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From identity to indistinguishability

Enric Pérez Canals

Published Jan 1, 2012• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

It is widely accepted that the papers by Bose in 1924 and by Einstein in 1924-1925 definitely opened the path to the quantum concept of ‘indistinguishability’. Since then, distinction in physics between ‘identity’ and ‘indistinguishability’ of particles has come to be required. However, even before the rise of quantum physics, Maxwell, Boltzmann and Gibbs, among others, had to tackle the difficulties and paradoxes that appear when counting identical particles. Later, after Sackur’s and Tetrode’s first quantum derivation of the canonical partition function of an ideal gas, much confusion arose around its dependence on the number of molecules in the system. Many other physicists, such as Planck, Lorentz or Schrodinger took part in those debates. In 1921, Ehrenfest and Trkal devoted a whole paper to this subject. Clearly, in the days before Bose’s seminal work, embroiling and misunderstanding were commonplace. In considering the emergence of the distinction between ‘identical’ and ‘indistinguishable’ particles, we will go through the so-called statistical route to quantum mechanics. The first developments in statistical mechanics became immediately confused and entangled with the irruption of quantum physics. In the first quarter of the twentieth century the mutual influence between both disciplines was profuse. We will pay special attention to the story of the so-called ‘Gibbs Paradox.’ We will argue that what is now often known by this name in some textbooks of statistical mechanics did not exist as such in those foundational days.

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Studia Historiae Scientiarum•Sep 30, 2020•7 citations
It is widely accepted that the papers by Bose in 1924 and by Einstein in 1924-1925 definitely opened the path to
the quantum concept of ‘indistinguishability’. Since then, distinction in physics between ‘identity’ and
‘indistinguishability’ of particles has come to be required.
However, even before the rise of quantum physics, Maxwell, Boltzmann and Gibbs, among others, had to tackle
the difficulties and paradoxes that appear when counting identical particles. Later, after Sackur’s and Tetrode’s
first quantum derivation of the canonical partition function of an ideal gas, much confusion arose around its
dependence on the number of molecules in the system. Many other physicists, such as Planck, Lorentz or
Schrodinger took part in those debates. In 1921, Ehrenfest and Trkal devoted a whole paper to this subject.
Clearly, in the days before Bose’s seminal work, embroiling and misunderstanding were commonplace.
In considering the emergence of the distinction between ‘identical’ and ‘indistinguishable’ particles, we will go
through the so-called statistical route to quantum mechanics. The first developments in statistical mechanics
became immediately confused and entangled with the irruption of quantum physics. In the first quarter of the
twentieth century the mutual influence between both disciplines was profuse.
We will pay special attention to the story of the so-called ‘Gibbs Paradox.’ We will argue that what is now often
known by this name in some textbooks of statistical mechanics did not exist as such in those foundational days.
The suggestion that particles of the same kind may be indistinguishable in a fundamental sense, even so that challenges to traditional notions of individuality and identity may arise, has first come up in the context of classical statistical mechanics. In particular, the Gibbs paradox has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of the untenability of the classical concept of a particle and as a premonition that quantum theory is needed. This idea of a ‘quantum connection’ stubbornly persists in the literature, even though it has also been criticized frequently. Here we shall argue that although this criticism is justified, the proposed alternative solutions have often been wrong and have not put the paradox in its right perspective. In fact, the Gibbs paradox is unrelated to fundamental issues of particle identity; only distinguishability in a pragmatic sense plays a role (in this we develop ideas of van Kampen [10]), and in principle the paradox always is there as long as the concept of a particle applies at all. In line with this we show that the paradox survives even in quantum mechanics, in spite of the quantum mechanical (anti-)symmetrization postulates.
The Gibbs paradox has frequently been interpreted as a sign that particles of the same kind are fundamentally indistinguishable; and that quantum mechanics, with its identical fermions and bosons, is indispensable for making sense of this. In this article we shall argue, on the contrary, that analysis of the paradox supports the idea that classical particles are always distinguishable. Perhaps surprisingly, this analysis extends to quantum mechanics: even according to quantum mechanics there can be distinguishable particles of the same kind. Our most important general conclusion will accordingly be that the universally accepted notion that quantum particles of the same kind are necessarily indistinguishable rests on a confusion about how particles are represented in quantum theory.
Identical classical particles are distinguishable. This distinguishability affects the number of ways W a macrostate can be realized on the microlevel, and from the relation S=k ln W leads to a nonextensive expression for the entropy. This result is usually considered incorrect because of its inconsistency with thermodynamics. It is sometimes concluded from this inconsistency that identical particles are fundamentally indistinguishable and that quantum mechanics is indispensable for making sense of this inconsistency. In contrast, we argue that the classical statistics of distinguishable particles and the resulting nonextensive entropy function are perfectly acceptable from both a theoretical and an experimental perspective. The inconsistency with thermodynamics can be removed by taking into account that the entropy concept in statistical mechanics is not completely identical to the thermodynamical one. We observe that even identical quantum particles are in some cases distinguishable, and conclude that quantum mechanics is irrelevant to the Gibbs paradox.
The concept of indistinguishable particles in quantum theory is fundamental to questions of ontology. All ordinary matter is made of electrons, protons, neutrons, and photons and they are all indistinguishable particles. Yet the concept itself has proved elusive, in part because of the interpretational difficulties that afflict quantum theory quite generally, and in part because the concept was so central to the discovery of the quantum itself, by Planck in 1900; it came encumbered with revolution. I offer a deflationary reading of the concept ‘indistinguishable’ that is identical to Gibbs’ concept ‘generic phase’, save that it is defined for state spaces with only finitely-many states of bounded volume and energy (finitely-many orthogonal states, in quantum mechanics). That, and that alone, makes for the difference between the quantum and Gibbs concepts of indistinguishability. This claim is heretical on several counts, but here we consider only the content of the claim itself, and its bearing on the early history of quantum theory rather than in relation to contemporary debates about particle indistinguishability and permutation symmetry. It powerfully illuminates that history.
Gibbs paradox in the context of statistical mechanics addresses the issue of additivity of entropy of mixing gases. The usual discussion attributes the paradoxical situation to classical distinguishability of identical particles and credits quantum theory for enabling indistinguishability of identical particles to solve the problem. We argue that indistinguishability of identical particles is already a feature in classical mechanics and this is clearly brought out when the problem is treated in the language of information and associated entropy. We pinpoint the physical criteria for indistinguishability that is crucial for the treatment of the Gibbs’ problem and the consistency of its solution with conventional thermodynamics. Quantum mechanics provides a quantitative criterion, not possible in the classical picture, for the degree of indistinguishability in terms of visibility of quantum interference, or overlap of the states as pointed out by von Neumann, thereby endowing the entropy expression with mathematical continuity and physical reasonableness.
The principal mathematical idea behind the statistical properties of black-body radiation (photons) was introduced already by L. Boltzmann (1877/2015) and used by M. Planck (1900; 1906) to derive the frequency distribution of radiation (Planck’s law) when its discrete (quantum) structure was additionally added to the reasoning. The fundamental physical idea – the principle of indistinguishability of the quanta (photons) – had been somewhat hidden behind the formalism and evolved slowly. Here the role of P. Debye (1910), H. Kamerlingh Onnes and P. Ehrenfest (1914) is briefly elaborated and the crucial role of W. Natanson (1911a; 1911b; 1913) is emphasized. The reintroduction of this Natanson’s statistics by S. N. Bose (1924/2009) for light quanta (called photons since the late 1920s), and its subsequent generalization to material particles by A. Einstein (1924; 1925) is regarded as the most direct and transparent, but involves the concept of grand canonical ensemble of J. W. Gibbs (1902/1981), which in a way obscures the indistinguishability of the particles involved. It was ingeniously reintroduced by P. A. M. Dirac (1926) via postulating (imposing) the transposition symmetry onto the many-particle wave function. The above statements are discussed in this paper, including the recent idea of the author (Spałek 2020) of transformation (transmutation) – under specific conditions – of the indistinguishable particles into the corresponding to them distinguishable quantum particles. The last remark may serve as a form of the author’s post scriptum to the indistinguishability principle.