the so-called problem of measurement or observation. Various interpretations of measurement in Quantum Theory, including those of Heisenberg, von Neumann, Everett and Bohr, are compared and contrasted. A second problem concerns whether or not QT can be considered complete and therefore satisfactory as a basis for physics. Various attempts to complete QT by means of the addition of ‘hidden variables’ to the quantum mechanical state function are considered and their aims and achievements assessed. Finally, we investigate some of the characteristic ontological problems for the orthodox interpretation of Relativistic Quantum Theory.
In this paper we will address important considerations for the structure of a physical theory and the need and implications for the conscious observer and creator. Complementarity and reciprocity are dominate in the sttucture of the Quantum \'Vorld. It is clear that one's meaningful existence directly involves one's intent and acdon both mental and physical in consequence. Hence, it is vital ro undersrand what intemional will is, the manner in which it arises, as it relates to one's ethical responsibility the meaning of their life may also be considered in the context of intentional will and may be described and understOod. We investigate the role of conscious intention in the physical and mental world. In this paper, we examine the theoretical constructs of the properties of observational intention and their local and nonlocal effects on mind and matter. One begins by sensing a physical or psychic input and then becoming consciously aware of it as perceptions and thoughts which result in concepts developed for memories, reasoning and feelings. Then a thought and decision will be made and imention are carried into action in the physical and mental world. We proceed by investigating the role and action of the thought of intentional will and its role in quantum mechanics, its structure of the theoty and manner in which it appears ro demand a role for consciousness. In order to proceed with our investigation will present some of the basic tenants of quantum mechanics, the structure of the theoty and manner in which it appears ro demand a role for consciousness in quantum measurement and its non local intentional interaction. The quantum theory gives us two inescapable conclusions: J) we are intimaly linked ro the world as participatory observers, and 2) nonlocal remote connections and interactions are shown to be parr of our world process. Discoveries, and/or creations of new concepts in physics lead ro the observer/participant issue. Quantum mechanics, the theory of atomic microcosm, is a description that may imply that the observer has an impact on the observed, that rhe observer has an effect on what is observed. The relativity theory scems to imply that the state of the observer affecrs his interpretation of what he sees. In the context of quantum theoty and relativity, we may be able to shed light on the relationship of discovery as well as creation and irs validation of the properties of an external reality. In quantum physics, as well as in the structure of n-dimensional relativistic models, the implication for a fundamental remore connection of events is deeply implied by the structure of these models and their experimental test and we can use this property for our experimental models of the properties of consciousness. The structure of physical theoty, its very fabric, is pointing towards a world view that speaks of concepts which have been considered external to the body of science but yet may be implied by modern physical theoty itself.
We begin by discussing ``What exists?'', i.e. ontology, in Classical Physics which provided a description of physical phenomena at the macroscopic level. The microworld however necessitates a introduction of Quantum ideas for its understanding. It is almost certain that the world is quantum mechanical at both microscopic as well as at macroscopic level. The problem of ontology of a Quantum world is a difficult one. It also depends on which interpretation is used. We first discuss some interpretations in which Quantum Mechanics does not provide a complete framework but has to be supplemented by extra ingredients e.g. (i) Copenhagen group of interpretations associated with the names of Niels Bohr, Heisenberg, von-Neumann, and (ii) de-Broglie-Bohm interpretations. We then look at some interpretations in which Quantum mechanics is supposed to provide the entire framework such as (i) Everett-deWitt many world, (ii) quantum histories interpretations. We conclude with some remarks on the rigidity of the formalism of quantum mechanics, which is sharp contrast to it's ontological fluidity.
On the assumptions of completeness, conceptual economy, and universality of quantum mechanics, and taking into account the developments linked to decoherence, one concludes that physical reality has only an epistemic nature. It is fundamental then to make a distinction between ontological reality, constituted by everything that does not depend at all on the collectivity of human beings, nor on their decisions or limitations, nor on their existence, and empirical reality, constituted by everything that not being ontological is, however, intersubjective. The fact that the direct presence of consciousness is not required to complete a quantum phenomenon implies that quantum phenomena are not mere “appearances to consciousness”. Empirical reality, as conceived in this paper, is not reducible to mere “appearances to consciousness”. Complementarity, that was proposed by Niels Bohr as a conceptual framework to answer the problems presented by the interpretation of quantum mechanics, is considered here as a way of talking about the empirical reality that goes beyond the simple description of experimental results, or better still, the observer’s perceptions of such results. It aims to describe not ontological reality, but empirical reality. It is proposed that the state vector represents, in general, infinite potentialities that are actualized when a quantum phenomenon is completed. Such potentialities, unlike the Aristotelian and the one suggested by Heisenberg, are epistemic and not ontological. The infinite potentialities of empirical reality are taken as an argument to claim that ontological reality is infinite, complementarity being the manner in which infinite ontological reality is manifested to the finite mind. The possibility that complementarity constitutes a general framework that can be applied to other areas of knowledge is based on an analysis of the relationship between theory and observation. Two possible examples of the use of complementarity in areas different from quantum mechanics are presented, one in thermodynamics and another in biology. Given that logic does not impose the mutual exclusion of two complementary concepts, there isn’t any inconsistency implied by complementarity from the point of view of classical or ordinary logic: one uses ordinary logic in each experimentally defined context. Consequently, there is no need for any new logic.
This brief survey analyzes the epistemological implications about the role of observer in the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. As we know, the goal of most interpretations of quantum mechanics is to avoid the apparent intrusion of the observer into the measurement process. In the same time, there are implicit and hidden assumptions about his role. In fact, most interpretations taking as ontic level one of these fundamental concepts as information, physical law and matter bring us to new problematical questions. We think, that no interpretation of the quantum theory can avoid this intrusion until we do not clarify the nature of observer.