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European Journal of Physics

Microphysical objects as 'potentiality waves'

C N Villars

Published Apr 1, 1987• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1088/0143-0807/8/2/115

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We like to take stock of the matter now, after we have presented different aspects of quantum-like reality proposal. We started by observing that the objective realist picture of the world as proposed by Newtonian-Hamiltonian framework, and much endorsed by scientists and philosophers from different domains of knowledge, could not stand the test of time. Particularly since the 1920s, it got clarified that the same picture of reality would be an obvious failure in the microphysical realm, the quantum-physical realm. Since the 1920s, the world witnessed the rise of the Copenhagen framework, with various interpretations over time. Most of these interpretations (whether ontological, non-ontological or epistemological) were in contrast to the classical physics ontology (either waves or particles with definite trajectories). Such varied interpretations have largely generated two ideological camps, realist and anti-realist. The realist camp (including diverse frameworks like Bohmian pilot wave theory, Everettian multiverse theory, to David Albert-led wave function realism [ Albert, 2023 ]) attempted to provide a new ontology of the world, whereas the non-realist camp (particularly the original Copenhagen camp) wanted to challenge the very attempt of whether at all an objective picture of microphysical reality is even possible to imagine.
A presentation showing how the statements which relate to microphysical objects as they are different from the statements of classical mechanics is made. The determinism of classical and of quantum-mechanical theories is qualified. A (crucial) distinction between causality and determinism is given. Detailed analyses of diffraction as a result of single and double-slit demonstrations point to paradoxes arising from the use of particle or wave models, respectively, for photons and electrons. The compromising wave-packet model is underscored. The meanings for the Psi-function and for |ψ|2 are presented, with an explanation of the limitations that arise from giving an interpretation of |ψ|2 as a probability. The meaning of ψ-waves is analyzed. A case is made for the ψ-function's describing a well-ordered list of betting odds, based on previous statistical experiences, for the different results of specific experiments of a microscopic object of study with macroscopic apparatus. The Schrödinger wave equation is evaluated for meaning and judged as a deterministic expression.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations are very like many ordinary occurrences of everyday life. So it is a little difficult for the man in the street to understand immediately why there has been so much fuss about them. It must be recalled that the founding fathers of quantum mechanics had convinced themselves that it was necessary to abandon the idea of an objective reality at the microphysical level. But the correlations in question, together with the idea of local causality, were a formidable argument for such a reality. The founding fathers offered counter-arguments (neither very clear nor very convincing in my opinion) and each side held to its position. Since then it has been possible to push the analysis a little further, considering especially situations just a little different from those considered before. Then correlations appear, according to quantum mechanics, which are not at all like those of everyday life. As a result it is not now easy to believe, with Einstein, that quantum mechanical predictions are reconcilable with the notion of a Lorentz invariant objectively real microphysical world.