Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

International Conference on Information Science, Electronics and Electrical Engineering

An entropy-based demonstration of the security of Shamir's secret sharing scheme

Christian L. F. Corniaux, Hossein Ghodosi

Published Apr 1, 2014• 18 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In a k-threshold secret sharing scheme, a dealer who holds a secret s distributes parts of this secret (the shares) to n players; If k or more of these players pool their shares, they are able to determine s, but if less than k of them pool their shares, they cannot infer any information on s. In 1979, Shamir introduced such a scheme, based on polynomial interpolation in a finite field. This scheme is widely used in other cryptographic protocols, because it is simple, elegant and above all information-theoretically secure. There are a few proofs of the scheme's security, but to our knowledge, none of them is entirely based on the information-theoretical entropy function introduced by Shannon in 1948. We propose such a demonstration.

DOI
10.1109/infoseee.2014.6948065

Related papers

Bounds on the Statistical Leakage-Resilience of Shamir's Secret Sharing

Utkarsh Gupta, Hessam Mahdavifar

Secret sharing is an instrumental tool for sharing secret keys in distributed systems. In a classical threshold setting, this involves a dealer who has a secret/key, a set of parties/users to which shares of the secret are sent, and a threshold on the number of users whose presence is needed in order to recover the secret. In secret sharing, secure links with no leakage are often assumed between the involved parties. However, when the users are nodes in a communication network and all the links are physical links, e.g., wireless, such assumptions are not valid anymore. In order to study this critical problem, we propose a statistical leakage model of secret sharing, where some noisy versions of all the secret shares might be independently leaked to an adversary. We then study the resilience of the seminal Shamir's secret sharing scheme with statistical leakage, and bound certain measures of security (i.e., semantic security, mutual information security), given other parameters of the system including the amount of leakage from each secret share. We show that for an extreme scenario of Shamir's scheme, in particular when the underlying field characteristic is 2, the security of each bit of the secret against leakage improves exponentially with the number of users. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards understanding secret sharing under general statistical noisy leakage.

arXiv:2405.04622•IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jul 7, 2024•2 citations

Efficient and Distributed Secret Sharing in General Networks

Nihar B. Shah, K. V. Rashmi, Kannan Ramchandran

Shamir's (n, k) threshold secret sharing is an important component of several cryptographic protocols, such as those for secure multiparty-computation, key management, and Byzantine agreement. These protocols typically assume the presence of direct communication links from the dealer to all participants, in which case, the dealer can directly pass the shares of the secret to each participant. In this paper, we consider the problem of secret sharing when the dealer does not have direct links to all the participants, and instead, the dealer and the participants form a general network. We present an efficient and distributed algorithm for secret sharing over general networks that satisfy what we call the k-propagating-dealer condition. We derive information-theoretic lower bounds on the communication complexity of secret sharing over any network, which may also be of independent interest. We show that for networks satisfying the k-propagating-dealer condition, the communication complexity of our algorithm is {\Theta}(n), and furthermore, is a constant factor away from the lower bounds. We also show that, in contrast, the existing solution entails a communication-complexity that is super-linear for a wide class of networks, and is {\Theta}(n^2) in the worst case. Moreover, the amount of randomness required under our algorithm is a constant, while that required under the existing solution increases with n for a large class of networks, and in particular, is {\Theta}(n) whenever the degree of the dealer is bounded. Finally, while the existing solution requires considerable coordination in the network and knowledge of the global topology, our algorithm is completely distributed and requires each node to know only the identities of its neighbours. Our algorithm thus allows for efficient generalization of several cryptographic protocols to a large class of general networks.

arXiv:1207.0120•Jun 30, 2012•2 citations

Breaking the circuit-size barrier in secret sharing

Tianren Liu, Vinod Vaikuntanathan

We study secret sharing schemes for general (non-threshold) access structures. A general secret sharing scheme for n parties is associated to a monotone function F:{0,1}n→{0,1}. In such a scheme, a dealer distributes shares of a secret s among n parties. Any subset of parties T ⊆ [n] should be able to put together their shares and reconstruct the secret s if F(T)=1, and should have no information about s if F(T)=0. One of the major long-standing questions in information-theoretic cryptography is to minimize the (total) size of the shares in a secret-sharing scheme for arbitrary monotone functions F.

ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)•Jun 20, 2018•54 citations

Efficient Threshold Function Secret Sharing With Information-Theoretic Security

Jinglong Luo, Liang Feng Zhang, Fuchun Lin +1 more

Function secret sharing (FSS) is a cryptographic primitive that is introduced by Boyle et al. (Eurocrypt 2015), motivated by application scenarios involving private access to large distributed data while minimising the overhead of communication, for example, private information retrieval. Informally, an n-party FSS scheme splits a function f into n functions f1,...,fnsuch that f = f1+...+ fnand every strict subset of the function shares hide f . Most of the known FSS constructions only have computational hiding, namely, the hiding property holds only against a computationally bounded adversary. We consider information-theoretic hiding in this work while allowing f to be recovered from t function shares and correspondingly, any (t - 1) function shares unconditionally hide f . Call it (t, n)-threshold function secret sharing ((t, n)-TFSS for short). Using information-theoretic tools and through a series of optimizations, we show that our (t, n)-TFSS have better performance than FSS in terms of communication complexity, a criterion that measures the efficiency of such protocols. Specifically, a (t, n)-TFSS scheme with communication complexity O(l) is designed in this paper and it is better than the existing FSS schemes with lowest communication complexity O(λl), where λ is the length of pseudo-random generator's seeds. In addition, the (t, n)-TFSS have an extra robustness property in the sense that even if up to (n - t) function shares are not available, the protocol still computes the function value at a given point correctly.

IEEE Access•Jan 1, 2020•7 citations

Improving quantum secret-sharing schemes

Anderson C. A. Nascimento, Joern Mueller-Quade, Hideki Imai

We propose a protocol that enables a dealer to share a quantum secret with n players using less than n quantum shares for several access structures. For threshold schemes we derived an expression that shows how many quantum shares can be saved in this scheme. Also, several features that are available for classical secret-sharing schemes (and previously not known to be possible for quantum secret-sharing) become available with this protocol.

Physical Review A•Sep 1, 2001•85 citations

Secure Multi-Player Protocols: Fundamentals, Generality, and Efficiency

Serge Fehr

While classically cryptography is concerned with the problem of private communication among two entities, say players, in modern cryptography multi-player protocols play an important role.And among these, it is probably fair to say that secret sharing, and its stronger version verifiable secret sharing (VSS), as well as multi-party computation (MPC) belong to the most appealing and/or useful ones.The former two are basic tools to achieve better robustness of cryptographic schemes against malfunction or misuse by "decentralizing" the security from one single to a whole group of individuals (captured by the term threshold cryptography).The latter allows-at least in principle-to execute any collaboration among a group of players in a secure way that guarantees the correctness of the outcome but simultaneously respects the privacy of the participants.In this work, we study three aspects of secret sharing, VSS and MPC, which we denote by fundamentals, generality, and efficiency.By fundamentals we mean the quest for understanding why a protocol works and is secure in abstract (and hopefully simple) mathematical terms.By generality we mean generality with respect to the underlying mathematical structure, in other words, minimizing the mathematical axioms required to do some task.And efficiency of course deals with the improvement of protocols with respect to some meaningful complexity measure.We briefly summarize our main results.(1) We give a complete characterization of blackbox secret sharing in terms of simple algebraic conditions on the integer sharing coefficients, and we propose a black-box secret sharing scheme with minimal expansion factor.Note that, in contrast to the classical field-based secret sharing schemes, a black-box secret sharing scheme allows to share a secret sampled from an arbitrary Abelian group and requires only black-box access to the group operations and to random group elements.Such a scheme may be very useful in the construction of threshold cryptosystems based on groups with secret order (like RSA).(2) We show that without loss of efficiency, MPC can be based on arbitrary finite rings.This is in sharp contrast to the literature where essentially all MPC protocols require a much stronger mathematical structure, namely a field.Apart from its theoretical value, this can lead to efficiency improvements since it allows a greater freedom in the (mathematical) representation of the task that needs to be securely executed.(3) We propose a unified treatment of perfectly secure linear VSS and distributed commitments (a weaker version of the former), and we show that the security of such a scheme can be reduced to a linear algebra condition.The security of all known schemes follows as corollaries whose proofs are pure linear algebra arguments, in contrast v to some hybrid arguments used in the literature.(4) We construct a new unconditionally secure VSS scheme with minimized reconstruction complexity in the setting of a dishonest minority.This improves on the reconstruction complexity of the previously best known scheme without affecting the (asymptotic) complexity of the sharing phase.In the context of MPC with pre-processing, our scheme allows to improve the computation phase of earlier protocols without increasing the complexity of the pre-processing.(5) Finally, we consider commitment multiplication proofs, which allow to prove a multiplicative relation among three commitments, and which play a crucial role in computationally secure MPC.We study a non-interactive solution which works in a distributed-verifier setting and essentially consists of a few executions of Pedersen's VSS.We simplify and improve the protocol, and we point out a (previously overlooked) property which helps to construct non-interactive proofs of partial knowledge in this setting.This allows for instance to prove the knowledge of ℓ out of m given secrets, without revealing which ones.We also construct a noninteractive distributed-verifier proof of circuit satisfiability, which-in principle-allows to prove anything that can be proven without giving away the proof.

•Jan 1, 2003•2 citations
In a k-threshold secret sharing scheme, a dealer who holds a secret s distributes parts of this secret (the shares) to n players; If k or more of these players pool their shares, they are able to determine s, but if less than k of them pool their shares, they cannot infer any information on s. In 1979, Shamir introduced such a scheme, based on polynomial interpolation in a finite field. This scheme is widely used in other cryptographic protocols, because it is simple, elegant and above all information-theoretically secure. There are a few proofs of the scheme's security, but to our knowledge, none of them is entirely based on the information-theoretical entropy function introduced by Shannon in 1948. We propose such a demonstration.
Secret sharing is an instrumental tool for sharing secret keys in distributed systems. In a classical threshold setting, this involves a dealer who has a secret/key, a set of parties/users to which shares of the secret are sent, and a threshold on the number of users whose presence is needed in order to recover the secret. In secret sharing, secure links with no leakage are often assumed between the involved parties. However, when the users are nodes in a communication network and all the links are physical links, e.g., wireless, such assumptions are not valid anymore. In order to study this critical problem, we propose a statistical leakage model of secret sharing, where some noisy versions of all the secret shares might be independently leaked to an adversary. We then study the resilience of the seminal Shamir's secret sharing scheme with statistical leakage, and bound certain measures of security (i.e., semantic security, mutual information security), given other parameters of the system including the amount of leakage from each secret share. We show that for an extreme scenario of Shamir's scheme, in particular when the underlying field characteristic is 2, the security of each bit of the secret against leakage improves exponentially with the number of users. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards understanding secret sharing under general statistical noisy leakage.
Shamir's (n, k) threshold secret sharing is an important component of several cryptographic protocols, such as those for secure multiparty-computation, key management, and Byzantine agreement. These protocols typically assume the presence of direct communication links from the dealer to all participants, in which case, the dealer can directly pass the shares of the secret to each participant. In this paper, we consider the problem of secret sharing when the dealer does not have direct links to all the participants, and instead, the dealer and the participants form a general network. We present an efficient and distributed algorithm for secret sharing over general networks that satisfy what we call the k-propagating-dealer condition. We derive information-theoretic lower bounds on the communication complexity of secret sharing over any network, which may also be of independent interest. We show that for networks satisfying the k-propagating-dealer condition, the communication complexity of our algorithm is {\Theta}(n), and furthermore, is a constant factor away from the lower bounds. We also show that, in contrast, the existing solution entails a communication-complexity that is super-linear for a wide class of networks, and is {\Theta}(n^2) in the worst case. Moreover, the amount of randomness required under our algorithm is a constant, while that required under the existing solution increases with n for a large class of networks, and in particular, is {\Theta}(n) whenever the degree of the dealer is bounded. Finally, while the existing solution requires considerable coordination in the network and knowledge of the global topology, our algorithm is completely distributed and requires each node to know only the identities of its neighbours. Our algorithm thus allows for efficient generalization of several cryptographic protocols to a large class of general networks.
We study secret sharing schemes for general (non-threshold) access structures. A general secret sharing scheme for n parties is associated to a monotone function F:{0,1}n→{0,1}. In such a scheme, a dealer distributes shares of a secret s among n parties. Any subset of parties T ⊆ [n] should be able to put together their shares and reconstruct the secret s if F(T)=1, and should have no information about s if F(T)=0. One of the major long-standing questions in information-theoretic cryptography is to minimize the (total) size of the shares in a secret-sharing scheme for arbitrary monotone functions F.
Function secret sharing (FSS) is a cryptographic primitive that is introduced by Boyle et al. (Eurocrypt 2015), motivated by application scenarios involving private access to large distributed data while minimising the overhead of communication, for example, private information retrieval. Informally, an n-party FSS scheme splits a function f into n functions f1,...,fnsuch that f = f1+...+ fnand every strict subset of the function shares hide f . Most of the known FSS constructions only have computational hiding, namely, the hiding property holds only against a computationally bounded adversary. We consider information-theoretic hiding in this work while allowing f to be recovered from t function shares and correspondingly, any (t - 1) function shares unconditionally hide f . Call it (t, n)-threshold function secret sharing ((t, n)-TFSS for short). Using information-theoretic tools and through a series of optimizations, we show that our (t, n)-TFSS have better performance than FSS in terms of communication complexity, a criterion that measures the efficiency of such protocols. Specifically, a (t, n)-TFSS scheme with communication complexity O(l) is designed in this paper and it is better than the existing FSS schemes with lowest communication complexity O(λl), where λ is the length of pseudo-random generator's seeds. In addition, the (t, n)-TFSS have an extra robustness property in the sense that even if up to (n - t) function shares are not available, the protocol still computes the function value at a given point correctly.
While classically cryptography is concerned with the problem of private communication among two entities, say players, in modern cryptography multi-player protocols play an important role.And among these, it is probably fair to say that secret sharing, and its stronger version verifiable secret sharing (VSS), as well as multi-party computation (MPC) belong to the most appealing and/or useful ones.The former two are basic tools to achieve better robustness of cryptographic schemes against malfunction or misuse by "decentralizing" the security from one single to a whole group of individuals (captured by the term threshold cryptography).The latter allows-at least in principle-to execute any collaboration among a group of players in a secure way that guarantees the correctness of the outcome but simultaneously respects the privacy of the participants.In this work, we study three aspects of secret sharing, VSS and MPC, which we denote by fundamentals, generality, and efficiency.By fundamentals we mean the quest for understanding why a protocol works and is secure in abstract (and hopefully simple) mathematical terms.By generality we mean generality with respect to the underlying mathematical structure, in other words, minimizing the mathematical axioms required to do some task.And efficiency of course deals with the improvement of protocols with respect to some meaningful complexity measure.We briefly summarize our main results.(1) We give a complete characterization of blackbox secret sharing in terms of simple algebraic conditions on the integer sharing coefficients, and we propose a black-box secret sharing scheme with minimal expansion factor.Note that, in contrast to the classical field-based secret sharing schemes, a black-box secret sharing scheme allows to share a secret sampled from an arbitrary Abelian group and requires only black-box access to the group operations and to random group elements.Such a scheme may be very useful in the construction of threshold cryptosystems based on groups with secret order (like RSA).(2) We show that without loss of efficiency, MPC can be based on arbitrary finite rings.This is in sharp contrast to the literature where essentially all MPC protocols require a much stronger mathematical structure, namely a field.Apart from its theoretical value, this can lead to efficiency improvements since it allows a greater freedom in the (mathematical) representation of the task that needs to be securely executed.(3) We propose a unified treatment of perfectly secure linear VSS and distributed commitments (a weaker version of the former), and we show that the security of such a scheme can be reduced to a linear algebra condition.The security of all known schemes follows as corollaries whose proofs are pure linear algebra arguments, in contrast v to some hybrid arguments used in the literature.(4) We construct a new unconditionally secure VSS scheme with minimized reconstruction complexity in the setting of a dishonest minority.This improves on the reconstruction complexity of the previously best known scheme without affecting the (asymptotic) complexity of the sharing phase.In the context of MPC with pre-processing, our scheme allows to improve the computation phase of earlier protocols without increasing the complexity of the pre-processing.(5) Finally, we consider commitment multiplication proofs, which allow to prove a multiplicative relation among three commitments, and which play a crucial role in computationally secure MPC.We study a non-interactive solution which works in a distributed-verifier setting and essentially consists of a few executions of Pedersen's VSS.We simplify and improve the protocol, and we point out a (previously overlooked) property which helps to construct non-interactive proofs of partial knowledge in this setting.This allows for instance to prove the knowledge of ℓ out of m given secrets, without revealing which ones.We also construct a noninteractive distributed-verifier proof of circuit satisfiability, which-in principle-allows to prove anything that can be proven without giving away the proof.