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WORLD SCIENTIFIC (EUROPE) eBooks

Possible Worlds and Uncertainty Measures

Published Apr 20, 2026• 0 citations
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DOI
10.1142/9781800618633_0001

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The 2022 Tel Aviv conference on the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics highlighted many differences between theorists. A very significant dichotomy is between Everettian fission (splitting) and Saunders–Wallace–Wilson divergence. For fission, an observer may have multiple futures, whereas for divergence they always have a single future. Divergence was explicitly introduced to resolve the problem of pre-measurement uncertainty for Everettian theory, which is universally believed to be absent for fission. Here I maintain that there is indeed pre-measurement uncertainty prior to fission, so long as objective probability is a property of Everettian branches. This is made possible if the universe is a set and branches are subsets with a probability measure. A universe that is a set of universes that are macroscopically isomorphic and span all possible configurations of local beäbles fulfills that role. If objective probability is a property of branches, then a successful Deutsch–Wallace decision-theoretic argument would justify the Principal Principle and be part of probability theory rather than specific to many-worlds theory. Any macroscopic object in our environment becomes a set of isomorphs with different microscopic configurations, each in an elemental universe (elemental in the set-theoretic sense). This is similar to the many-interacting-worlds theory, but the observer inhabits the set of worlds, not an individual world. An observer has many elemental bodies.
The main problem with the many-worlds theory is that it is not clear how the notion of probability should be understood in a theory in which every possible outcome of a measurement actually occurs. In this paper, I argue for the following theses concerning the many-worlds theory: (1) If probability can be applied at all to measurement outcomes, it must function as a measure of an agent's self-location uncertainty. (2) Such probabilities typically violate reflection. (3) Many-worlds branching does not have sufficient structure to admit self-location probabilities. (4) Decision-theoretic arguments do not solve this problem.
Abstract The most common metaphysical consequence claimed of quantum mechanics is indeterminism. But while the GRW theory is indeterministic, Bohm’s theory is fully deterministic. The many-worlds theory is more interesting. What place could there be for probability in a theory in which every possible outcome of a measurement actually occurs? The options for locating uncertainty within a many-worlds ontology are surveyed, and the arguments that probabilities can be assigned to the worlds are critically assessed. The argument that all of us are immortal according to the many-worlds theory is considered and shown to be mistaken. The consequences of quantum mechanics for free will are shown to be minimal.