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IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

An Information-theoretic Treatment Of Secret Sharing Schemes

Renato M. Capocelli, Alfredo De Santis, Luisa Gargano, Ugo Vaccaro

Published Aug 24, 2005• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1109/isit.1991.695235

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In a k-threshold secret sharing scheme, a dealer who holds a secret s distributes parts of this secret (the shares) to n players; If k or more of these players pool their shares, they are able to determine s, but if less than k of them pool their shares, they cannot infer any information on s. In 1979, Shamir introduced such a scheme, based on polynomial interpolation in a finite field. This scheme is widely used in other cryptographic protocols, because it is simple, elegant and above all information-theoretically secure. There are a few proofs of the scheme's security, but to our knowledge, none of them is entirely based on the information-theoretical entropy function introduced by Shannon in 1948. We propose such a demonstration.
We study secret sharing schemes for general (non-threshold) access structures. A general secret sharing scheme for n parties is associated to a monotone function F:{0,1}n→{0,1}. In such a scheme, a dealer distributes shares of a secret s among n parties. Any subset of parties T ⊆ [n] should be able to put together their shares and reconstruct the secret s if F(T)=1, and should have no information about s if F(T)=0. One of the major long-standing questions in information-theoretic cryptography is to minimize the (total) size of the shares in a secret-sharing scheme for arbitrary monotone functions F.