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NeuroQuantology

Quantum Decision-making in Newcomb’s Problem: Effect of Reward Size

Nobuye Ishibashi-Ohmura, Taiki Takahashi

Published Jun 22, 2015• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

This study experimentally examined people’s decision making in the Newcomb’s problem. We observed that Savage’s sure-thing principle and Kolmogorovian law of probability was violated. Also, the degree of the violation increased as the reward size increased. By adopting quantum decision theory, we further quantified interference effect as a quantum phase factor. The quantum phase also depended on the reward size; i.e., it increased as the reward size in the unknown box in the Newcomb’s problem increased. Future directions in the application of the present theory to studies in quantum decision theory and neuroeconomics are discussed.

DOI
10.14704/nq.2015.13.3.857

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This study experimentally examined people’s decision making in the Newcomb’s problem. We observed that Savage’s sure-thing principle and Kolmogorovian law of probability was violated. Also, the degree of the violation increased as the reward size increased. By adopting quantum decision theory, we further quantified interference effect as a quantum phase factor. The quantum phase also depended on the reward size; i.e., it increased as the reward size in the unknown box in the Newcomb’s problem increased. Future directions in the application of the present theory to studies in quantum decision theory and neuroeconomics are discussed.
Recent work in cognitive psychology has revealed that quantum probability theory provides another method of computing probabilities without falling into the restrictions that classical probability has in regard to modeling cognitive systems and decision-making. This enables the explanation of paradoxical scenarios that are difficult, or even impossible, to explain through classical probability theory. In this work, we perform an overview of the most important quantum models in the literature that are used to make predictions under scenarios where the Sure Thing Principle is being violated (the Quantum-Like Approach, the Quantum Dynamical Model, the Quantum Prospect Theory and Quantum-Like Bayesian Networks). We evaluated these models in terms of three metrics: interference effects, parameter tuning and scalability. The first examines if the analyzed model makes use of any type of quantum interference to explain human decision-making. The second is concerned with the assignment of values to a large number of quantum parameters. The last one consists of analyzing the ability of the models to be extended and generalized to more complex scenarios. We also studied the growth of the quantum parameters when the complexity and the levels of uncertainty of the decision scenario increase. Finally, we compared these quantum models with traditional classical models from the literature. We conclude with a discussion of the manner in which the models addressed in this paper can only deal with very small decision problems and why they do not scale well to larger, more complex decision scenarios.
Two experimental tasks in psychology, the two-stage gambling game and the Prisoner's Dilemma game, show that people violate the sure thing principle of decision theory. These paradoxical findings have resisted explanation by classical decision theory for over a decade. A quantum probability model, based on a Hilbert space representation and Schrödinger's equation, provides a simple and elegant explanation for this behaviour. The quantum model is compared with an equivalent Markov model and it is shown that the latter is unable to account for violations of the sure thing principle. Accordingly, it is argued that quantum probability provides a better framework for modelling human decision-making.
One of the most complex systems is the human brain whose formalized functioning is characterized by decision theory. We present a "Quantum Decision Theory" of decision-making, based on the mathematical theory of separable Hilbert spaces. This mathematical structure captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions, which allows us to explain a variety of interesting fallacies and anomalies that have been reported to particularize the decision-making of real human beings. The theory describes entangled decision-making, non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, and intention interference of composite prospects. We demonstrate how the violation of the Savage's sure-thing principle (disjunction effect) can be explained as a result of the interference of intentions, when making decisions under uncertainty. The conjunction fallacy is also explained by the presence of the interference terms. We demonstrate that all known anomalies and paradoxes, documented in the context of classical decision theory, are reducible to just a few mathematical archetypes, all of which allow the finding of straightforward explanations in the frame of the developed quantum approach.
The expected utility hypothesis is one of the building blocks of classical economic theory and founded on Savage's Sure-Thing Principle. It has been put forward, e.g. by situations such as the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, that real-life situations can violate Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and hence also expected utility. We analyze how this violation is connected to the presence of the 'disjunction effect' of decision theory and use our earlier study of this effect in concept theory to put forward an explanation of the violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle, namely the presence of 'quantum conceptual thought' next to 'classical logical thought' within a double layer structure of human thought during the decision process. Quantum conceptual thought can be modeled mathematically by the quantum mechanical formalism, which we illustrate by modeling the Hawaii problem situation, a well-known example of the disjunction effect, and we show how the dynamics in the Hawaii problem situation is generated by the whole conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation. We analyze the Ellsberg paradox situation, taking into account our hypothesis of the presence of quantum conceptual thought. We put forward a model for the conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation of the Ellsberg paradox by making use of the data we gathered by conducting an experimental test of the Ellsberg paradox situation. We show how this gives rise to the violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and explain its dynamics.
Recent advances in behavioral economics and quantum cognition and decision elucidated a number of deviations of actual human decisions and choices from mathematical principles of normative decision theory, which are referred to as “anomalies”. One of the prominent anomalies is that the violations of Savage’s sure-thing principle, which is the fundamental axiom of the rational theory of decision under uncertainty. It states that if prospect x is preferred to y knowing that Event A occurred, and if x is preferred to y knowing that A did not occur, then x should be preferred to y even when it is not known whether A occurred. I explicitly derive an inequality for testing the violations of Savage’s principle in behavioral experiments on decision under uncertainty. The derivation suggests that the violation of Savage’s sure-thing principle may be due to the violation of the rule of complementarity in probability theory. Future applications for behavioral and neuro- economics and quantum cognition and decision theory are discussed.
FINDING: Human decision-making under uncertainty violates classical probability axioms and is better modeled by quantum probability theory — specifically non-commutative Hilbert space formalism with interference terms. MATH: - Classical (Kolmogorov) probability: P(A∪B) = P(A) + P(B) − P(A∩B); total probability law holds - Quantum probability: P(A) = |⟨ψ|A|ψ⟩|²; events as projection operators; non-commutativity [A,B] ≠ 0 - Interference term: P(A∪B) = P(A) + P(B) + 2√(P(A)P(B))·cos(θ) — the cos(θ) term has no classical analogue - Order effects: P(A then B) ≠ P(B then A) when projectors don't commute - Disjunction effect (Tversky-Shafir): P(A) > P(A∧B) + P(A∧¬B) — violates sure-thing principle - Social agent model (arXiv 1202.4918): quantum probabilities with entanglement-like correlations between agents; decision probability P_i = Tr(ρ·Π_i) where ρ is a joint density matrix CONNECTION: - The interference term cos(θ) introduces phase angles — the same mathematical structure underlying c Author: Andrew Stewart Caldin, Independent Researcher, UK. Part of the E8 Intelligence Research series. Platform: e8intelligence.com