The development of the concept of indistinguishability in the writings of Gibbs is traced, leading from the ‘‘Gibbs paradox’’ to his definition of generic phase.
The Gibbs Paradox is an important question in thermodynamics. In this thesis I search for a solution for the paradox from a classical, philosophical and quantum mechanical point of view. A common way to solve the Gibbs Paradox is by using the reduced entropy. However, this definition of entropy should not be interpreted as an argument for the indistinguishability of identical particles, because all other particles which have unique trajectories through space-time are distinguishable in principle. The Gibbs paradox could be solved in a few ways, but each solution has certain constrains.
It is widely accepted that the papers by Bose in 1924 and by Einstein in 1924-1925 definitely opened the path to
the quantum concept of ‘indistinguishability’. Since then, distinction in physics between ‘identity’ and
‘indistinguishability’ of particles has come to be required.
However, even before the rise of quantum physics, Maxwell, Boltzmann and Gibbs, among others, had to tackle
the difficulties and paradoxes that appear when counting identical particles. Later, after Sackur’s and Tetrode’s
first quantum derivation of the canonical partition function of an ideal gas, much confusion arose around its
dependence on the number of molecules in the system. Many other physicists, such as Planck, Lorentz or
Schrodinger took part in those debates. In 1921, Ehrenfest and Trkal devoted a whole paper to this subject.
Clearly, in the days before Bose’s seminal work, embroiling and misunderstanding were commonplace.
In considering the emergence of the distinction between ‘identical’ and ‘indistinguishable’ particles, we will go
through the so-called statistical route to quantum mechanics. The first developments in statistical mechanics
became immediately confused and entangled with the irruption of quantum physics. In the first quarter of the
twentieth century the mutual influence between both disciplines was profuse.
We will pay special attention to the story of the so-called ‘Gibbs Paradox.’ We will argue that what is now often
known by this name in some textbooks of statistical mechanics did not exist as such in those foundational days.
This is a systematic review of the concept of indistinguishability in both classical and quantum mechanics, with particular attention to Gibbs' paradox. Section 1 is on the Gibbs paradox; section 2 is a defense of the concept of classical indistinguishability, that addresses (and refutes) the view that classical particles can always be distinguished by their trajectories so are distinguishable. Section 3 is on the notion of object more generally, and on whether indistinguishables should be thought of as objects at all
The Gibbs Paradox is essentially a set of open questions as to how sameness of gases or fluids (or masses, more generally) are to be treated in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. They have a variety of answers, some restricted to quantum theory (there is no classical solution), some to classical theory (the quantum case is different). The solution offered here applies to both in equal measure, and is based on the concept of particle indistinguishability (in the classical case, Gibbs' notion of 'generic phase'). Correctly understood, it is the elimination of sequence position as a labelling device, where sequences enter at the level of the tensor (or Cartesian) product of one-particle state spaces. In both cases it amounts to passing to the quotient space under permutations. 'Distinguishability', in the sense in which it is usually used in classical statistical mechanics, is a mathematically convenient, but physically muddled, fiction.
The suggestion that particles of the same kind may be indistinguishable in a fundamental sense, even so that challenges to traditional notions of individuality and identity may arise, has first come up in the context of classical statistical mechanics. In particular, the Gibbs paradox has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of the untenability of the classical concept of a particle and as a premonition that quantum theory is needed. This idea of a ‘quantum connection’ stubbornly persists in the literature, even though it has also been criticized frequently. Here we shall argue that although this criticism is justified, the proposed alternative solutions have often been wrong and have not put the paradox in its right perspective. In fact, the Gibbs paradox is unrelated to fundamental issues of particle identity; only distinguishability in a pragmatic sense plays a role (in this we develop ideas of van Kampen [10]), and in principle the paradox always is there as long as the concept of a particle applies at all. In line with this we show that the paradox survives even in quantum mechanics, in spite of the quantum mechanical (anti-)symmetrization postulates.
Gibbs paradox in the context of statistical mechanics addresses the issue of additivity of entropy of mixing gases. The usual discussion attributes the paradoxical situation to classical distinguishability of identical particles and credits quantum theory for enabling indistinguishability of identical particles to solve the problem. We argue that indistinguishability of identical particles is already a feature in classical mechanics and this is clearly brought out when the problem is treated in the language of information and associated entropy. We pinpoint the physical criteria for indistinguishability that is crucial for the treatment of the Gibbs’ problem and the consistency of its solution with conventional thermodynamics. Quantum mechanics provides a quantitative criterion, not possible in the classical picture, for the degree of indistinguishability in terms of visibility of quantum interference, or overlap of the states as pointed out by von Neumann, thereby endowing the entropy expression with mathematical continuity and physical reasonableness.