Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics

Uncertainty and probability for branching selves

Peter J. Lewis

Published Jun 20, 2006• 72 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsb.2006.02.001

Related papers

Branching with Uncertain Semantics: Discussion Note on Saunders and Wallace, ‘Branching and Uncertainty’

Nuel Belnap, Thomas Müller

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Jun 23, 2010•9 citations

Global Branching and Everettian Probability: A Critique of Sebens and Carroll’s Proposal

Shan Gao

Foundations of Physics•Oct 23, 2025•0 citations

Why We Shouldn’t Pity Schrödinger’s Kitty: Revisiting David Lewis’ Worry About Quantum Immortality in a Branching Multiverse

Bartlomiej A. Lenart

Abstract David Lewis cautions that although a no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics entails immortality for trans-world selves, the nature of the branching leaves us crippled, lonely, deathly ill (although never dead), and mentally infirm, meaning that immortal life, on such terms, amounts to an existence in eternal torment. This paper argues that the problem Lewis points to is in fact one of individuation and that a synthesis of Lewis’ own notion of perdurance and Robert Nozick’s closest continuer theory, when cast in the mould of a deterministic multiverse (as conceived by the Oxford quantum physicist David Deutsch), individuates trans-world selves in such a way as to allow to prune the infinitesimal expectation of a miserable eternal existence from the histories of most trans-world agents. Thus, contrary to Lewis’ warning that if personal identity is a trans-world notion, then we should all shake in our shoes, this paper argues that even if we are trans-world selves, we almost certainly have nothing to worry about.

Metaphysica•Mar 8, 2019•2 citations

Chaos, Decoherence, and Branching

David Wallace

Oxford University Press eBooks•May 24, 2012•1 citation

Can Self-Locating Uncertainty Ground the Born Rule? An Inconsistency Argument

Shan Gao

Vaidman's self-locating uncertainty (SLU) represents an innovative and influential approach to deriving Born rule probabilities in the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics, offering a promising epistemic foundation for understanding probabilities in a deterministic multiverse. This paper examines a potential inconsistency in the SLU framework: while the concept relies on observer branching to generate multiple copies and thus enable uncertainty about branch location, such branching results in pure, deterministic local states for each copy, making the mixed reduced density matrix (RDM)—a key element in deriving amplitude-squared probabilities—unavailable. Conversely, if the mixed RDM is retained, the observer remains unentangled and spans all branches, eliminating the multiplicity essential to SLU. The derivations by McQueen and Vaidman appear to draw on both SLU (which presupposes branching) and the mixed RDM (which presupposes no branching), without fully addressing this tension. Our analysis suggests that the inconsistency poses a significant challenge to grounding the Born rule purely in SLU, independent of specific branching models. The results highlight unresolved questions in the foundations of Everettian probability and point toward the need for further refinement or supplementation of the SLU approach.

•Dec 25, 2025•0 citations

Possible Worlds and Uncertainty Measures

WORLD SCIENTIFIC (EUROPE) eBooks•Apr 20, 2026•0 citations
Abstract David Lewis cautions that although a no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics entails immortality for trans-world selves, the nature of the branching leaves us crippled, lonely, deathly ill (although never dead), and mentally infirm, meaning that immortal life, on such terms, amounts to an existence in eternal torment. This paper argues that the problem Lewis points to is in fact one of individuation and that a synthesis of Lewis’ own notion of perdurance and Robert Nozick’s closest continuer theory, when cast in the mould of a deterministic multiverse (as conceived by the Oxford quantum physicist David Deutsch), individuates trans-world selves in such a way as to allow to prune the infinitesimal expectation of a miserable eternal existence from the histories of most trans-world agents. Thus, contrary to Lewis’ warning that if personal identity is a trans-world notion, then we should all shake in our shoes, this paper argues that even if we are trans-world selves, we almost certainly have nothing to worry about.
Vaidman's self-locating uncertainty (SLU) represents an innovative and influential approach to deriving Born rule probabilities in the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics, offering a promising epistemic foundation for understanding probabilities in a deterministic multiverse. This paper examines a potential inconsistency in the SLU framework: while the concept relies on observer branching to generate multiple copies and thus enable uncertainty about branch location, such branching results in pure, deterministic local states for each copy, making the mixed reduced density matrix (RDM)—a key element in deriving amplitude-squared probabilities—unavailable. Conversely, if the mixed RDM is retained, the observer remains unentangled and spans all branches, eliminating the multiplicity essential to SLU. The derivations by McQueen and Vaidman appear to draw on both SLU (which presupposes branching) and the mixed RDM (which presupposes no branching), without fully addressing this tension. Our analysis suggests that the inconsistency poses a significant challenge to grounding the Born rule purely in SLU, independent of specific branching models. The results highlight unresolved questions in the foundations of Everettian probability and point toward the need for further refinement or supplementation of the SLU approach.