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QUANTUM STRUCTURE IN ECONOMICS: RISK VERSUS AMBIGUITY

Diederik Aerts, Jan Broekaert, Bart D’Hooghe, Sandro Sozzo

Published Dec 1, 2011• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The expected utility hypothesis is one of the building blocks of classical economic theory and founded on Savage's Sure-Thing Principle. It has been put forward, e.g. by situations such as the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, that real-life situations can violate Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and hence also expected utility. We analyze how this violation is connected to the presence of the 'disjunction effect' of decision theory and use our earlier study of this effect in concept theory to put forward an explanation of the violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle, namely the presence of 'quantum conceptual thought' next to 'classical logical thought' within a double layer structure of human thought during the decision process. Quantum conceptual thought can be modeled mathematically by the quantum mechanical formalism, which we illustrate by modeling the Hawaii problem situation, a well-known example of the disjunction effect, and we show how the dynamics in the Hawaii problem situation is generated by the whole conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation. We analyze the Ellsberg paradox situation, taking into account our hypothesis of the presence of quantum conceptual thought. We put forward a model for the conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation of the Ellsberg paradox by making use of the data we gathered by conducting an experimental test of the Ellsberg paradox situation. We show how this gives rise to the violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and explain its dynamics.

DOI
10.1142/9789814383080_0014

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The expected utility hypothesis is one of the building blocks of classical economic theory and founded on Savage's Sure-Thing Principle. It has been put forward, e.g. by situations such as the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, that real-life situations can violate Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and hence also expected utility. We analyze how this violation is connected to the presence of the 'disjunction effect' of decision theory and use our earlier study of this effect in concept theory to put forward an explanation of the violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle, namely the presence of 'quantum conceptual thought' next to 'classical logical thought' within a double layer structure of human thought during the decision process. Quantum conceptual thought can be modeled mathematically by the quantum mechanical formalism, which we illustrate by modeling the Hawaii problem situation, a well-known example of the disjunction effect, and we show how the dynamics in the Hawaii problem situation is generated by the whole conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation. We analyze the Ellsberg paradox situation, taking into account our hypothesis of the presence of quantum conceptual thought. We put forward a model for the conceptual landscape surrounding the decision situation of the Ellsberg paradox by making use of the data we gathered by conducting an experimental test of the Ellsberg paradox situation. We show how this gives rise to the violation of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle and explain its dynamics.
The expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions, as shown by the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes. The popular explanation in terms of ambiguity aversion is not completely accepted. As a consequence, uncertainty is still problematical in economics. To overcome these difficulties a distinction between risk and ambiguity has been introduced which depends on the existence of a Kolmogorovian probabilistic structure modeling these uncertainties. On the other hand, evidence of everyday life suggests that context plays a fundamental role in human decisions under uncertainty. Moreover, it is well known from physics that any probabilistic structure modeling contextual interactions between entities structurally needs a non-Kolmogorovian framework admitting a quantum-like representation. For this reason, we have recently introduced a notion of contextual risk to mathematically capture situations in which ambiguity occurs. We prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and elaborate a sphere model within our hidden measurement formalism which reveals that it is the overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human decisions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox. This result points to the presence of a quantum conceptual layer in human thought which is superposed to the usually assumed classical logical layer, and conceptually supports the thesis of several authors suggesting the presence of quantum structure in economics and decision theory.
The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes show that the expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions.The popular explanation in terms of ambiguity aversion is not completely accepted.On the other hand, we have recently introduced a notion of contextual risk to mathematically capture what is known as ambiguity in the economics literature.Situations in which contextual risk occurs cannot be modeled by Kolmogorovian classical probabilistic structures, but a non-Kolmogorovian framework with a quantum-like structure is needed.We prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and elaborate a sphere model within our hidden measurement formalism which reveals that it is the overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human decisions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox.This result points to the presence of a quantum conceptual layer in human thought which is superposed to the usually assumed classical logical layer.
The broader scope of our investigations is the search for the way in which concepts and their combinations carry and influence meaning and what this implies for human thought. More specifically, we examine the use of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics as a modeling instrument and propose a general mathematical modeling scheme for the combinations of concepts. We point out that quantum mechanical principles, such as superposition and interference, are at the origin of specific effects in cognition related to concept combinations, such as the guppy effect and the overextension and underextension of membership weights of items. We work out a concrete quantum mechanical model for a large set of experimental data of membership weights with overextension and underextension of items with respect to the conjunction and disjunction of pairs of concepts, and show that no classical model is possible for these data. We put forward an explanation by linking the presence of quantum aspects that model concept combinations to the basic process of concept formation. We investigate the implications of our quantum modeling scheme for the structure of human thought, and show the presence of a two-layer structure consisting of a classical logical layer and a quantum conceptual layer. We consider connections between our findings and phenomena such as the disjunction effect and the conjunction fallacy in decision theory, violations of the sure thing principle, and the Allais and Elsberg paradoxes in economics.
One of the most complex systems is the human brain whose formalized functioning is characterized by decision theory. We present a "Quantum Decision Theory" of decision-making, based on the mathematical theory of separable Hilbert spaces. This mathematical structure captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions, which allows us to explain a variety of interesting fallacies and anomalies that have been reported to particularize the decision-making of real human beings. The theory describes entangled decision-making, non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, and intention interference of composite prospects. We demonstrate how the violation of the Savage's sure-thing principle (disjunction effect) can be explained as a result of the interference of intentions, when making decisions under uncertainty. The conjunction fallacy is also explained by the presence of the interference terms. We demonstrate that all known anomalies and paradoxes, documented in the context of classical decision theory, are reducible to just a few mathematical archetypes, all of which allow the finding of straightforward explanations in the frame of the developed quantum approach.
Empirical evidence has confirmed that quantum effects occur frequently also outside the microscopic domain, while quantum structures satisfactorily model various situations in several areas of science, including biological, cognitive and social processes. In this paper, we elaborate a quantum mechanical model which faithfully describes the Ellsberg paradox in economics, showing that the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is capable to represent the ambiguity present in this kind of situations, because of the presence of contextuality. Then, we analyze the data collected in a concrete experiment we performed on the Ellsberg paradox and work out a complete representation of them in complex Hilbert space. We prove that the presence of quantum structure is genuine, that is, interference and superposition in a complex Hilbert space are really necessary to describe the conceptual situation presented by Ellsberg. Moreover, our approach sheds light on 'ambiguity laden' decision processes in economics and decision theory, and allows to deal with different Ellsberg-type generalizations, e.g., the Machina paradox.
The core assumptions of modern economic utility theories such as rationality have been placed under scrutiny by recent studies in decision theory and behavioural economics and fi?nance. The main questions that were explored in these studies could be expressed as follows: do people always make rational choices? Do they make use of the normative rules of traditional logic and probability when dealing with risk and uncertainty? Are there any alternative methods to capture choices and reasoning when individuals are faced with uncertainty and risk? In this thesis I will elaborate on an interdisciplinary application of so-called QL (quantum-like) models to decision-making problems in ?finance and other socio-economic contexts. The core inquiry of this work is related to experimental tests of decision making with the help of investment related questions. Calculus and logic borrowed from quantum physics will be used to develop probabilistic models for the formation and evolution of decisions in ?finance context with the potential to generalize to other social decision- making settings. The main fi?ndings of this thesis can be summarized as follows: individuals exhibit preference reversals and context-dependent behaviour in different informational contexts. In particular, in condition of risk individuals exhibit uncertainty aversion and thus aversion to participating in other investment task, violating the postulates of classical probability theory. The core principle of rational (consequential) behaviour conceived by Savage (1954) [207], that is the "Savage Sure Thing" principle, was shown to be violated. In mathematical language, this violation is equivalent to the violation of the "Law of total probability". Implying contextuality of human judgement, different events cannot be jointly evaluated in a single probability space. Moreover, additional experimental fi?ndings showed that participants exhibited reference dependence in their risk attitudes depending on the preceding gain respective loss. These fi?ndings were statistically signi?cant and a quantum model for accommodating the above effects of contextual behaviour is introduced. A geometric depiction of the experimental fi?ndings was proposed. A so-called `state reconstruction' procedure from statistical data was performed via the inverse Born's rule (1926) [47], allowing the construction of a complete representation of agents' resolution from indeterminacy.