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ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL NONLOCALITY

Arthur B. Komar

Published Aug 1, 2000• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Nonlocality, although qualitatively intuitively clear, is not a very well defined quantitative concept for physical theories. We discuss several valid, but inequivalent, quantitative expressions of this concept, both for classical and quantum theories, and apply them in important situations. In particular we exhibit a polarization procedure for construction a large class of nontrivial, nonlocal observables for linear field theories and derive their invariant mappings. An analysis of the physics of the various inequivalent choices of boundary conditions for field quantization throws significant light on a critical question associated with the quantization program for gravitation. It also clarifies the nature of some of the physical assumptions underlying the choice of boundary conditions, as well as indicating the existence, in principle, of experimentally verifiable differences implied by such choices.

DOI
10.1142/9789812792938_0004

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Quantum nonlocality has been a long-standing and fascinating problem in the foundations of quantum theory since its proof by the Bell inequality. It seems to contradict our intuitive picture of space-time and thus urges us to reconsider its foundation. With the advent of quantum information science, it has attracted renewed interest from a fundamental point of view as well as from a quantum information-theoretic one. Another fundamental question on the nature of quantum theory is how we understand what quantum states represent. (Quantum states hereafter refer to pure states.) This is also a long-standing problem since the early days of quantum theory. Roughly speaking, there are two conflicting views on this matter: one is ontology and the other is epistemology. Ontological models of quantum theory are models in which we assume some underlying reality for physical systems and require that all the predictions of quantum theory should be reproduced. The ontological models are divided into two categories, depending on which views the models are based on, ontology or epistemology. In the models based on ontology, quantum states represent the underlying reality in some sense, and different quantum states correspond to different realities. In the models based on epistemology, quantum states do not necessarily correspond to the underlying realities, and even different quantum states can be consistent with a common underlying reality. The former type of ontological models of quantum theory is called 1⁄4-ontic. The latter is called 1⁄4-epistemic. Thus, it might be rather confusing that ontological models are classified further into 1⁄4-ontic models and 1⁄4-epistemic ones. We use these terms here in accordance with the recent literature on quantum foundations. (For details of these notions in the ontological models of quantum theory, see the paper by Harrigan and Spekkens.) Quite recently, the question just mentioned has been answered by Pusey et al., and one of the above models has been refuted. It was shown that 1⁄4-epistemic models are inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. In other words, epistemological views on quantum states turned out to be false as long as we assume some underlying reality for physical systems. Therefore, only 1⁄4-ontic models of quantum theory are valid for describing quantum systems. This significantly advances our understanding on the nature of quantum states. It is expected that various conclusions will be drawn from this fact. In this paper, we will discuss a connection with nonlocality. The above two fundamental questions, nonlocality and the nature of quantum states, are intimately connected, and the connection was first implicitly recognised by Einstein in the early days of quantum theory. In a private correspondence with Schrodinger, Einstein constructed a fascinating argument that relates the above two. (That argument is distinctly different from the well-known EPR argument.) Recently, it was revisited and reconstructed in accordance with more rigorous notions in quantum foundations. Nonlocality is usually shown by violations of Bell inequalities. (Bell inequalities hereafter include all the subsequent developments such as the CHSH inequality.) Even if it is not clear whether the models of quantum theory are 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic, we can prove nonlocality just by showing the violation of Bell inequalities. However, the above argument originated by Einstein implies that if we know the models are 1⁄4-ontic in advance (as we do now), we can prove nonlocality in a simpler way without Bell inequalities. (This argument had been known in quantum foundations before the refutation of 1⁄4-epistemic models.) Nonlocality is rigorously defined as a violation of the notion of local causality defined by Bell. Showing the violation of Bell inequalities is one way of demonstrating the violation of local causality. Since the simpler proof initiated by Einstein directly demonstrates the violation of local causality, it is a more straightforward proof of nonlocality from a conceptual point of view. In the following, we will see that this simple argument of nonlocality without Bell inequalities can be used to show multipartite nonlocality as well. Before moving onto multipartite cases, first let us define the necessary notions for presenting our result. First of all, we assume that there exists a complete specification of the properties of a physical system, which we refer to as the ontic state of that system. The ontic states represent the underlying realities and are not necessarily equal to ordinary quantum states. (In other words, the ontic states correspond to hidden variables.) 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Unless there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ontic states and quantum states, the probability distribution spreads over . (See Fig. 1.) The question of whether an ontological model is 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic is concerned with the behaviour of the epistemic states for two distinct preparations of quantum states. Consider two distinct preparations of quantum states, Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 82 (2013) 055003

Journal of the Physical Society of Japan•Apr 23, 2013•0 citations

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Abstract According to a regnant criterion of physical equivalence for quantum theories, a quantum field theory (QFT) typically admits continuously many physically inequivalent realizations. This, the second of a two‐part introduction to topics in the philosophy of QFT, continues the investigation of this alarming circumstance. It begins with a brief catalog of quantum field theoretic examples of this non‐uniqueness, then presents the basics of the algebraic approach to quantum theories, which discloses a structure common even to ‘physically inequivalent’ realizations of a QFT. Finally, it introduces and evaluates a handful of strategies for interpreting quantum theories in the face of the non‐uniqueness of their Hilbert space representations.

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Nonlocality, although qualitatively intuitively clear, is not a very well defined quantitative concept for physical theories. We discuss several valid, but inequivalent, quantitative expressions of this concept, both for classical and quantum theories, and apply them in important situations. In particular we exhibit a polarization procedure for construction a large class of nontrivial, nonlocal observables for linear field theories and derive their invariant mappings. An analysis of the physics of the various inequivalent choices of boundary conditions for field quantization throws significant light on a critical question associated with the quantization program for gravitation. It also clarifies the nature of some of the physical assumptions underlying the choice of boundary conditions, as well as indicating the existence, in principle, of experimentally verifiable differences implied by such choices.
Quantum nonlocality has been a long-standing and fascinating problem in the foundations of quantum theory since its proof by the Bell inequality. It seems to contradict our intuitive picture of space-time and thus urges us to reconsider its foundation. With the advent of quantum information science, it has attracted renewed interest from a fundamental point of view as well as from a quantum information-theoretic one. Another fundamental question on the nature of quantum theory is how we understand what quantum states represent. (Quantum states hereafter refer to pure states.) This is also a long-standing problem since the early days of quantum theory. Roughly speaking, there are two conflicting views on this matter: one is ontology and the other is epistemology. Ontological models of quantum theory are models in which we assume some underlying reality for physical systems and require that all the predictions of quantum theory should be reproduced. The ontological models are divided into two categories, depending on which views the models are based on, ontology or epistemology. In the models based on ontology, quantum states represent the underlying reality in some sense, and different quantum states correspond to different realities. In the models based on epistemology, quantum states do not necessarily correspond to the underlying realities, and even different quantum states can be consistent with a common underlying reality. The former type of ontological models of quantum theory is called 1⁄4-ontic. The latter is called 1⁄4-epistemic. Thus, it might be rather confusing that ontological models are classified further into 1⁄4-ontic models and 1⁄4-epistemic ones. We use these terms here in accordance with the recent literature on quantum foundations. (For details of these notions in the ontological models of quantum theory, see the paper by Harrigan and Spekkens.) Quite recently, the question just mentioned has been answered by Pusey et al., and one of the above models has been refuted. It was shown that 1⁄4-epistemic models are inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. In other words, epistemological views on quantum states turned out to be false as long as we assume some underlying reality for physical systems. Therefore, only 1⁄4-ontic models of quantum theory are valid for describing quantum systems. This significantly advances our understanding on the nature of quantum states. It is expected that various conclusions will be drawn from this fact. In this paper, we will discuss a connection with nonlocality. The above two fundamental questions, nonlocality and the nature of quantum states, are intimately connected, and the connection was first implicitly recognised by Einstein in the early days of quantum theory. In a private correspondence with Schrodinger, Einstein constructed a fascinating argument that relates the above two. (That argument is distinctly different from the well-known EPR argument.) Recently, it was revisited and reconstructed in accordance with more rigorous notions in quantum foundations. Nonlocality is usually shown by violations of Bell inequalities. (Bell inequalities hereafter include all the subsequent developments such as the CHSH inequality.) Even if it is not clear whether the models of quantum theory are 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic, we can prove nonlocality just by showing the violation of Bell inequalities. However, the above argument originated by Einstein implies that if we know the models are 1⁄4-ontic in advance (as we do now), we can prove nonlocality in a simpler way without Bell inequalities. (This argument had been known in quantum foundations before the refutation of 1⁄4-epistemic models.) Nonlocality is rigorously defined as a violation of the notion of local causality defined by Bell. Showing the violation of Bell inequalities is one way of demonstrating the violation of local causality. Since the simpler proof initiated by Einstein directly demonstrates the violation of local causality, it is a more straightforward proof of nonlocality from a conceptual point of view. In the following, we will see that this simple argument of nonlocality without Bell inequalities can be used to show multipartite nonlocality as well. Before moving onto multipartite cases, first let us define the necessary notions for presenting our result. First of all, we assume that there exists a complete specification of the properties of a physical system, which we refer to as the ontic state of that system. The ontic states represent the underlying realities and are not necessarily equal to ordinary quantum states. (In other words, the ontic states correspond to hidden variables.) Ontological models of quantum theory are models that assume ontic states and reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory. An important question is how ontic states correspond to quantum states in quantum theory. In order to frame the question accurately, we need the notion of an epistemic state, which represents the relation between them. Suppose we prepare a physical system in a quantum state 1⁄4. Although the system is uniquely specified as 1⁄4 in quantum theory, there still remains a possibility that it allows a more detailed specification in the ontic state space, in which case many different ontic states turn out to be consistent with 1⁄4. The relation between ontic states and the preparation procedure, P1⁄4, is described by a conditional probability distribution over the ontic state space, pð jP1⁄4Þ, which we refer to as an epistemic state. In general, the preparation P can be a preparation of a physical system in a mixed sate. Unless there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ontic states and quantum states, the probability distribution spreads over . (See Fig. 1.) The question of whether an ontological model is 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic is concerned with the behaviour of the epistemic states for two distinct preparations of quantum states. Consider two distinct preparations of quantum states, Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 82 (2013) 055003
The standard definition of entanglement entropy in quantum field theory requires regularizing the entangling surface and factorizing the Hilbert space, which in turn involves a choice of boundary conditions at the regularized surface. This raises two natural questions which are open at present. The first is under what conditions there is a choice of boundary conditions that leads to a unitary map between the original Hilbert space and the factorized one, which is a necessary condition for a well-defined entanglement entropy. The second concerns the situation where there are multiple such choices, in which case the question is whether they all yield the same entropy, or at least the same terms usually referred to as universal. Focusing on topological theories and using three-dimensional Chern-Simons theory as a concrete illustration, we show under specified assumptions that different such choices affect only the non-universal terms in the entropy, such that the remaining terms are universal in this sense as well, while we explicitly demonstrate that boundary conditions corresponding to non-unitary maps can change these terms. We then explain how a similar argument applies to two-dimensional conformal field theories and discuss a condition for universality in general theories.
Given the importance of quantum reference frames (QRFs) to both quantum and gravitational physics, it is pertinent to develop a systematic method for switching between the descriptions of physics relative to different choices of QRFs, which is valid in both fields. Here we continue with such a unifying approach, begun in [Quantum 4, 225 (2020)], whose key ingredient is a symmetry principle, which enforces physics to be relational. Thanks to gauge related redundancies, this leads to a perspective-neutral structure which contains all frame choices at once and via which frame perspectives can be consistently switched. Formulated in the language of constrained systems, the perspective-neutral structure is the constraint surface classically and the gauge invariant Hilbert space in the Dirac quantized theory. By contrast, a perspective relative to a specific frame corresponds to a gauge choice and the associated reduced phase and Hilbert space. QRF changes thus amount to a gauge transformation. We show that they take the form of `quantum coordinate changes'. We illustrate this in a general mechanical model, namely the relational N -body problem in 3D space with rotational and translational symmetry. This model is especially interesting because it features the Gribov problem so that globally valid gauge fixing conditions, and hence relational frame perspectives, are absent. The constraint surface is topologically non-trivial and foliated by 3-, 5- and 6-dimensional gauge orbits, where the lower dimensional orbits are a set of measure zero. The N -body problem also does not admit globally valid canonically conjugate pairs of Dirac observables. These challenges notwithstanding, we exhibit how one can construct the QRF transformations for the 3-body problem. Our construction also sheds new light on the generic inequivalence of Dirac and reduced quantization through its interplay with QRF perspectives.
For over a century, we have sought to understand the abstract formulation of quantum theory from more convincing physical arguments, and this is one of the most enticing scientific challenges of recent times: to derive quantum theory from simple physical principles. There are various ideas on how to approach this, and at least two different approaches to the problem stand out. The first consists of assuming general probabilistic theories that allow probability distributions more general than those that arise in quantum theory, with the goal of finding principles that select quantum theory from this range of possible theories, reconstructing quantum theory as a purely operational probabilistic theory that follows from certain sets of axioms. Although successful, this approach does not completely resolve the problem. Another approach goes in a different direction. Instead of attempting to reconstruct quantum theory as a whole, the focus is on understanding which physical principles explain two of the most peculiar aspects of quantum theory: nonlocality and contextuality, using a device-independent approach. This is one of the key questions we aim to investigate with this masters project: what are the physical principles that explain nonlocality and contextuality in quantum systems?
Abstract According to a regnant criterion of physical equivalence for quantum theories, a quantum field theory (QFT) typically admits continuously many physically inequivalent realizations. This, the second of a two‐part introduction to topics in the philosophy of QFT, continues the investigation of this alarming circumstance. It begins with a brief catalog of quantum field theoretic examples of this non‐uniqueness, then presents the basics of the algebraic approach to quantum theories, which discloses a structure common even to ‘physically inequivalent’ realizations of a QFT. Finally, it introduces and evaluates a handful of strategies for interpreting quantum theories in the face of the non‐uniqueness of their Hilbert space representations.