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International Journal of Theoretical Physics

Why modal interpretations of quantum mechanics must abandon classical reasoning about physical properties

Rob Clifton

Published Aug 1, 1995• 53 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf00676242

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Philosophica•Jan 2, 2010•29 citations
Orthodox quantum mechanics includes the principle that an observable of a system possesses a well-defined value if and only if the presence of that value in the system is certain to be confirmed on measurement. Modal interpretations reject the controversial ‘only if’ half of this principle to secure definite outcomes for quantum measurements that leave the apparatus entangled with the object it has measured. However, using a result that turns on the construction of a Kochen–Specker contradiction, I argue that modal interpretations cannot deliver a metaphysically tenable conception of properties in quantum mechanics unless they also abandon the less controversial ‘if’ half of the orthodox principle.
The thesis of this article is simple: even if it is accepted that quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory, this provides us with no special reason to believe in "chances" in the sense of objectively existing factors that are responsible for the relative frequencies we encounter in experiments.More in general, quantum mechanics gives us no special reason to believe in the actual existence of modalities.We may intuitively be inclined to believe in chances as a kind of causes, just as in classical mechanics we are inclined to think of forces as causal powers that produce accelerations.It might even be the case that intuitions of this kind can be developed into a coherent metaphysical scheme (something which has yet to be done, I think).But as I shall argue, a sober Humean perspective on quantum mechanics is certainly possible as well, and has much to recommend it.In short, the thesis of the present paper is that for a Humean, quantum mechanics introduces no reasons to abandon his position.